Opinion
Civil No. 04-1003 (PG/GAG).
April 4, 2005
ORDER
Pending before the Court is a discovery dispute between the captioned parties over the relevance of certain documents and information requested via interrogatory to defendant Bristol Myers Squibb Holding Limited Liability Comp. ("Bristol-Myers") by plaintiff Carlos E. Díaz-Padilla ("Díaz-Padilla" or "plaintiff"). Specifically, Bristol-Myers originally claimed that the information sought in Plaintiff's interrogatories 7-9 was "wholly irrelevant to [his] claims or defenses" and that it was also "impermissibly overbroad." ¶ 7-8, Defendant's Opposition to Motion in Compliance of Order in Relation to Discovery Dispute, p. 2-3 (Docket No. 25). Thereafter, the parties held a Local Rule 26 conference in which Bristol-Myers agreed to supplement its responses to said interrogatories in a limited fashion. ¶ 2, Defendant's Opposition, p. 1 (Docket No. 25). After receiving such information, Díaz-Padilla requested copy of the "original documents or source data used" to prepare the supplemental production, along with copy of an affirmative action plan. ¶ 4,Id., 2; ¶ 13, Plaintiff's Motion in Compliance of Order in Relation to Discovery Dispute, p. 4 (Docket No. 23). Said request prompted the discovery dispute at bar.
Having held the requisite Local Rule 26 conference, the parties submitted the issue to the Court, which ordered the parties to file memoranda on the matter. (See Docket Nos. 23 and 25). After carefully reviewing the same, the Court rules as follows.
Both parties agree that the matter at bar is withing the purview of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26, which allows "discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party." Upon a showing of good cause, the Court may expand the admittedly dim constraints of Rule 26 in order to "discover any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 (b)(1). The present framework is a result of amendments to said rule conducted so that discovery "relate more directly to a claim or defense than it did" under the previous language. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F. 3d. 951, 968 (9TH Cir. 2004). Such change was brought about by an increasing concern within the legal profession that the prior statutory language's reference to "subject matter" permitted overbroad discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26, Advisory Committee Notes (2000 Amendments). Most importantly, the rule change is meant to alert the federal courts that they "have the authority to confine discovery to the claims and defenses asserted in the pleadings, and signals to the parties that they have no entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses" that are outside the scope of those already pleaded. Id.
In the case at bar, the three interrogatories which gave rise to the present controversy requested (1) the names, occupational classification, age, and date of commencement of all Bristol-Myers employees working at the company's Manatí Puerto Rico plant (the "Manatí plant") from 1999 to 2004; (2) the names, ages, occupational classification and date of commencement of all the Bristol-Myers employees terminated while working at the Manatí plant within the years 1999-2004; and (3) the specific reasons for terminating each of the employees listed in the prior request. ¶ 7, Plaintiff's Motion in Compliance, p. 2-3 (Docket No. 23). After initially objecting, Bristol-Myers eventually agreed to comply in part. As a result, Bristol-Myers produced various tables which listed all the supervisors, managers and directors involved in the manufacturing operation at the Manatí plant (the "tables"). ¶ 3, Defendant's Opposition, p. 2 (Docket No. 25). Such information clearly did not comply with the interrogatories, which requested like information on all employees, not just managerial, at the Manatí plant during the relevant time period. To that effect, Bristol-Myers alleges that pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 (b)(1), since Díaz-Padilla's claim is predicated on defendant's failure to promote him from a supervisory post to a managerial position, evidence of lower-echelon employees is irrelevant. Id., p. 4.
Those terminated while working at Bristol-Myers' Manatí plant from 1999 through 2004.
Upon receipt of the tables, Plaintiff requested access and authority to photocopy "the original documents or source data" that served as a basis for said tables. ¶ 13, Plaintiff's Motion in Compliance, p. 4 (Docket No. 23). Such request was again objected to by Plaintiff as overbroad and irrelevant. ¶ 14, Id.
Before delving into the merits of the parties' contentions, the Court must first determine who carries the initial burden of persuasion. The Court notes that at least one court has established a "relevancy on its face" test, whereby the burden depends on whether the discovery sought appears relevant on its face or not. DirecTV, Inc. v. Puccinelli, 224 F.R.D. 677, 684 (D. Kan. 2004). Other courts have placed the initial burden on the party seeking discovery over another's objection, no matter whether the evidence's relevance is explicit or not. Caouette v. Office Max, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d. 134, 136 (D.N.H. 2005) ("the party seeking information in discovery over an adversary's objection has the burden of showing its relevance"); Creely v. Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 2005 WL 44526, * 1 (E.D. Pa. 2005) ("once a party opposes a discovery request, the party seeking the discovery must demonstrate the relevancy of the information sought"). Such a showing is not an onerous one.Condit v. Dunne, 225 F.R.D. 100, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("once any possibility of relevance sufficient to warrant discovery is shown, the burden shifts to the party opposing discovery to show the discovery is improper") (emphasis added). This Court adopts the latter approach, whereby the party seeking discovery over another's objection must first make a showing, as meager as that may be, of relevance. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show why discovery should not be permitted.See Creely, 2005 WL at *1.
In light of the aforementioned, it is Díaz-Padilla's affirmative duty to set forth sufficient allegations as to the relevance of the discovery. This, plaintiff has failed to do. In his brief, Díaz-Padilla does not expound in the least on how and why the information requested as to the non supervisory and managerial employees is relevant. Rather plaintiff merely states in a conclusory fashion that the requested information is relevant. Moreover, Díaz-Padilla does not even attempt to outline the need for the "original documents or source data" used to prepare the tables. Indeed, if the information requested was produced as to the managerial employees listed in the table, and plaintiff has not argued the contrary, he necessarily had to set forth sufficient allegations to sustain why in addition the original documents need be discovered. While Rule 26 (b)(1) provides for broad discovery, under the new language "courts should not grant discovery requests based on pure speculations that amount to nothing more than a fishing expedition into actions or past wrongdoing not related to the alleged claims or defenses." Collens v. City of New York, 222 F.R.D. 249, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Consequently, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's request for a discovery order as to the above matters.
Next, the Court must determine whether the affirmative action reports prepared by Bristol-Myers are discoverable. Díaz-Padilla claims that said reports contain statistical information related to the breakdown of employees by age, which would be pertinent for his own, age-based discrimination action. ¶ 23, Plaintiff's Motion in Compliance, p. 7 (Docket No. 23). Bristol-Myers counters by claiming that pursuant to 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.15A, they are only required to maintain information on the basis of race or national origin, for which they allege that no such information as to age is contained in the reports. Defendant's Opposition to Motion in Compliance, p. 6-7 (Docket No. 25). As noted, the Court is, thus, left with two opposing declarations as to the existence of age-related data in the affirmative action plans. However, the basis on which Plaintiff bases his allegation is flawed. Díaz-Padilla claims that the discovery request under question was prompted by the deposition of Evelyn Alejandro ("Alejandro"). According to Plaintiff, Alejandro testified that Bristol-Myers "prepared statistical data related to the people who cease their services in the company by termination, resignation, firing, or other." ¶ 19-20, Plaintiff's Motion in Compliance, p. 6 (Docket No. 23). At no point does Díaz-Padilla claim that Alejandro stated that such reports included information regarding the age of such employees. Any such allegation is conclusory in nature, and insufficient to warrant the requested order. Thus, the Court hereby also DENIES plaintiff's discovery request as to Bristol-Myers' affirmative action plan.
WHEREFORE, in light of the preceding, the Court DENIES Díaz-Padilla's Motion in Compliance of Order in Relation to Discovery Dispute (Docket No. 23).