Opinion
No. 379, 2001
Decided: March 5, 2002
Court Below-Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Kent County Cr. No. 99C-10-017.
Affirmed.
Unpublished opinion is below.
SALLY A. DICKERSON, Trustee, Plaintiff Below-Appellant, v. WILLIAM D. SIMPSON, JOAN C. SEAVER, KENNETH PLEASANTON, CHARLES PLEASANTON, ALDEN H. and FRANCES A. HURLEY, PAULYNE LONGABACH, DELAWARE WILDLIFE, INC., WILLIAM and MARTHA CLEAVES, BRYANT and ZOE BELL, and BENJAMIN and CAROL SOLLOWAY, Defendants Below-Appellees. No. 379, 2001 In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: January 11, 2002 Decided: March 5, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices.
MYRON T. STEELE, JUSTICE.
ORDER
This 5th day of March 2002, upon consideration of the parties' briefs and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The plaintiff-appellant, Sally Dickerson, as the individual trustee of two trust agreements dated October 20, 1978, filed this appeal from the Superior Court's post-trial decision entering judgment in defendant William Simpson's favor. The Superior Court, after hearing all the testimony, found that Dickerson had not proven title up to the boundary she claimed on certain marshland in Kent County and thus denied her claim for ejectment. The Superior Court concluded as a matter of fact that Simpson had established by a preponderance of the evidence that he and his predecessors-in-interest had adversely possessed the disputed property since at least 1954. This adverse possession had formed the basis for the Kent County tax maps of record since 1972.
William Simpson was the only defendant who appeared below to contest Dickerson's complaint, except for the State of Delaware, which later dropped out of the case.
(2) In her opening brief, Dickerson first contends that the Superior Court's decision "radically changes the Delaware law of adverse possession." We disagree. The Superior Court properly applied Delaware law and concluded, as a matter of fact, that the construction of a canal on the property between 1937 and 1954, the plotting of lots, which were offered for sale and actually sold, and the lot owners payment of taxes on those lots for many years, constituted open, notorious, hostile and exclusive possession of the disputed property. We reject Dickerson's suggestion that buildings had to be erected on the property in order for Simpson's possession to be considered open and notorious.
(3) Dickerson next contends that the Superior Court's conclusions are not the result of a logical deductive process and are not supported by the record. Dickerson asserts that the Superior Court offered no factual basis to support its conclusion that Dickerson "[had] not proven title up to the boundary she claims."
We disagree. Given the Superior Court's conclusion that Simpson had established his title to the property through adverse possession, we find the basis for the Superior Court's conclusion that Dickerson had failed to prove title to be evident and to be supported by the record.
(4) Accordingly, upon consideration of the parties' briefs and the record below, we conclude that this matter should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Superior Court in its well-reasoned decision dated July 10, 2001.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.