Opinion
65847.
DECIDED APRIL 6, 1983.
Burglary. Crisp Superior Court. Before Judge Faircloth.
A. Frank Grimsley, Jr., for appellant.
Gary C. Christy, District Attorney, for appellee.
Defendant was convicted of the offense of burglary. After his motion for new trial was filed, heard and denied, he appeals. Held:
We are concerned here only with the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize the jury to return a verdict of guilty. According to the state's evidence the burglary occurred between 5:30 p. m., August 21, 1981, and 7:30 a. m., August 22, 1981, in which many items of jewelry were removed from a pawn shop. On the morning of August 22, 1981, defendant pawned a class ring identified as a ring stolen in the burglary. Defendant was apprehended and other items involved in the burglary were located at the home of a female who drove the motor vehicle which had provided transportation to the pawn shop and who consented to a search of her home, testifying that the items came from the defendant. The investigation had also centered on another person allegedly involved in the burglary who was arrested and made a voluntary statement (after his rights had been read to him) to the police implicating the defendant as a party to that burglary. However, when this witness was called by the state he testified that he committed the burglary alone and the defendant was not with him, admitting that he had told the investigating officer that it was defendant's idea to burglarize the store and that his statement to the investigator was entirely false.
First of all, recent unexplained possession or recent unsatisfactorily explained possession of stolen goods is sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Evans v. State, 156 Ga. App. 162 ( 275 S.E.2d 341). But in addition to this testimony under Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858 ( 286 S.E.2d 717), a prior inconsistent statement of a witness is admissible as substantive evidence. See Green v. State, 249 Ga. 369, 370 (2) ( 290 S.E.2d 466); Conyers v. State, 249 Ga. 438, 440 (2) ( 291 S.E.2d 709). Consequently, viewing the entire evidence here, a rational trier of fact could reasonably have found the essential elements of the crime of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. See Harris v. State, 234 Ga. 871, 873 ( 218 S.E.2d 583); Harris v. State, 236 Ga. 766, 767 ( 225 S.E.2d 263); Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 807, 811 (II-1) ( 243 S.E.2d 1). After careful review of the trial transcript and the record, we are convinced and so hold that a rational trier of fact (the jury in this case) could reasonably have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Davis v. State, 249 Ga. 309, 310 ( 290 S.E.2d 273); Sanders v. State, 246 Ga. 42 (1) ( 268 S.E.2d 628).
Judgment affirmed. Shulman, C. J., and Birdsong, J., concur.