Opinion
FBTCV156051926S
02-07-2017
Augusto G. DePina v. Alloy Engineering Co., Inc
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO REARGUE
Edward T. Krumeich, J.
Plaintiff Augusto G. DePina has moved pursuant to Practice Book § 11-11 for reargument and/or reconsideration of the Court's memorandum of decision dated January 4, 2017, that had granted summary judgment to plaintiff's former employer, defendant Alloy Engineering Company, Inc. Plaintiff contends that in granting summary judgment on his claim of negligent misrepresentation the Court misstated the facts when it found plaintiff's discharge was " instigated by the plaintiff himself, " that there was no evidence that the supervisor's statements alleged " were false and known to be false" and that " no pecuniary loss [was] caused by reliance on the representations made." Plaintiff argues that the Court should have followed the decision of Judge Arnold in Goncalves v. Superior Plating, FBT CV 08-5015711 S, (Conn.Super. 2010).
A motion to reargue under Practice Book § 11-11 may be granted only in limited circumstances:
A motion to reargue is not a device to obtain a second bite of the apple or to present additional cases or briefs which could have been presented at the time of the original argument . . . Rather, reargument is proper when intended to demonstrate to the court that there is some . . . principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked . . . (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Durkin Village Plainville, LLC v. Cunningham, 97 Conn.App. 640, 656, 905 A.2d 1256 (2006). C.R. Klewin Northeast, LLC v. City of Bridgeport, 282 Conn. 54, 101 n.39, 919 A.2d 1002 (2007).
A motion to reargue may also be granted when there has been a " misapprehension of facts . . . or claims of law that the [movant] claimed were not addressed by the court . . ." Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, n.28, 952 A.2d 1 (2008). See generally 1 Conn. Prac., Super.Ct. Civ. Rules § 11-11 (2016 ed.).
" Moreover, '[t]he purpose of a reargument is . . . to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or that there has been a misapprehension of facts . . . It also may be used to address . . . claims of law that the [movant] claimed were not addressed by the court . . . [A] motion to reargue [however] is not to be used as an opportunity to have a second bite of the apple . . .'" Chapman, 288 Conn. at 94 n.28.
Here, the Court did not overlook any controlling principles of law or misapprehend any facts submitted on the summary judgment motion. See e.g., Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Conn., Inc., 2010 WL 3038327 *3 (Conn.Super. 2010) (Shapiro, J.). The Court addressed the law applicable to the negligent misrepresentation count and chose not to accept plaintiff's argument based on the Goncales case that had been briefed by plaintiff in its objection to the summary judgment motion. Plaintiff is seeking a " second bite of the apple, " which is not proper under P.B. § 11-11. See Chapman, 288 Conn. at 94 n.28; C.R. Klewin, 282 Conn. at 101 n.39.
Plaintiff's motion for reargument and/or reconsideration is denied.