Opinion
No. 532, 1999
Decided: August 29, 2000
Family 97-8525.
Reversed and remanded.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
MARIA A. DeSHIELDS, Petitioner Below, Appellant, v. ALVIN L. HARRIS, Respondent Below, Appellee. No. 532, 1999 In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: August 8, 2000 Decided: August 29, 2000
Before WALSH, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices.
ORDER
This 29th day of August 2000, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, it appears to the Court that:
(1) This is an appeal from a Family Court decision denying a request for alimony. On June 24, 1998, the appellant/petitioner-below, Maria DeShields ("Wife"), filed a Petition for Divorce against the appellee/respondent-below, Alvin Harris ("Husband"). Two days later, on June 26, 1998, Wife obtained a Protection from Abuse (PFA) order against Husband, in which Husband was ordered to pay spousal support of $750 per month in addition to child support for their minor child. On January 8, 1999, the court entered an order for interim alimony of $802 per month, and the parties were divorced by a decree entered on May 5, 1999.
(2) A hearing to determine matters ancillary to the divorce was held on September 21, 1999, during which evidence was taken regarding the parties' relative financial situations. The record reveals that Husband is a manager at Sears and that his annual income is $44,200 per year, plus an additional $9,000 in bonuses. Wife is a student at Delaware Technical and Community College and works ten hours per week as a teaching assistant under the work-study program. As a teaching assistant, Wife receives $230 per month. When Wife was last fully employed as a home daycare provider in 1992, however, her income was established at approximately $15,000 per year. Wife further testified that she suffers from pseudo tumor cerebra, a condition which causes debilitating headaches and submitted a doctor's note in this regard dated November 1998.
(3) In its September 27, 1999 disposition, the Family Court denied Wife's request for post-divorce alimony based on the fact that Wife deleted a request for "permanent alimony" from her petition, leaving only a request for "temporary alimony," which the Family Court interpreted to mean "interim alimony." The court alternatively stated that it would be unable to award alimony because: (i) Wife had made no effort to seek employment since the date of the parties' separation and had failed to sustain her burden of proving that she is unable to work or that she has limitations for reasons of poor health; and (ii) Wife failed to provide the court with evidence of her expenses that could be compared against any earnings that the court attributed to her.
(4) On October 6, 1999, Wife filed a Motion for Reargument requesting that the Family Court reinstate her request for post-divorce alimony based upon her misunderstanding of what she was giving up when she amended her divorce petition to delete her request for permanent alimony. Wife's motion explained to the court that she had deleted her request for permanent alimony believing that she was not entitled to it because the parties had been married less than twenty years. In denying reargument, the Family Court ruled that if even Wife had in fact misunderstood the ramifications of her amendment to the Petition for Divorce, she had failed to prove her dependency. This appeal followed.
(5) The Family Court's decision on a petition for alimony "will not be disturbed on appeal if: (i) its findings of fact are supported by the record; (ii) its decision reflects due consideration of the statutory factors found in section 1512; and (iii) its explanations, deductions and inferences are the product of a logical and deductive reasoning process." Gray v. Gray, Del. Supr., 503 A.2d 198, 201 (1986).
(6) Wife submits two arguments on appeal. First, Wife contends that the Family Court erred in refusing to consider her request for "temporary alimony" because it confused the term "temporary" with "interim" alimony. Second, Wife contends that the Family Court abused its discretion in relying upon Wife's failure to seek full-time employment without explaining why her pursuit of an education and part-time job are insufficient to meet her obligation.
(7) Alimony jurisdiction is conferred upon the Family Court by 13 Del. C. § 1512. That section addresses both pre- and post-divorce alimony. Pre-divorce, or "interim alimony," is payable to a dependent party "during the pendency of an action for divorce or annulment." Id. at § 1512(a). Post-divorce alimony is divided into two subcategories — temporary alimony, which is payable for a number of years not to exceed half the length of the marriage, and permanent alimony, which is available only where the parties were married for twenty years or longer. See id. at § 1512(d).
Although section 1512 does not, itself, use the term "temporary" to describe non-permanent post-divorce alimony, this term has been frequently used by both this Court and the Family Court. See e.g., Gray, 503 A.2d at 200; J.P.D. v. J.M.D., Del. Supr., 413 A.2d 1233, 1234 (1980); McCall v. McCall, Del. Fam., C.A. No. 95-08245, 1997 WL 878439, at *8, Tumas, J. (Aug. 4, 1997); Chandler v. Chandler, Del. Fam., C.A. No. 89-10280, 1990 WL 163946, at *2, Gallagher, J. (Oct. 2, 1990).
(8) Although Wife's Motion to Amend her Petition for Divorce deleted her initial request for permanent alimony, it left the request for "temporary alimony" unchanged. Nonetheless, the Family Court held that it did "not have to reach any decision on the merits of [Wife's] request for continuing alimony, due to her withdrawal of her application for permanent alimony in her Motion to Amend her Petition for Divorce filed April 7, 1999." This statement makes clear that the court failed to differentiate between post-divorce temporary alimony and interim alimony awarded "temporarily" pending a final divorce hearing. Instead, the court seems to consider all post-divorce awards of alimony "permanent," even those "temporary" post-divorce awards, which by statutory decree are only "payable for a number of years not to exceed half the length of the marriage." 13 Del. C. § 1512(d).
(9) Although we find the Family Court's use of the term "permanent" to describe both permanent and non-permanent alimony post-divorce alimony somewhat confusing, that, in itself, does not constitute sufficient grounds for reversal. The court's failure, however, to consider Wife's request for "temporary alimony," after interim alimony had already been awarded, as a request for non-permanent post-divorce alimony does constitute an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case for a rehearing subject to the statutory standards set forth in 13 Del. C. § 1512.
(10) While we make no formal ruling on Wife's second argument, we are concerned with the Family Court's claim that Wife has failed to seek employment. Wife is currently enrolled full-time at Del Tech pursuing a degree in criminal justice and holds down a part-time work-study job earning approximately $230 a month. On remand, the court should explain why Wife's efforts are insufficient to fulfill her obligation to seek employment or training.
(11) We are also concerned with Family Court's statement that Wife did not present any evidence to document her expenses. The court's conclusions with respect to the division of marital property indicate that at least some evidence was presented to allow the court to determine that Wife is at a distinct financial disadvantage to Husband. Specifically, in awarding Wife 65% of the marital property, the court concluded that it "is satisfied [Husband] has an over three-to-one earnings advantage over [Wife] and will have the opportunity to earn far more income than she will in the future. He will also be able to acquire more assets including retirement assets."
Moreover, all parties are required to document their expenses in a financial report under Family Court Rule 16(c), a requirement that Wife claims to have satisfied prior to the hearing.
(12) Finally, we note that the Family Court failed to make findings on the several other factors that it must consider under 13 Del. C. § 1512(c).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court be, and the same hereby is,
REVERSED AND REMANDED.