Summary
In Dickinson v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, 217 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1968), this Court held constitutionally invalid an Act which directed payment of compensation to an individual out of funds specifically appropriated to a county because the Act was passed without prior publication of notice or referendum.
Summary of this case from State ex Rel. City of Pompano Beach v. LewisOpinion
No. 36968.
December 18, 1968.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County, Ben C. Willis, J.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Larry Levy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.
Bolles, Goodwin, Ryskamp Ware, Miami, for appellee.
By appeal we have for review a final judgment which adjudicated the unconstitutionality of Chapter 67-677, Laws of Florida, 1967.
Our consideration of the matter is limited to the problem of the validity of the cited statute.
James Rubino, at the age of nine (9), sustained fatal injuries on April 8, 1963. He was injured while a student playing on the grounds of a Dade County elementary school. Subsequently, the Legislature enacted Chapter 67-677, Laws of Florida, 1967, entitled: "An Act for the relief of Edwin F. Rubino; making an appropriation to compensate him for medical expenses and damages resulting from the injuries and wrongful death of his minor son, James Frederick Rubino; providing an effective date."
Section 2 of the Act provides:
"The sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) is appropriated from funds due the board of public instruction of Dade county from the state treasury not specifically appropriated to a particular use to be paid to Edwin F. Rubino as compensation for medical expenses and other damages which he sustained as a result of the wrongful death of his son James Frederick Rubino."
By Section 3, the appellant, Comptroller Dickinson, was directed to draw a warrant in the sum of $5,000.00 "upon funds in the state treasury due the board of public instruction of Dade county not specifically appropriated to a particular use, * * *." The appellant, Treasurer Williams, was directed to pay the sum to appellant Rubino. Chapter 67-677, supra, became effective August 4, 1967.
Fla. Stat. § 236.075 (1967), F.S.A. creates in the office of the State Treasurer a "county school sales tax trust fund." It directs disbursement of the fund to the several county school funds on the basis of instruction units in each particular county. By subsection (3), effective July 1, 1967, the amount per instruction unit was increased to $1,050.00 for the purpose of providing the funds necessary to enable county boards of public instruction to meet required payments to certain teacher and employee retirement systems.
By chapter 67-300, Laws of Florida, 1967, Section 4, Item 2, the Legislature "appropriated" out of the general revenue fund an amount needed to meet the requirements of the "county school sales tax trust fund" established by § 236.075, supra.
The ultimate effect of the several statutes which we have summarized simply meant that the Legislature, by Chapter 67-677, supra, directed payment of $5,000.00 to Mr. Rubino out of funds appropriated to the use of Dade County schools and not specifically committed.
Chapter 67-677, supra, was a local law within the contemplation of Fla. Const. art. III, § 21, F.S.A. It was also a special law because it related to a particular person in connection with a specific situation in which that person was involved. It was a local law because it affected only Dade County and made an appropriation out of specific funds due to the schools of that county only. State ex rel. Gray v. Stoutamire, 131 Fla. 698, 179 So. 730 (1938).
Chapter 67-677, supra, was passed without prior publication of notice of its intended introduction. Alternatively, it had no provision for a referendum in the area affected. Fla. Const. art. III, § 21. The trial judge was of the view that when considered in isolation as a special and local law, the statute was necessarily invalid because of the failure to comply with the essential constitutional conditions precedent. We agree with this holding. Aside from any other aspects of constitutional weakness, the statute would necessarily fall on this ground alone.
We do not agree with appellant that a so-called "claim bill" of the nature involved is governed solely by Fla. Const. art. XVI, § 11, when the legislation deals with a particular locality as it did in the case at bar. We agree that all claim bills, general and local, must receive the approval of "two thirds of the members elected to each house of the Legislature" as required by art. XVI, § 11, supra. When the claim bill is also a local law, as it was here, it must be enacted pursuant to the requirements of art. III, § 21, supra, with reference to prior publication of notice or referendum.
The foregoing discussion disposes of the immediate problem. It, however, implies that Chapter 67-677, supra, would otherwise have been valid had it been enacted in accord with constitutional procedural requirements. In addition to the attack on this ground, the appellee Board of Public Instruction also assaulted the statute on the ground that it was purely a local act, applicable only to Dade County and inapplicable to any county other than Dade. They contend that the statute must, therefore, collapse under the proscriptions of the so-called Dade County Home Rule amendment. Fla. Const. art. VIII, § 11(5), (6), and (9). As we have done on other occasions, we concur in the view that in matters which affect only Dade County, and which are not the subject of specific constitutional provisions or valid general acts pertaining to Dade County and at least one other county, the electors of Dade County may "govern themselves autonomously and differently than the people of other counties of the state." S J Transportation, Inc. v. Gordon, 176 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1965). In the cited opinion we announced the view that a reasonable construction of the constitutional scheme formulated for the government of Dade County alone suggests that the Legislature "no longer has authority to enact laws which relate only" to the affairs of Dade County. Indeed, the view which we announced in the last cited case expresses the very essence of so-called "home rule government." Consistent with this view it appears to us that in regard to matters of the nature under consideration, the people of Dade County have adequate authority through the referendum process to make provision in their Home Rule Charter for meeting moral obligations of this type. Actually, in so doing they would be following a course little different than if they were required to pursue a constitutional referendum on a local law. The trial judge expressed concern that in the absence of some alternative procedure, a strict application of the Dade County Home Rule amendment might make it impossible to provide for compensation to claimants justly entitled to relief in that particular county. What we have last written precludes the possibility of such an injustice or inequality.
We have not overlooked our decision on Bonvento v. Board of Public Instruction, 194 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1967). We there dealt with a local act applicable to Palm Beach County. We held that a claim of the nature here involved could be paid out of the county school fund when properly authorized. We also held that the notice of intent to introduce the act had been properly published. We deal here with problems which were not involved in the Palm Beach decision. We do not recede therefrom; we merely distinguish it.
For reasons herein announced, the final judgment adjudicating the invalidity of Chapter 67-677, supra, is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
CALDWELL, C.J., and THOMAS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
DREW, J., concurs in judgment with opinion.
HOPPING, J., concurs in judgment and agrees with DREW, J.,
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.
I find it quite impossible to reconcile the views expressed in the majority opinion with the decision of this Court in Bonvento v. Board of Public Instruction, Fla. 1967, 194 So.2d 605. The decision in Bonvento upholds the acts of the Legislature of this State in giving $50,000 of the school funds of Palm Beach County to a student injured in the public schools of that County while this case rejects a similar act of the Legislature awarding $5,000 out of the public school funds of Dade County to a Dade County student injured in the public schools of that County. This result is exactly what I feared would arise out of the decision in Bonvento. In the concluding paragraph of my dissent in that case I inquired "[i]f we uphold this legislation, what is the limit upon the powers of the Legislature in the appropriation of public funds? What becomes of the checks and balances in government we so often speak of and, finally, by what constitutional standards can such legislation ever be judged?"
The Constitution of this State does not in my opinion authorize or empower the Legislature to give away the public funds of the State to persons it deems entitled to them for injuries which they have received because of the allegedly negligent act of the State or its subdivisions in the absence of a prior determination of legal liability made pursuant to a general law enacted in accordance with the provisions of Section 22 of Article III of the Constitution. The cornerstone of the majority decision in this case is, as I understand it, the false assumption that the failure to either advertise intention to apply for this legislation or to attach thereto an appropriate referendum was in itself sufficient to require that the act be stricken on constitutional grounds. I say this because in the decision, after referring to such legislation as a "local act," it recites: "aside from any other aspects of constitutional weakness, the statute would necessarily fall on this ground alone." Surely this conclusion cannot under any theory be reconciled with the decision in Bonvento. In commenting on Bonvento the majority say we there held "that the notice of intent to introduce the act had been properly published." The quoted language, in my judgment, was not justified in Bonvento. In the first place, the Bonvento decision expressly recognizes the fact that the trial judge in that case disregarded the challenge to the act on this ground and after so stating concluded with the mere observation "we will notice it but only to remark that an examination of the notice convinces us it conforms to our many expressions on the subject." This last observation does not even attain the dignity of obiter. Moreover, the dissenting opinion in that case quoted at length the disclosures of the Journal with reference to the progress of this bill through the Legislature, and sets forth in detail the advertisement. There can be no doubt whatever that the bills advertised were not the bills passed by the Legislature. The bills actually passed in the Legislature were passed purely as claims bills under the Constitution by a constitutional 2/3 vote and appeared in the statutes as general laws. There was not even a pretense that they were considered as special or local acts. The majority decision here therefore flies directly in the face of the decision in the Bonvento case on this point. It is also pertinent to observe that the act involved in this case was never considered to be a special or local law by any party connected with its introduction or passage. It was treated as a claims bill under the Constitution and enacted as such. This fact is confirmed by the disclosures of the Journals of the Legislature.
Journal of the House of Representatives, May 25, 1967, page 691:
"Your Committee on Rules Calendar herewith submits, as the Special Order Calendar under Rule 8.16 for Thursday, May 25, 1967, immediately following consideration of bills of a local nature, the consideration of the following bills together with their companion measures: * * *
HB 1215 Claim Bill"
Journal of the House of Representatives, May 25, 1967, page 707:
"HB 1215 — A bill to be entitled An act for the relief of Edwin F. Rubino; making an appropriation to compensate him for medical expenses and damages resulting from the injuries and wrongful death of his minor son, James Frederick Rubino; providing an effective date.
— was taken up.
On motion by Mr. Lewis, the rules were waived and HB 1215 was read the second time by title.
The Committee on Claims offered the following amendment:
In Section 2, on page 1, strike "the sum of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00)" and insert "the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00)"
Mr. Lewis moved the adoption of the amendment which was adopted. * * *
On motion by Mr. Lewis, the rules were waived and HB 1215, as amended, was read the third time in full and passed, as amended, by the required Constitutional two-thirds vote of all Members elected to the House."
Journal of the Senate, July 11, 1967:
"CLAIM BILL
SB 1071 was taken up, and unanimous consent was granted Senator Weissenborn to substitute HB 1215 in lieu thereof.
HB 1215 — * * *
On motions by Senator Weissenborn, the rules were waived and HB 1215 was read the second time by title, the third time in full and passed, title as stated, by the required Constitutional two-thirds vote of all members elected to the Senate." (E.S.)
The legislative acts in the Bonvento case, after introduction as local bills, were amended, thereafter considered as claims bills and enacted as claims bills. In the Bonvento case the appropriation of $50,000 was "from the general county school fund of the county in favor of John Bonvento" while in this case the appropriation of $5,000 was "from funds due the board of public instruction of Dade county * * * not specifically appropriated to a particular use to be paid to Edwin F. Rubino * * *." The language used in these claims bills emphasized the fact that both bills were prepared and enacted as claims bills, that both bills directed the payment of school funds of the county and the fact that both injuries were to students for damages sustained by virtue of certain alleged negligent acts occurring in the public schools without previous adjudication of liability or damages.
There is another matter discussed in the majority opinion and a conclusion reached there with which I cannot agree. Moreover, I find no precedent in this State for it. As I understand the opinion, it holds that any claim bill under Section 11, Article XVI of the Constitution relating "to a particular person in connection with a specific situation in which that person was involved" and affecting only one county, payable out of county funds, is a local act in contemplation of Section 21 of Article III of the Florida Constitution and that such claim bill may not be lawfully enacted without prior advertisement or having attached thereto a referendum. This holding would require every claims bill enacted under the provisions of Section 11, Article XVI of the Constitution not payable out of the general revenue fund or the funds of some state agency to be enacted as a local law and to be passed by two-thirds vote of the members of the House and Senate. I do not believe this conclusion is authorized even if payment of tort claims is permissible under the Constitution. For the reasons pointed out in my dissent in Bonvento, I do not think such claims are within the contemplation of the Constitution.
Sec. 21, Art. III of the Constitution requires that the Journals of the Senate and House recite the fact that notice of intention to apply for such legislation was published. Rarely, if ever, do these relief acts (even when payable out of local funds) appear to have been published. See, for instance, the bills passed by the 1963 Legislature listed on page 839 of Vol. 1 of Gen. Acts of 1963 and those listed on pages 935-936, Vol. 1 (part 2) Gen. Acts of 1967 (Regular Session).
I also read the majority opinion as holding that no claims bill, whether advertised or not or whether enacted pursuant to the constitutional provision, may be passed by the Legislature where it "related to a particular person in connection with a specific situation in which that person was involved" and is payable out of the funds of Dade County. I do not feel this conclusion is justified. The Dade County Home Rule Amendment is a part of the Constitution and must be construed along with Article XVI, Section 11 and Article III, Section 22. Effect can be given to all these provisions of the Constitution without doing violence to any of them.
In conclusion I again say as I said in Bonvento that in my judgment — in spite of the fact that the Legislature has for years treated the matter otherwise — there is no constitutional, nor for that matter rational, basis upon which public funds of this State can be parceled out by the Legislature for injuries to individuals arising out of alleged negligence of the State or its subdivisions without previous adjudication of the questions of liability and damages by the courts pursuant to general law enacted for that purpose under Section 22 of Article III. When the people wrote into the Constitution this provision for bringing suit against the State, under elemental rules of constitutional construction it precluded the Legislature from accomplishing the same result in any other way — expressio unius est exclusio alterius. This is a profoundly important question. This practice of the Legislature, which according to my research has, like Topsy, just "growed", should not continue. If the State is to be liable for the tortious acts of its agents, such liability should be determined and damages fixed in an orderly judicial proceeding so that all citizens would be treated alike. As it is now, this is simply not being done and to continue to require the citizen to beg for relief, and accept whatever may be offered, will only breed disrespect for government and could eventually result in fiscal chaos.
In referring to Sec. 11, Art. XVI this Court, in a concurring opinion by Justices Terrell and Whitfield in the case of Amos v. Mathews (1930), 99 Fla. 65, 126 So. 308 (text page 334) said: "Both these classes of claims are personal; the first for extra compensation on an authorized contract, and the second for compensation on an unauthorized contract."
For the above reasons, as well as those set forth in my dissent in Bonvento, and not for the reasons given in the majority opinion, I concur in the judgment only.
HOPPING, J., concurs.
I feel compelled to dissent from the majority view that Chapter 67-677, Laws of Florida, 1967, is unconstitutional for the reason that the Act is governed by the procedural requirements of Section 21, Article III, which requirements were admittedly not complied with in the present case. I further dissent from the view announced by the majority that claim acts may run afoul of the proscriptions of the so-called Dade County Home Rule Amendment. Florida Constitution, Section 11, Article VIII.
At the outset, I think it is clear from prior decisions of this Court that not all laws which have local or special impact or character are subject to the procedural requirements of Section 21, Article III. Discussing the authority of the Legislature pursuant to Section 24, Article V, to establish a criminal court of record for a county independently of the requirements of Section 21, Article III, this Court, in State ex rel. Cohen v. O'Neal (1930), 100 Fla. 1277, 131 So. 165, 166, stated:
"* * * All local laws that are not forbidden by section 20, art. 3, may not be subject to the proviso to section 21, art. 3, Constitution. Other sections of the Constitution might expressly or impliedly provide otherwise. See State ex rel. [McQuaid] v. County Com'rs, 23 Fla. 483, 3 So. 193. There may be other classes of permissible local laws affecting state functions and purposes that are not intended by the Constitution to be governed by the proviso to section 21, art. 3, Constitution, for example, the establishment of courts, state instrumentalities, etc. In so far as chapter 11363 establishes a criminal court of record in Palm Beach county, it is not forbidden by section 20, art. 3, Constitution. The establishment of a criminal court of record is not among the inherent or implied powers of the Legislature. Local laws enacted under the inherent powers of the Legislature may be controlled by sections 20 and 21, art. 3, Constitution unless otherwise expressly or impliedly provided by some provision of the Constitution, and express powers to enact local laws may be subject to the proviso to section 21, art. 3, unless the grant of the power expressly or impliedly provides other-wise. Section 24, art. 5, Constitution, expressly and specifically authorizes the Legislature to establish a criminal court of record in any county 'upon application of a majority of the registered voters in such' county. This provision necessarily contemplates the establishment of criminal courts of record by local laws; and section 20, art. 3, does not forbid local laws establishing courts. Section 24, art. 5, may fairly be regarded as granting complete specific authority to severally establish criminal courts of record, and as prescribing the only condition for enacting laws establishing such courts, notwithstanding the proviso to section 21, art. 3, section 23, c. 483. This express grant of power to establish a criminal court of record reasonably may be held to indicate an organic intent that the specifically granted authority shall be exercised upon compliance with the sole condition stated in the section, viz. 'upon application of a majority of the registered voters in' a county, without a publication of notice of the proposed local law required by section 21, art. 3, of the Constitution * * *."
In my view, a similar approach is called for in the treatment and construction of the claim bill procedure authorized by Section 11, Article XVI of the State Constitution. An act passed in conformity with this constitutional provision is inherently special, and often local in its impact and character since the benefits flowing from such act ordinarily accrue to a particular person or entity. However, as in the case of other powers conferred upon the Legislature by express constitutional grant, I believe it reasonable to view Section 11, Article XVI as indicating an organic intent that the authority thereby expressly conferred is autonomous and exercisable upon compliance with the conditions and limitations contained in that section.
The majority opinion concludes that Chapter 67-677 as a "claim bill" assumed that degree of local law character contemplated by Section 21, Article III because the warrant for payment of the claim was authorized to be drawn "upon funds in the state treasury due the board of public instruction of Dade county not specifically appropriated to a particular use." In this context, I believe the majority are hardpressed for reason and precedent to justify the conclusion that the diversion of state funds previously appropriated for school purposes in a particular county to pay a claim recognized as a moral obligation of the State in a relief act is in reality a local law enactment.
Where the Legislature merely diverts State funds previously appropriated for public school purposes in a particular county, with the result that such diverted funds are committed by the Legislature for the accomplishment of another valid and authorized state purpose, I think such diversion is only incidentally local in operation; does not detract from the primary objective, namely, recognition of a moral obligation of the State in a claims act, and is not within the intended meaning of Section 21, Article III. Political subdivisions of the State are its creatures and have no constitutionally vested right to retain State funds allocated to them, and such funds that have not been committed by contract may be withdrawn or diverted by general law at any later legislative session for another purpose since the Legislature's power is plenary in this regard. See State ex rel. Harrell v. Cone (Fla.), 130 Fla. 158, 177 So. 854, text 857, 858.
In State ex rel. Gray v. Stoutamire, 131 Fla. 698, 179 So. 730, this Court commented on the nature of special or local laws as follows:
The terms 'special or local laws' as used in the Constitution refer ordinarily to law relating to entities, interests, rights, and functions other than those of the State, since the organic law does not contemplate or require previous publication of notice of proposed laws for the exercise of State powers and functions though they may be more or less local or special in their operation or objects. For example, the establishment of counties and of courts authorized by the Constitution, fixing the terms of courts of the State, the creation of offices, the disposition of State funds and property, and many other attributes of sovereignty." (Emphasis supplied.) (Text 733.)
It is common knowledge that the Legislature has always treated claim or relief bills as general bills rather than local bills. Local bills, with few exceptions, are placed on the local bill calendar without reference to a committee for study and recommendation. Claim bills are always referred to claims committees for study and recommendation. The footnotes to Justice Drew's concurring opinion in this case delineate the progress of the claim bill that became Chapter 67-677. They reflect that a claim bill is handled as a general bill through committees and to pass must receive the extra constitutionally required two-thirds vote of the elected members of each house.
Claim bills are enacted to satisfy moral obligations of the State, its agencies or political subdivisions. Claims against the State are referred to as moral obligations because sovereign immunity precludes suit thereon as legal claims absent legislative consent. Such obligations represent state subjects and require general legislation for their satisfaction, although ordinarily a particular person or entity in some locality is the recipient of claim relief. Such obligations may arise, and often do, from a local incident, accident or injury flowing from some state related activity. Often relief acts are paid from special funds irrespective of whether they are devoted to a general or a local purpose, rather than from the State's General Fund, depending upon the origin of the claim or the State agency or subdivision held accountable. But the fact that monies from a particular fund are appropriated for the payment of a claim recognized as a moral obligation of the State does not convert the general legislation authorizing payment into a special or local act. Once a claim is recognized as a state obligation by passage of a claim bill, the incidental requirement therein that it be paid from a particular fund — perhaps from the funds of a political subdivision — does not convert the relief act into local legislation. See Kaulakis v. Boyd (Fla.), 138 So.2d 505.
It would greatly handicap the Legislature in following its traditional policy of satisfying the State's moral obligations through the medium of claim bills if prior publication of notice of intention to introduce those having some local impact were required. Not infrequently a claim bill is introduced providing for the claim to be paid from the State's General Fund, but the claims committee decides the equities of the claim are such that it should be paid from a state agency's funds or from state funds locally allocated, or from local funds of a political subdivision of the State, and amends the bill accordingly. Under the majority opinion such an amendment relating to funds of a political subdivision often would be constitutionally impermissible during the session, there being no timely prior publication of intent to introduce such an enactment. Other examples come to mind which would hamper legislative discharge of claims if prior publication of the claims legislation was required; namely, claim payments proposed to be made from local and state matching funds, claims arising from dual state and local activity, and claims which could be paid either from state or local funds, or both.
Section 11 of Article XVI, and Section 22, Article III of the State Constitution, read together, clearly indicate claims against the State, its agencies and political subdivisions, are state subjects or purposes and if resort is made to legislation to obtain relief, a general, rather than a local law is constitutionally contemplated. Section 22, Article III grants permissive authority to lift sovereign immunity "by general law for bringing suit against the State as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating." (Emphasis added.) Section 11 of Article XVI permits the Legislature to directly appropriate or pay without prior adjudication in a legislatively authorized suit "any claim, the subject matter of which shall not have been provided for by pre-existing laws," provided the claim bill therefor is passed by the two-thirds vote of each house. A fair conclusion to be drawn from these sections is that any claim or liability attributable to the State may be satisfied either by general legislation authorizing suit or making a direct appropriation.
Turning now to the question whether the Dade County Home Rule Amendment, Section 11, Article XVI, State Constitution, affects the validity of Chapter 67-677, I find it has no effect because Chapter 67-677 relates to a claim made against the State growing out of the operation of the public school system, a state purpose, rather than against Dade County in its metro capacity; which claim under the Constitution is subject to satisfaction only pursuant to authority of a general law. In Kaulakis v. Boyd (Fla.), 138 So.2d 505, we considered a case involving a personal injury action against Dade County. In disallowing the action, we said:
"Counties, unlike municipalities, are organized as political subdivisions of the state and constitute a part of the machinery of the state government. Therefore, it has been held that they partake of the sovereign immunity from liability. * * * Consequently, unless it can be said that the home rule amendment removes Dade County from the operation of Article III, Section 22 of the Constitution, the county is immune from tort liability, in the absence of a general statute * * *. No such general statute is involved in this case.
* * * * * *
"Appellant relies on paragraph (9) of Section 11 of Article VIII wherein it is declared to be the intent * * * to provide 'home rule for the people of Dade County in local affairs' * * *. It is his position that since the funds which would be used in satisfaction of a judgment in his favor are county funds, the matter of immunity from tort liability involves essentially 'local affairs'. The complete answer to this argument is that by virtue of Article III, Section 22 of the Constitution, immunity from suit is not a matter of local concern but must be dealt with by general law only. * * *" (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing quotation not only is decisive of the question herein concerning the Dade County home rule amendment, but in its broader implications answers questions in this case concerning whether local legislation and the constitutional rules relating to local legislation have any application to a claim act involving funds of a political subdivision of the state. The answer is in the negative.
I do not subscribe to the views expressed in the majority and concurring opinions that further restraints are in order and intended by the Constitution than have been recognized in the past by the Legislature during the existence of the 1885 State Constitution in the enactment of claim bills. Assuming arguendo that abolishment of sovereign immunity and granting general permission of suit against the State similarly as in the case of municipalities would be a salutary reform, there is little reason before realization for rendering it more difficult for citizens to obtain satisfaction of moral obligations through legislative enactments by requiring prior publication of intention to introduce claim bills that have local impact or characteristics.
The policy of handling claim bills as general legislation when state political subdivisions or their funds are involved has not drawn widespread criticism. The Constitution reposes confidence in the good judgment and fair dealing qualities of legislative members (who represent not only state but local interests, also) in the discharge of moral obligations of the state through general legislation. The practical problems incident to processing of claims by the Legislature dictated that general legislation be employed rather than local legislation, which latter is hobbled with procedural restraints that would render it difficult for the Legislature to fit the relief and the accountability for claims appropriately in many situations.
It seems to me the better course is not to judicially innovate in this long-followed general legislation claims policy unless and until the Constitution is revised to permit innovations.