Summary
vacating Final Administrative Support Order where ALJ limited child support obligation to amounts stated in proposed order: the ALJ was required to establish the father's child support obligation based on the evidence presented at the hearing"
Summary of this case from Hernandez v. GuerraOpinion
No. 1D15–710.
01-06-2016
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellant, v. Clara Luz RESENDIZ and Daniel Andres Maravilla, Appellees.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Toni C. Bernstein, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. No Appearance for Appellees.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Toni C. Bernstein, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
No Appearance for Appellees.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
The Florida Department of Revenue raises two issues in this appeal of a Final Administrative Support Order determining the child support obligation of Appellee Daniel Andres Maravilla (the father). In the first issue, the Department argues that the administrative law judge (ALJ) erred by concluding that he lacked authority to enter a support order exceeding the amounts set forth in the Department's Proposed Final Administrative Support Order based on new information developed at an evidentiary hearing that would increase the father's child support obligation under the statutory child support guidelines. In the second issue, the Department argues that the Final Administrative Support Order is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Consistent with our opinion in Department of Revenue v. Reyes, No. 1D15–707, 181 So.3d 1270, 2015 WL 9584862 (Fla. 1st DCA Dec. 31, 2015), we resolve both issues by concluding that the ALJ was required to establish the father's child support obligation based on the evidence presented at the hearing. By limiting the father's child support obligation to the amounts contained in the proposed order, notwithstanding the evidence presented, the Final Administrative Support Order is contrary to Florida law and not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Accordingly, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.
WETHERELL, ROWE, and RAY, JJ., concur.