Opinion
No. 05-10-01168-CV
Opinion issued August 17, 2011.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2, Kaufman County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 10C-0192-2.
Before Justices MORRIS, MOSELEY, and FITZGERALD.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellee George Murphy was arrested for driving while intoxicated and was given notice that his driver's license would be suspended because he refused to provide a breath specimen. He requested an administrative hearing, and the administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that the Texas Department of Public Safety could not suspend Murphy's license. The Department appealed the ALJ's ruling to the county court at law. The trial judge affirmed the ALJ's ruling, and the Department appeals. We affirm.
I. Background
The evidence before the ALJ supported the following facts. Police officer Jason Stastny stopped Murphy at 2:33 in the morning after noticing that Murphy's vehicle "appeared to have defective license plate lights." When Stastny made contact with Murphy, he detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage. After Murphy performed some field sobriety tests, Stastny concluded that Murphy was intoxicated to a dangerous degree and arrested him. After Murphy was taken to jail, he said he would give a specimen of his breath, but after two attempts he "was unable to perform the tests."
Murphy was given notice that his license would be suspended, and he requested a hearing before the State Office of Administrative Hearings to contest the suspension. At the hearing, the Department introduced two pieces of evidence: Stastny's sworn report regarding Murphy's arrest, and the statutory warning that was given to Murphy regarding the suspension of his driver's license if he refused to give a sample of his breath. Murphy adduced no evidence, and no testimony was taken. After the hearing, the ALJ issued an administrative decision ordering that the Department was not authorized to suspend Murphy's license. She found that the Department's evidence did not show reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.
The Department appealed the ALJ's decision to the county court at law. After a hearing, the trial judge signed an order in which he adopted the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Department then perfected appeal of the trial judge's order. Murphy has not filed an appellee's brief.
II. Analysis
In a single issue on appeal, the Department contends that the ALJ erred by failing to find that reasonable suspicion existed for the traffic stop in question.
A. Standard of review
We review the trial court's decision de novo, which means we independently assess the ALJ's decision under the substantial-evidence standard of review. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Gonzales, 276 S.W.3d 88, 91 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.); see also Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 162-64 (Tex. App.-Dallas no pet.) (reviewing ALJ decision under substantial-evidence standard). Under the substantial-evidence standard, we do not decide whether the ALJ's determination was correct, but only whether the record demonstrates some reasonable basis for the agency's action. Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999); Fisher, 56 S.W.3d at 162. We must affirm administrative findings in a contested case if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support them. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131. Indeed, an administrative decision may be sustained even if the evidence preponderates against it. Id.
By statute, "[t]he [D]epartment's right to appeal is limited to issues of law." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 524.041(d) (West 2007). Whether substantial evidence exists to support an ALJ's order is a question of law. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Alford, 209 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
B. The ALJ's determination of "reasonable suspicion"
In an administrative license-suspension hearing, the Department bears the burden of proving several elements, the first of which is that "reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to stop or arrest the person." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.042(1) (West 2011). The Department's burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Norrell, 968 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.). Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer is aware of specific articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect that a particular person has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaging in criminal activity. York v. State, No. PD-0088-10, 2011 WL 2555688, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. June 29, 2011).
The ALJ found that the Department had not proved reasonable suspicion to stop Murphy by a preponderance of the evidence. She provided the following additional analysis in her order:
The Peace Officer's Sworn Report (DPS Exhibit One) states that on December 27, 2009, the arresting officer stopped the Defendant for operating the vehicle with a "Defective license plate light". The officer stated that he turned off his headlights and could not see [the] license plate. However, there was no specific evidence that the license plate was not visible from a distance of at least 50 feet as required by the Transportation Code.
The evidence fails to establish any specific articulable facts by which the fact finder can judge the reasonableness of the stop.
On appeal, the Department contends that the sworn report compelled the ALJ to find that Stastny had reasonable suspicion to stop Murphy. The pertinent passage of the report is as follows:
On Sunday, December 27, 2009 at 0233 hours, I . . . witnessed a white 1995 Buick . . . that appeared to have defective license plate lights. I positioned my patrol unit 7 behind the vehicle and turned off my headlamps to check the license plate lights of the vehicle. The license plate was not visible when my headlamps were turned off. I [e]ffected a traffic stop on the vehicle. . . .
According to the Department, this evidence established reasonable suspicion that the Buick's driver, Murphy, was violating three distinct traffic laws:
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the law requiring a vehicle to display at nighttime every lighted lamp and illuminating device required by chapter 547 of the transportation code, Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 547.302(a)(1) (West 2011);
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the law requiring a vehicle to have a taillight or a separate lamp that emits white light that illuminates the rear license plate and makes it clearly legible at a distance of 50 feet from the rear, id. § 547.322(f); and
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the law requiring the lamp used to illuminate the rear license plate to emit light whenever a headlamp or auxiliary driving lamp is lighted, id. § 547.322(g).
Thus, a driver commits an offense if (1) it is nighttime or his vehicle's headlights are on and (2) the rear license plate is not illuminated or the lamp illuminating the rear license plate does not make the license clearly legible at a distance of 50 feet.
On substantial-evidence review, our inquiry is not whether the ALJ's decision was correct, but only whether there was some reasonable basis for it. Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131. We conclude that there was a reasonable basis for the ALJ's decision in this case. It was the Department's burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Stastny possessed knowledge of specific articulable facts reasonably indicating the commission of a crime. See York, 2011 WL 2555688, at *5. Stastny said that at 2:33 in the morning he got behind Murphy's vehicle, he switched off his own headlights, and Murphy's license plate was not visible. If Stastny was reasonably close to Murphy's vehicle at the time, these facts would tend to support the existence of reasonable suspicion. But the lack of detail in Stastny's report leaves open the possibility that he was so far away from Murphy's vehicle when he conducted his test that he could not reasonably tell whether Murphy's license plate was illuminated or whether it was illuminated sufficiently to be legible at a distance of 50 feet. The Department's evidence of reasonable suspicion was not so strong that a reasonable ALJ would have had to conclude that Stastny's suspicion was reasonable. Accordingly, under substantial-evidence review, the trial court correctly let the ALJ's decision stand.
III. Disposition
We reject the Department's sole argument on appeal and affirm the trial court's order affirming the order of the ALJ.