Opinion
C.A. No. 97C-06-063.
Submitted: February 2, 2004.
Decided: February 23, 2004.
Upon Plaintiff's Pro Se Motion to amend order for evidentiary hearing Denied.
Kevin L. Dickens Gregory E. Smith, Esquire Deputy Attorney General.
ORDER
This 23rd day of February, 2004, upon consideration of the plaintiff's pro se Motion to Amend Order for Evidentiary Hearing, it appears to this Court that:
1. The movant, Kevin L. Dickens ("Plaintiff"), filed a pro se Motion to Amend Complaint for Substitution of Party Defendants on November 13, 2003, and filed a pro se Motion to Compel Discovery and Order for DCC Officials to Return Legal Mail and Documents on November 17, 2003.
2. By Order, dated January 21, 2004, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims against defendant Richard Chapman, denied Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint for Substitution of Party Defendants, and denied Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery and Order for DCC Officials to Return Legal Mail and Documents.
3. On January 27, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Order for Evidentiary Hearing, invoking Superior Court Civil Rule 59, and requesting that the Court "amend its [January 21, 2004] Order and schedule [sic] evidentiary hearing to determine material fact issues on Motions to Amend, to Compel Discovery and to Order DCC Officials to return Plaintiff's Legal Mail." In this latest motion, Plaintiff disagrees with, and refutes the Court's decision contained in its January 21, 2004 Order. Plaintiff also calls into question the judicial correctness of Superior Court procedure. Plaintiff's case, after having been presided over for approximately three years by the same Superior Court judge, has been assigned to a different Superior Court judge, who in turn, issued the Court's January 24, 2004 Order.
4. First, as a matter of Superior Court procedural accuracy, the Court notes that the Plaintiff has improperly filed the instant motion under the purview of Superior Court Civil Rule 59. This Rule defines Court procedures and requirements for filing either a motion for a new trial, a motion to alter or amend a judgment, or alternatively, a motion for reargument. Although Plaintiff's motion is more appropriately filed pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 7(b), relating to pleadings allowed and form of motions, the Court will, nonetheless, consider Plaintiff's motion in the light most favorable to the movant. This Court has consistently granted more leniency to a pro se litigant in articulating his legal arguments in support of his grounds for relief. Because the Plaintiff is acting pro se, the Court will attempt to unearth the merits of his most recent motion.
See Vick v. Haller, 1987 WL 36716 (Del.) (holding that a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, may be held to a less stringent technical standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers). See also Jackson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 1986 WL 11546 (Del.Super.Ct.) (holding that Superior Court may give a pro se litigant leniency to allow the case to be fully and fairly heard).
5. Plaintiff's initial concern, as set forth in his motion, is that a "substitute" judge issued the Court's January 21, 2004 Order, denying his November 13 and November 17, 2003 motions, respectively. Plaintiff asserts that he is not aware of any "permanent assignment" of his case to the current presiding judge, and that he is "left wondering" why this judge was "allowed to sit and decide these motions by substitution." He further propounds that, "[i]t is standard jurisprudence for judges to defer decisions and orders of this nature to [sic] assigned judge, absent death, long illness, retirement, or resignation."
Since the Court finds that Plaintiff's quandaries as to the legality of Court procedure are both non-substantive and without merit, it will not address his concerns, other than to note that, a litigant, whether or not of pro se status, does not get to "pick and choose" which Superior Court judge he or she would like to preside over his or her respective case. Neither the United States Constitution, nor the Delaware Constitution, guarantee a litigant such a right. Moreover, it is not a constitutional right that a litigant be "made aware" of the assignment of his cause of action to another judge within the Superior Court. Further, there is no Superior Court Civil Rule of procedure which either creates, or promotes, the use of a "substitute judge" to preside over any proceeding. Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 40(a), "[t]he President Judge of the Superior Court is designated Assignment Judge for the Superior Court with authority to assign and designate the several judges who shall hold said courts or either of them in the several counties of the State for any designated period of time or for the hearing of any 1 or more designated causes."
SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 40(a).
Before issuing its January 21, 2004 Order, the Court made a thorough and precise examination of the record in Plaintiff's case, dating back to its very inception in June of 1997, including the initial complaint. Plaintiff may feel assured that the presiding judge is as familiar with the principles of law underlying his civil case, and as cognizant of his claims of alleged civil right's violations, as was the previous presiding judge.
6. With respect to the remaining claims outlined in Plaintiff's instant motion, they are merely rehashed and recycled versions of the claims put forth in his November 13 and November 17, 2003 motions, which the Court denied. Hence, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Order for Evidentiary Hearing for the same reasons delineated in its January 21, 2004 Order.
In conclusion, for all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Order for Evidentiary Hearing is DENIED.