Opinion
HHDCV184086996S
10-29-2018
Mirko DESPOTOVIC dba Tradexim International Co. California v. GAVRILOVIC HOLDING PETRINJA
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
ROBERT B. SHAPIRO, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE
By order dated May 1, 2018 (# 104), the court (Berger, J.T.R.), scheduled a hearing on June 4, 2018, and directed the plaintiff to show cause why the foreign judgment which is the subject of this matter should be enforced in the State of Connecticut. In his May 2, 2018 memorandum (# 105), the plaintiff argues that, pursuant to the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, General Statutes § 50a-30 to 50a-38 ("the Act"), he seeks certification of the foreign judgment he obtained in the Republic of Croatia against the defendant in the amount of $385,868.28, plus postjudgment interest. The judgment was filed in this court on April 9, 2018. Hearings were held on June 4, 2018, before Judge Berger, who later recused himself; and on October 18, 2018, before this court.
The plaintiff argues that the Act incorporates General Statutes § 52-604, which is part of a different statutory scheme, the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, § § 52-604 to 52-609. Citing General Statutes § 52-605, he asserts that such a foreign judgment is treated in the same manner as a judgment of a sister-state, and there is no judicial review of the foreign judgment before it becomes effective as a Connecticut judgment.
The plaintiff also contends that the Act does not require an independent basis of jurisdiction once a judgment has been granted and that all a judgment creditor has to do is file a certification. He asserts that jurisdictional facts need not be alleged or proved to establish jurisdiction. In addition, he argues that the court has no jurisdiction to sua sponte reopen a judgment. He argues that, "[i]n short, there is nothing for the judge to do ..." (Citation omitted.) See plaintiff’s supplemental brief, dated October 16, 2018, p. 2.
At the June 4, 2018 hearing, the court questioned whether it had jurisdiction, questioning whether there was any contact within the State of Connecticut with this matter.
"As a matter of law, in the absence of jurisdiction over the parties, a judgment is void ab initio and is subject to both direct and collateral attack." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reiner, Reiner & Bendett, P.C. v. The Cadle Co., 278 Conn. 92, 99 n.7, 897 A.2d 58 (2006) (including well beyond the four-month period within which a judgment may be opened. See General Statutes § § 52-212 and 52-212a).
"[W]hen the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the attention of the court, cognizance of that fact must be taken and the matter determined before it can proceed further in the case ... In whatever manner such an issue comes to the attention of a court, it must be addressed, even if the court must act sua sponte in order to do so ... [A] provision of a judgment that exceeds the jurisdiction of a court is necessarily void and cannot be remedied merely by the lapse of time. Such a judgment is void ab initio and is subject to both direct and collateral attack ... If a court has never acquired jurisdiction over a defendant ... any judgment ultimately entered is void and subject to vacation or collateral attack." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pinder v. Pinder, 42 Conn.App. 254, 258, 679 A.2d 973 (1996).
General Statutes § 50a-32, concerning applicability of the Act, provides that "Sections 50a-30 to 50a-38 inclusive, apply to any foreign judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered." Section 50a-31(2) defines a "foreign judgment" to mean "any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty or a judgment for support in matrimonial or family matters."
General Statutes § 50a-33, which concerns recognition and enforcement, provides, "Except as provided in section 50a-34, a foreign judgment meeting the requirements of section 50a-32 is conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money. The foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit."
As discussed above, the plaintiff argues that the Croatian "judgment satisfies the provisions of the Act and should be recognized and enforced in Connecticut. On this issue, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof." Panchenkova v. Chigirinsky, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. X10 UWY CV 12 6020819 (June 5, 2015, Dooley, J.) (60 Conn.L.Rptr. 154).
Here, in his May 2, 2018 memorandum, page 2, the plaintiff asserts that "The judgment issued by Croatia is final, conclusive and enforceable in the Republic of Croatia, as required by Connecticut General Statutes § 50a-32."
No evidence is cited for this conclusory statement. The appellate courts "repeatedly ha[ve] stated that representations of counsel are not evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Norberg-Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 162 Conn.App. 661, 670, 133 A.3d 482 (2016).
In plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 to his Certification of Foreign Judgment, the plaintiff includes the statement of Zoran Mihajkovic, who states that he is an expert for finances and accounting. He states that his task was to confirm the mean rate of the Croatian National Bank and to calculate interest. In his Opinion, he refers to the judgment as being "final and enforceable." This conclusory statement provides no evidence as to the finality, binding effect, or enforceability of the Croatian judgment.
In contrast, in Panchenkova v. Chigirinsky, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X10 UWY CV 12 6020819, the parties presented expert opinions concerning Russian law, including the plaintiff’s expert’s opinion, which the court credited, that the judgment there was final, binding and enforceable in Russia under Russian law. See id.
Here, in the absence of an evidentiary basis, no such finding may be made. Thus, the court may not find that the Croatian judgment issued by Croatia is final, conclusive and enforceable in the Republic of Croatia. See General Statutes § 50a-32; General Statutes § 50a-34 (grounds for nonrecognition).
Under these circumstances, the court need not consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper and consistent with the Due Process Cause and the minimum contacts standard. "The test for whether a court properly invokes personal jurisdiction is essentially one of ‘reasonableness or fairness.’ ... [T]he defendant’s contacts with the forum [s]tate must be such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice ... In other words, the defendant must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there ... [The requirement of contacts may be greatly relaxed ... where a plaintiff is suing a nonresident defendant to enforce a judgment procured in another State." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Herman, 175 Conn.App. 662, 673, 168 A.3d 514, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 960, 172 A.3d 1262 (2017) (Florida judgment registered in Connecticut).
Since the plaintiff has not shown that the Croatian judgment satisfies the provisions of the Act and should be recognized and enforced in Connecticut, the court need not consider the minimum contacts issue. "It is axiomatic that courts do not engage in constitutional analysis if a nonconstitutional basis upon which to resolve an issue exists." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. Am. Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516-17, 923 A.2d 638 (2007).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the certification of the Croatian judgment as a Connecticut judgment is vacated and this matter is dismissed. It is so ordered.