Opinion
C.A. No. 07C-01-202 MMJ.
Submitted: July 12, 2010.
Decided: September 23, 2010.
On Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment DENIED.
Kenneth T. Deputy, Pro Se, Plaintiff.
Catherine Damavandi, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Kenneth Deputy is an inmate at the Delaware Correctional Center ("DCC") in Smyrna, Delaware. In October 2001, he injured his left shoulder while playing basketball. Over the next several years, Correctional Medical Services ("CMS") provided plaintiff with treatment that he alleges was inadequate. Ultimately, CMS refused plaintiff's requests for shoulder surgery. On January 18, 2007, plaintiff brought suit against DCC medical director, Dr. Conlon, DCC health administrator, James Welch, and DCC warden, Thomas Carroll. Plaintiff claims that defendants violated his rights under the 8th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution by acting with deliberate indifference towards his injury.
On March 6, 2007, the Court dismissed plaintiff's claims as factually and legally frivolous. On November 13, 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court vacated the Court's decision and remanded. On December 17, 2008, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's claims as factually and legally frivolous. On March 25, 2009, this Court denied defendants' motion in part, holding that plaintiff had asserted a prima facie case of deliberate indifference. However, the Court dismissed plaintiff's medical negligence claims. On August 21, 2009, plaintiff filed this motion for summary judgment.
FACTS
Two months after plaintiff's injury, x-rays revealed there to be no fracture or dislocation in his left shoulder. A CMS physician diagnosed plaintiff with a "probable strain," prescribed ibuprofen, recommended therapeutic exercises to strengthen his shoulder, and advised plaintiff to cease strenuous physical activity. Nonetheless, plaintiff regularly played basketball and did push-ups. On October 30, 2002, the Kent General Hospital Diagnostic Imaging Department administered an MRI of plaintiff's shoulder. The interpreting radiologist described the results as a "[n]ormal MRI of the left upper extremity." On March 25, 2005, Mid-Delaware Imaging administered a second MRI. This time, however, the results indicated that plaintiff's condition had worsened. The interpreting radiologist diagnosed plaintiff with tendonitis and a partial tendon tear.On May 26, 2006, after reviewing plaintiff's medical history and examining his shoulder, Dr. R. P. DuShuttle, ordered an "R/O" (rule out) MRI as to the existence of a complete tear. The results revealed a partial tear, and thus, a complete tear was ruled out. In a letter dated October 21, 2009, Dr. DuShuttle explained that if there had been a complete tear then surgery would have been necessary and urgent; alternatively, tendonitis and a partial tear make surgery an "elective" procedure.
Dr. DuShuttle is a board certified orthopaedic surgeon who practices in Delaware. He is not employed by CMS.
Plaintiff claims that Dr. DuShuttle "explained . . . that he would have to have surgery or live with the pain . . . failure to have surgery done could result in complete rupture of rotator [sic] and pain medications would not combat pain." Plaintiff alleges that he replied to Dr. DuShuttle that "the pain was to [sic] serious to live with" and that he "agreed to have the surgery, which the doctor recommended." Consequently, plaintiff sought CMS approval of the surgery by filing numerous grievances. Plaintiff was unsuccessful. CMS has administered cortisone injections in plaintiff's shoulder. Plaintiff avers that his injury significantly affects his quality of life, inhibiting his ability to get dressed, bathe, sleep, and exercise.
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
Plaintiff argues that Dr. DuShuttle "recommended" that he undergo surgery. By refusing his requests for surgery, plaintiff asserts that defendants have violated his 8th and 14th Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference towards his injury. Therefore, plaintiff contends that summary judgment is appropriate. Defendants respond that the surgery was deemed "elective" by Dr. DuShuttle, and therefore, denying plaintiff's requests for surgery was reasonable. Defendants maintain that an adequate treatment plan was provided, and accordingly, they have not acted with deliberate indifference.
ANALYSIS Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is granted only if the moving party establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and judgment may be granted as a matter of law. All facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment may not be granted if the record indicates that a material fact is in dispute, or if there is a need to clarify the application of law to the specific circumstances. When the facts permit a reasonable person to draw only one inference, the question becomes one for decision as a matter of law.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
Hammond v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 565 A.2d 558, 560 (Del. Super. 1989).
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
Wootten v. Kiger, 226 A.2d 238, 239 (Del. 1967).
Deliberate Indifference to a Medical Need
The United States Supreme Court has declared that a prison official's "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners" violates the 8th Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. To succeed with a deliberate indifference claim, an inmate must make two showings: (1) from an objective standpoint, the medical need must be sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official must have the culpable state of mind of "deliberate indifference" towards the inmate's health. The first prong requires an injury that a physician diagnosed as requiring treatment, or an obvious injury that a layperson could identify as requiring medical attention.The second prong is a subjective inquiry, requiring culpability beyond mere negligence, yet less than an outright act or omission. Deliberate indifference is akin to recklessness — the prison official must "both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Choosing a treatment plan other than what has been requested by an inmate, however, does not amount to deliberate indifference, provided that the treatment plan is reasonable.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
Id. at 837; see also Hyson, 2004 WL 769362, at *3 (citing Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346) ("[A] prison official's denial of an inmate's reasonable requests for medical treatment constitutes deliberate indifference if such denial subjects the inmate to undue suffering or a threat of tangible residual injury. Additionally, deliberate indifference may also be present if necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons or if a prison official bars access to a physician capable of evaluating an inmate's need for medical treatment.").
Diaz v. Carroll, 570 F.Supp.2d 571, 578 (D. Del. 2008) (citing Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 138-40 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1967) (Prison officials have "wide discretion" in providing medical treatment to inmates.).
The Severity of Plaintiff's Shoulder Injury
Though plaintiff voluntarily engaged in strenuous exercise after his injury occurred, his injury is "sufficiently serious" to satisfy the first prong of a deliberate indifference claim as a matter of law. Hyson v. Correctional Medical Services instructs that an injury is sufficiently serious if a physician diagnoses it as requiring treatment. Shortly after his injury, a CMS physician diagnosed plaintiff with a probable shoulder strain, prescribed ibuprofen, recommended therapeutic exercises, and advised against strenuous physical activity. Subsequently, radiologists reviewed MRIs of plaintiff's shoulder, Dr. DuShuttle examined plaintiff, and CMS administered cortisone shots. Plaintiff was and continues to be treated. These facts are undisputed, and establish that plaintiff's injury is sufficiently serious as a matter of law.Defendants' State of Mind
There are factual disputes with respect to the second prong — whether defendants acted with "deliberate indifference" towards plaintiff's health. Plaintiff relies on his alleged conversation with Dr. DuShuttle, claiming that surgery was recommended. Defendants rely on Dr. DuShuttle's letter, claiming that surgery was merely elective.In order to demonstrate deliberate indifference, plaintiff must prove that prison officials knew of, and disregarded, an excessive risk to inmate health. Plaintiff must show that defendants were "both [] aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . also [drew] the inference." Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to defendants, it appears that they believed that the surgery was elective.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Defendants have discretion in providing medical care to plaintiff, so long as their decisions are reasonable. "[A] prisoner has no right to choose a specific form of medical treatment." Though defendants denied plaintiff surgery, they have produced evidence that they otherwise have provided plaintiff with adequate medical care, including, but not limited to: x-rays, ibuprofen, MRIs, and cortisone shots.
Diaz, 570 F.Supp.2d at 578; Harrison, 219 F.3d at 138-140.
The Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist, at least as to: the reasonableness of medical treatment provided to plaintiff; and whether defendants had the culpable state of mind of deliberate indifference toward plaintiff's health.
CONCLUSION
Though plaintiff's injury is sufficiently serious, plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law that defendants had the culpable mental state of mind of deliberate indifference toward inmate health. Genuine issues of material fact remain.
THEREFORE, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.
Plaintiff also has argued that "defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity." Defendant did not file a cross motion for summary judgment on this issue. Because the Court has denied plaintiff's summary judgment motion, the Court need not resolve qualified immunity at this juncture.
IT IS SO ORDERED.