Opinion
22-cv-07625-DMR
10-03-2023
ANDREA DIAZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STARBUCKS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
ORDER RE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO REMAND
Re: Dkt. No. 29
DONNA M. RYU CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiffs Andrea Diaz and her minor son M.A. move for leave to file an amended complaint adding a new defendant, and to remand this action in the event the court permits filing of the amended complaint. [Docket No. 29-1 at 1-8 (“Mot.”).] Defendant Starbucks Corporation opposes. [Docket No. 35 (“Opp'n”).] This matter is suitable for resolution without a hearing. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the following reasons, the motions are denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are citizens of California. They filed this action against Starbucks, Mariko Doe, and Does 1-25 in Alameda County Superior Court on April 29, 2022, alleging one claim for negligence. [Docket No. 1 (“Notice of Removal”), Ex. A (“Compl”).] Plaintiffs allege that on May 2, 2020, a hot beverage purchased from a Starbucks location in San Leandro spilled on them because the lid was not securely attached to the coffee cup. See generally Compl. Starbucks, which is headquartered in Washington, removed the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
When Plaintiffs filed the complaint, they believed Mariko Doe - later identified as Mariko Brown - was the supervisor and/or manager of the San Leandro location at the time of the incident. Mot. at 3; Compl. ¶ 4. Through discovery, Plaintiffs' counsel learned that the shift supervisor was in fact Sabrina Hopken. Id.; [Docket No. 29-1 at 9 (Elina Shakhbazyan Decl., Aug. 8, 2023) ¶¶ 2, 3).] Hopken is a citizen of California. Shakhbazyan Decl. ¶ 5.
Plaintiffs move to join Hopken as a defendant. They have already dismissed Mariko Brown. [Docket No. 33 (8/16/2023 Minute Order).] Plaintiffs argue that Hopken may be joined as a defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) because “a) Plaintiff has a right to relief against her; b) the action against SABRINA HOPKEN arises from the same occurrence as provides the basis of the action against ASHLEY and c) there are multiple same questions of law and fact against SABRINA HOPKEN and STARBUCKS.” Mot. at 5. If the court grants leave to amend the complaint to add Hopken, Plaintiffs move to remand this action on the ground that diversity jurisdiction no longer exists. Mot. at 6-7.
The court assumes the reference to “Ashley” is a typographical error.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or other defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A district court has diversity jurisdiction where the parties are “citizens of different States” and “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court has discretion to deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the case to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1998). When determining whether to permit joinder under Section 1447(e), courts generally consider six factors: 1) whether the party plaintiff seeks to join is needed for just adjudication and would be subject to joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a); 2) whether the statute of limitations would preclude an action against the new defendants in state court if the court denied joinder; 3) whether there has been unexplained delay in seeking joinder; 4) whether joinder is sought solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction; 5) whether the claim(s) against the new party appears valid; and 6) whether denial of joinder will prejudice the plaintiff. IBC Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Starbucks argues that the court should deny joinder of Hopken because she is not needed for just adjudication, Plaintiffs' request to join Hopken is untimely, joinder is sought solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction, there is no valid claim against Hopken, and Plaintiffs would not suffer prejudice if Hopken were not named as a defendant. Opp'n at 5-8. The court considers each factor of the multi-part test applicable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) in turn.
A. Necessary Party
Rule 19(a) governs joinder of necessary parties. It requires joinder of persons whose absence would preclude the grant of complete relief, impede their ability to protect their interests, or subject a party to the danger of inconsistent obligations. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(1). “Although courts consider whether a party would meet [Rule] 19's standard for a necessary party, amendment under § 1447(e) is a less restrictive standard than for joinder under [Rule] 19.” IBC, 125 F.Supp.2d at 1011-12. “Courts disallow joinder of non-diverse defendants where those defendants are only tangentially related to the cause of action or would not prevent complete relief.” Id.
Here, Plaintiffs claim that Hopken was “a supervisor and/or manager of the premises at the time of Plaintiffs' incident,” who was responsible for “the maintenance of the store, equipment and merchandise at the time of Plaintiffs incident,” “verify[ing] that there was in place a policy which provided for the maintenance of the maintenance of the store, equipment and merchandise according to industry standards,” “the training and education of the store employees who were tasked with conducting the maintenance . . . of the store, equipment and merchandise,” and “verifying that the maintenance of the store, equipment and merchandise be maintained according to industry standards and sufficient policies and procedures.” Mot. at 3 (citing Compl. ¶ 4). Plaintiffs also generally allege that Defendants maintained the coffee “at a temperature sufficiently hot as to pose a risk of serious injury to persons such as Plaintiffs,” and that while “acting in the course and scope of employment, poured the COFFEE which Plaintiff ANDREA DIAZ had ordered into a cup . . . placed a lid . . . over the CUP, and then proceeded to hand the CUP to Plaintiff.” Compl. ¶¶ 9-10. According to Plaintiffs, “prior to handing the CUP containing the dangerous COFFEE to Plaintiff ANDREA DIAZ[,] Defendants' agent had negligently failed to securely attach the LID to the CUP[.]” Id. ¶ 11. In addition, “Defendant's agent failed to exercise due care in packaging the CUP . . . but instead handed such CUP to Plaintiff ANDREA DIAZ in a careless and negligent fashion so that the CUP spilled the COFFEE on Plaintiffs [so] as to cause the injuries hereinafter alleged.” Id. ¶ 12.
Starbucks argues that Hopken is not a necessary party, asserting that any finding of negligence against Hopken would be assigned to it as the employer. Opp'n at 5. It claims that because an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of their employment, just adjudication does not require joining Hopken as a party. Id.
“Under the California doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held liable for the tortious acts of its employees when they are acting within the scope of their employment.” Randolph v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 97 F.3d 319, 327 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). “An employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment if either one of two conditions is met: (1) the act performed was either required or incident to her duties, or (2) the employee's misconduct could be reasonably foreseen by the employer.” Id. (citations omitted).
On September 15, 2023, the parties filed a stipulation agreeing that Hopken was acting within the scope of her employment with Starbucks in connection with the incident alleged in this case. [Docket No. 38.] In light of the parties' agreement that Starbucks will be held vicariously liable for any alleged actions by Hopken, joinder of Hopken is not needed for just adjudication. Accordingly, this factor weighs against joinder. See Sharpe v. Fedex Corp., No. C-06-4964 EMC, 2007 WL 1888878, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2007) (holding that joinder of additional defendant (driver of FedEx truck) was not needed for just adjudication where FedEx stipulated to vicarious liability if the individual defendant was found liable and effectively waived any defense based on scope of employment); see also Oettinger v. Home Depot, No. C 09-01560 CW, 2009 WL 2136764, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2009) (holding that joinder of Home Depot's assistant operations manager was not necessary because under California law, a “plaintiff seeking to hold an employer liable for injuries caused by employees acting within the scope of their employment is not required to name or join the employees as defendants”); Cha v. Hiossen, Inc., No. 2:23-CV-00691-WLH-PD, 2023 WL 4492420, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2023) (“courts have regularly determined that joinder of non-diverse supervisors is not required in . . . cases where the supervisors only acted within the scope of their employment, because complete relief can be accorded under a respondeat superior theory” (collecting cases)).
Plaintiffs rely on Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) in arguing that “[t]he joinder of a nondiverse party requires remand even if newly joined defendant (sic) is not indispensable.” Mot. at 8. Morris does not stand for that proposition. The Ninth Circuit first analyzed whether the district court properly held that it had removal jurisdiction based on diversity jurisdiction, even though a non-diverse defendant had been joined. Morris explained that “one exception to the requirement of complete diversity is where a non-diverse defendant has been ‘fraudulently joined.'” 236 F.3d at 1067. Because it was “abundantly obvious that [the plaintiff] could not possibly prevail on her [] claim against [the non-diverse defendant],” the Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly ignored the defendant's joinder, and removal was proper based on diversity of citizenship. Id. at 1068. Next, the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the district court retained jurisdiction over the action after plaintiff amended her complaint to join two additional non-diverse defendants. Id. The district court had permitted joinder of the non-diverse parties but nevertheless retained jurisdiction over the action. The Ninth Circuit explained that “[t]he presence of the [new defendants] in this action destroyed the district court's diversity jurisdiction, but not its original subject matter jurisdiction [based on the court's admiralty jurisdiction].” Id. It also noted that the plaintiff had not sought remand based on the joinder of the non-diverse defendants and had therefore waived the issue. Id. Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, nothing in Morris suggests that joinder of a nondiverse defendant requires remand even if that defendant is not a necessary party.
B. Statute of Limitations
Starbucks argues that the statute of limitations issue is moot because just adjudication does not require joining Hopken as a party. Opp'n at 5. It makes no other argument in this respect. Plaintiffs likewise do not meaningfully address the issue. Accordingly, this factor is neutral.
C. Timeliness of Amendment
Plaintiffs explain that they only recently learned about Hopken through Defendant's first set of discovery responses served on June 24, 2023. Mot. at 3, 6; Shakhbazyan Decl. ¶ 3.
Confusingly, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint shortly after, on July 5, 2023, incorrectly identifying Mariko Doe as Mariko Brown. [Docket No. 21 (corrected at Docket No. 23).] In any event, Plaintiffs filed the present motion on August 8, 2023, a little over one month after receiving Defendant's discovery responses. In addition, no significant activity has yet occurred in the case. Under these circumstances, the court finds that there has not been undue delay in moving to join Hopken as a defendant. See Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. CH2M Hill, Inc., No. 19-CV-08295-LHK, 2020 WL 4252677, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2020) (describing relevant factors in assessing timeliness).
D. Motive for Joinder
Starbucks argues that Plaintiffs have an improper motive for joinder, have been “forthcoming to the Court and counsel about their intent to remand to state court,” and their “shotgun approach in selecting a partner (employee) defendant verifies their intent to disrupt diversity jurisdiction instead of reaching the merits of the case.” Mot. at 6; [see also Docket No. 35-1 (Emily Genge Decl., Aug. 18, 2023) ¶ 8 (“During the second case management conference on May 31, 2023, Plaintiffs' counsel told the Court and me that Plaintiffs intend to rely on the inclusion of Mariko Doe, once properly served, to destroy diversity jurisdiction and request a remand to state court”); but see id. ¶ 13 (On August 3, 2023, “[Plaintiffs'] [c]ounsel . . . explained that Plaintiffs have named Mariko Brown because of her supervisory role at the store and that it was not just because they want to remand the case to state court”).]
Plaintiffs contend that they pleaded a claim against Hopken in the original complaint but mistakenly named her as Mariko Brown. Mot. at 6. They argue that they would have substituted Hopken for Brown even if this case were still pending in state court. Id. at 7. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that their motive for seeking to join Hopken is “to permit adjudication of this action in its entirety against all possible culpable parties.” Shakhbazyan Decl. ¶ 4.
In light of the parties' competing narratives on this point, the court finds that Plaintiffs' motive weighs only slightly against amendment. See Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 2020 WL 4252677, at *6 (“Importantly, even when the circumstances suggest that one of the plaintiff's motives is to defeat jurisdiction, factor four does not necessarily weigh against amendment when it is not readily apparent that it is the sole motivation, particularly when there is a seemingly valid claim against the proposed defendant” (cleaned up)).
E. Validity of Claim
Next, Starbucks argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged a viable claim against Hopken because Starbucks is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of the employment. Opp'n at 7. The court agrees.
On its face, the negligence claim against Hopken appears valid as she was the supervisor and/or manager of the premises where Plaintiffs were allegedly injured. See Sandhu v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, No. 16-CV-04987-BLF, 2017 WL 403495, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) (noting that a court need only determine whether claim asserted against proposed diversity-destroying defendant “seems valid”). However, Plaintiffs have effectively conceded that the claim does not have merit by agreeing that Hopken was acting within the scope of her employment with Starbucks in connection with the incident. See McGrath v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 298 F.R.D. 601, 608 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (finding claims against three individual defendants were “weak” where the operative complaint included no allegations to support a claim against any of them in their individual capacities “separate and apart from their actions in the scope of their employment by Defendant Home Depot USA, Inc.”). Thus, this factor weighs against joinder.
F. Prejudice to Plaintiffs
Denial of joinder will prejudice Plaintiffs by denying them their choice of forum. However, Plaintiffs may still obtain information and evidence from Hopken as a witness through the discovery process in this action. See Opp'n at 8.
Weighing the six factors, the court concludes that joinder of Hopken is not warranted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies Plaintiffs' motions to amend the complaint and remand this action to Alameda County Superior Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.