Opinion
SA-23-CV-00152-OLG
11-30-2023
JAMES THOMAS DEVINS, Plaintiff, v. UR M JADDOU, IN THE OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES; Defendant.
ELIZABETH S. ("BETSY") CHESTNEY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO THE HONORABLE ORLANDO L. GARCIA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation concerns Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [#6] and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint [#13]. All pretrial matters in this case have been referred to the undersigned for disposition pursuant to Western District of Texas Local Rule CV-72 and Appendix C [#7]. The undersigned therefore has authority to enter this recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Defendant's motion be granted and Plaintiff's motion be denied.
I. Background
This case arises out of the denial of a student visa to a citizen of Nepal (Rita Raut), who is not a party to this lawsuit. Plaintiff James Thomas Devins, who is proceeding pro se, alleges that Defendant UR M Jaddou, in his Official Capacity as Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), denied Mr. Devins his constitutionally protected right of freedom of religious expression when it twice denied Ms. Raut's F-1 student visa application. (Compl. [#1], at 2.) Mr. Devins explains in his pleading that he is deeply religious, and his Christian faith has inspired in him a desire to assist Ms. Raut in achieving her career ambitions in social work by paying for her college education. (Id.) Mr. Devins argues that the by declining to interview Ms. Raut and denying her visa application, USCIS effectively denied him his “most fundamental Christian obligation to do unto others as he would have done” for himself. (Id. at 3.) By his lawsuit, Mr. Devins requests a court judgment granting Ms. Raut a student and business visa, waiving the requirements of all face-to-face interviews and related fees in granting the visas, and awarding him a “non-economic payment” of $150,000 as redress for the mental anguish caused by the delays in the issuance of the visas. (Id. at 4.) He represents that he intends to use the $150,000 to pay for part of Ms. Raut's educational expenses. (Id.)
Defendant has moved to dismiss Mr. Devins's Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for three reasons: (1) Mr. Devins lacks standing to bring this lawsuit on behalf of Ms. Raut; (2) the consular officer's determinations regarding Ms. Raut's student visa are not reviewable in this Court under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability; and (3) Mr. Devins has sued the wrong Defendant. In response to the motion, Mr. Devins asks the Court to permit him to amend his pleadings. The motions are ripe for review.
II. Analysis
The District Court should grant Defendant's motion to dismiss because Mr. Devins lacks standing to bring this suit. The District Court should deny Mr. Devins's request to amend because the defects in standing are incurable, and amendment would therefore be futile. The Court need not resolve Defendant's other two arguments for dismissal of Mr. Devins's claims.
Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) allow a party to challenge the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must establish this Court's jurisdiction through sufficient allegations. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). “A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). “A court may base its disposition of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Montez v. Dep't of Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Robinson v. TCI/US W. Commc'ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1997)). The burden of proof rests on the party asserting jurisdiction. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
Mr. Devins has not carried his burden to establish this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Absent standing, a federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to address a plaintiff's claims. Cobb v. Cent. States, 461 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 2006). The doctrine of standing addresses the question of who may properly bring suit in federal court and “is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Standing implicates both constitutional requirements and prudential concerns. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
Article III standing requires the satisfaction of three elements: (1) a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact, either actual or imminent, (2) a causal connection between the injury and defendant's challenged conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury suffered will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Prudential standing “embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014). The Supreme Court “has not exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of the standing doctrine,” but the Court has “explained that prudential standing encompasses the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Servicios Azucareros de Venezuela, C.A. v. John Deere Thibodeaux, Inc., 702 F.3d 794, 801 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 12).
Mr. Devins's Complaint does not allege factual allegations, taken as true, that establish the elements of constitutional or prudential standing. There is no legal precedent establishing a claim under the First Amendment based on a denial of a third party's student visa. Nor is there any legal framework that would provide for legal redress for individuals interested in sponsoring a student to apply for an F-1 visa when the student's application for a visa is denied. The F-1 visa program serves the purposes of offering international students the opportunity to pursue education in the United States and offering U.S. institutions of learning the opportunity to have international students join their student bodies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2. To be eligible for admission under an F-1 student visa, a nonimmigrant student must have documentary evidence of financial support for the student's educational costs and living expenses. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(i). Although individuals and organizations may provide such support, there is no statutory requirement that an applicant obtain a sponsor in order to qualify for the visa. The general public's interest in interacting with or assisting international students is not regulated by any statutory or regulatory framework such that there exist any interests personal to Mr. Devins that are contemplated or protected in the context of F-1 student visas. Mr. Devins has not alleged a concrete and particularized injury or a legally protected interest redressable by the Court as required to establish Article III standing. Nor are Mr. Devins's alleged injuries within the “zone of interest” of the immigration framework at issue to give rise to prudential standing to seek relief in the form of a visa for Ms. Raut.
Federal courts have rejected similar attempts of purported sponsors of an F-1 visa applicant to seek judicial redress on the sponsors' own behalf for lack of standing. In a case filed in the District of New Jersey, the “sponsors” of a recipient of an F-1 student visa filed suit after the student was ordered removed and barred reentry for five years due to the failure to renew her visa before traveling to Mexico. Fife v. Barr, 469 F.Supp.3d 279 (D.N.J. 2020), aff'd sub nom. Fife v. Att'y Gen. United States, 845 Fed. App'x 95 (3d Cir. 2021). The sponsors alleged numerous due process violations to their liberty and property interests as a result of the expedited removal. Id. at 288. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the sponsors had failed to establish Article III or prudential standing, and the Third Circuit affirmed. Id. at 294-95.
The district court reasoned that there is no requirement of a sponsor for admission under an F-1 nonimmigrant student visa, despite the fact that immigration regulations require that a student applicant document financial support for their educational endeavors (which could be through a sponsorship) as part of the application process. Id. at 293-94. The court explained that that “[t]he fulfillment and maintenance of all the requirements of the F-1 student visa [are] solely [the foreign student's] obligation, and the [agency's] determination that she did not fulfill and maintain those requirements spoke only to [the foreign student], and not Plaintiffs.” Id. at 294. “The loss of [the student's] visa may have affected Plaintiffs, but not because they were harmed in a concrete and particularized way by Defendants' conduct but rather because of their own voluntary assumption of certain risks.” Id. at 295. The district court also found lack of prudential standing, as the sponsors were attempting to assert claims that belonged to the student herself. Id. at 297-98. Mr. Devins has similarly failed to show a concrete and particularized injury flowing from the denial of Ms. Raut's student visa application that is redressable by this Court or that his claims fall within the zone of interest of the relevant statutory framework. And, he, too, is attempting to bring claims that are, in fact, Ms. Raut's.
In summary, Mr. Devins fails to allege sufficient facts to confer Article III standing and to establish this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over his federal claims. The Court should therefore dismiss the Complaint for lack of standing. Because Mr. Devins lacks standing and this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over his claims, the Court need not address the other arguments raised in Defendant's motion in favor of dismissal.
The Court should also deny Mr. Devins's motion for leave to amend. His motion asks the Court to allow him the opportunity to file an amended pleading so he can limit the relief he is requesting to only a Court order declaring the violation of his religious liberty and construing his pleading as Mr. Devins being the actual applicant for the visas and “the sponsored girl acting as proxy in front of the immigration officer.” Although Rule 15 directs courts to freely grant leave to amend “when justice so requires,” the decision to grant leave remains within the discretion of a district court. Ballard v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 678 F.3d 360, 364 (5th Cir. 2012). Leave to amend need not be granted if it would be futile to do so. F.D.I.C. v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1385 (5th Cir. 1994). Nothing in Mr. Devins's proposed amendment would alter the Court's evaluation of standing and subject matter jurisdiction. His lack of standing cannot be cured through repleading. The Court should therefore deny the motion for leave to amend.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
Having considered the parties' motions, the responses thereto, and the governing law, the undersigned recommends that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [#6] be GRANTED and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint [#13] be DENIED.
IV. Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Object/Appeal
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this report and recommendation on all parties by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as a “filing user” with the clerk of court, or (2) by mailing a copy to those not registered by certified mail, return receipt requested. Written objections to this report and recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of same, unless this time period is modified by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Objections are limited to no more than 20 pages unless leave of court is granted. The party shall file the objections with the Clerk of Court and serve the objections on all other parties. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions or recommendations to which objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the district court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-52 (1985); Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000). Additionally, failure to file timely written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report and recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the un-objected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).