Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:96-CV-344-R
January 15, 1999.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Russell Denton filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleging that he was deprived of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Defendants, Wally Wilson, Kentucky Parol Board, Commissioner Doug Sapp, Dr. E.M. Comacho, Chester Adams, Don Johnson, and William Seabold ("State Defendants"), have filed a motion for summary judgment (docket #51). The Defendants Transcor America and its agents ("Transcor Defendants") have filed two pending motions to dismiss: one for Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim (doc. # 40) and one for the 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim (doc. # 50).
I. FACTS
Plaintiff Russell Denton is an inmate at the Roederer Correctional Complex. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants denied him adequate medical attention after two separate automobile accidents. Plaintiff complains that he suffers chronic pain caused by the denial of adequate medical treatment. Plaintiff filed suit against the (remaining) following Defendants: Transcor America, Inc.; Corporal Defreitas, a driver for Transcor; Dan Cochran, a driver for Transcor; Unknown Transcor Agents #1, Caucasian Male, and #1A, Hispanic Female, who transported Plaintiff on April 5; Unknown Transcor Agents #3, Caucasian Male, and #3A, Caucasian Female; Unknown Transcor Agents #4, Caucasian Female, and #4A, Black Male; Wally Wilson, parole officer; Doug Sapp, Commissioner, Kentucky Department of Corrections; Dr. Hector Comacho, Doctor at Roederer Correction Complex; Chester Adams, Farm Manager at Roederer; Don Johnson, Roederer Farm Cattle Supervisor; William Seabold, warden; and the Kentucky Parole Board. Plaintiff sues each Defendant in his or her individual and official capacity.
A. First Automobile Accident
Defendant Transcor America, Inc. contracts with the Kentucky Department of Corrections to transport detainees from other locations to Kentucky. Transcor Agents #1 and #1A were transporting Plaintiff from Florida to Kentucky on April 5, 1996, the day before the accident. Plaintiff brings suit against them because they turned over the prisoners to Transcor Agents, Cochran and Defreitas, who "obviously by their appearance . . . were incapable of further travel." Cochran and Defreitas were transporting Plaintiff on April 6, 1996 from Florida to Kentucky when the driver, Cochran, fell asleep about 7:30 P.M. The van ran off the road, and hit some trees near Perry, Florida. Plaintiff was taken to the jail in Taylor County, Florida and held there for two to three hours. He complained of pain and was offered ibuprofen. Plaintiff refused to sign a medical waiver and continued to request medical aid.
Plaintiff asserts that Transcor Agents #3, 3A, 4, and 4A were also responsible for transporting Plaintiff to Kentucky. After several hours in Perry, plaintiff was transported to Transcor's headquarters in Nashville, Tennessee. At approximately 4:30 P.M. on April 7, 1996, Transcor's agents transported Plaintiff and delivered him to the Jefferson County, Kentucky Jail. Transcor agents advised officials at the jail that plaintiff had been involved in a car accident.
Plaintiff asserts that Transcor has a policy of making drivers drive excessive hours, hauling too many prisoners in cramped vans, and intimidating prisoners into signing medical waivers after any accident. Plaintiff alleges that the Kentucky Parole Board is also liable since it arranged for Transcor to be involved in transporting the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges he was denied medical treatment at the Jefferson County Jail. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Wally Wilson visited plaintiff in the Jefferson County Jail on April 8, at which time plaintiff complained to him of the pain he had been suffering since the accident. Plaintiff asserts that Wilson acted with deliberate indifference to his medical need by ignoring him, while Wilson claims he had no personal contact with Plaintiff.
On April 19, 1996 Plaintiff was transported to the Roederer Correctional Complex and Assessment Center in LaGrange, Kentucky where Defendant Dr. Ernest Comacho oversaw Plaintiff's medical treatment. Dr. Comacho prescribed some pain medication, ibuprofen and parafon forte, for the Plaintiff's headaches and backaches. Plaintiff asserts that he should have had x-rays and other diagnostic tests.
B. Second Automobile Accident
On or about August 5, 1996 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Don Johnson drove plaintiff across the Roederer farm on the orders of Defendant Chester Adams. Defendant Johnson hit a sinkhole, allegedly injuring the Plaintiff and acting with deliberate indifference to the health and safety of Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Sapp, Seabold, Adams, and Johnson were aware that the pastures were dangerously high and failed to do anything to correct the problem.
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was transported to Tri County Hospital in LaGrange for x-rays and an examination. When he returned to the Roederer complex Dr. Comacho modified his prescription medications. Dr. Comacho attempted to have Plaintiff attend physical therapy at Kentucky State Reformatory, but he refused because he had a conflict with an inmate there. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Comacho failed to competently treat Plaintiff's injury which "has resulted in severe damage to the Plaintiff for the rest of his life."
Plaintiff also alleges that Commissioner Sapp, who is responsible for the operations and supervision of the Kentucky Department of Corrections, knew or should have known that the Roederer facility was operating with deliberate indifference to the medical needs of Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also claims that Warden Seabold is responsible for Eighth Amendment violations because he knew or should have known that Plaintiff was in severe jeopardy in his medical treatment.
C. Conspiracy
Plaintiff alleges that each and every defendant engaged in conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of medical treatment with deliberate indifference to his health, safety, and life, wantonly inflicting pain and suffering.
II. STANDARD
Summary Judgment is available under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) if the moving party can establish that the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
"[N]ot every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir 1989). The test is "whether the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury question as to each element in the case." Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff must present more than a mere scintilla of the evidence. To support his position, he must present evidence on which the trier of fact could find for the plaintiff. Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
III. DISCUSSION A. State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
To establish a right to relief under § 1983, Plaintiff must prove that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and that the Defendants deprived him of this right while acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). Plaintiffs claims against the State Defendants cannot withstand a motion for summary judgment.
The State Defendants are not subject to suit in their official capacities under the Eleventh Amendment. The amendment bars suits for damages against a state in federal court unless the state waives its immunity or Congress expressly abrogates that immunity. See e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 1360-61, 39 L. Ed.2d 662 (1974). In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L. Ed.2d 45 (1989), the Supreme Court held "that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are `persons' under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983." Thus, even if a state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, damages are not recoverable against a state official sued in his or her official capacity. In this action, Defendants Wilson, Comacho, Adams, Johnson, and Seabold are all state officials sued in their official capacities, and thus, are not liable for damages under § 1983. However, Plaintiff also sued them in their individual capacities. State officials sued in their individual capacities are not immune from liability for damages under § 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358, 365, 116 L. Ed.2d 301 (1991).
The appropriate inquiry when an inmate challenges the conditions of his confinement or alleges that prison officials failed to attend to serious medical needs is whether the officials exhibited "deliberate indifference." Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (1991). The deliberate indifference standard contains an objective component (was the deprivation sufficiently serious?) and a subjective component (did the officials act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind?) Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2327; Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 1992).
The objective component is contextual and governed by contemporary standards of decency.
Only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. A similar analysis applies to medical needs. Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are serious.Hudson v. McMillan, 112 S.Ct. at 1000 (citations omitted). A medical need is "serious" if it "has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Gaudrealt v. Municipality of Sale, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990).
There is no evidence that Plaintiff's injuries after the first accident were serious enough to require immediate medical attention. When Dr. Comacho examined Plaintiff shortly after the accident, he determined that Plaintiff did not have a serious injury. Although Plaintiff was in some pain, the doctor prescribed some mild pain medication. But when Dr. Comacho performed a physical exam on plaintiff on April 23, 1996, Plaintiff did not complain of pain and the doctor did not reissue the medication. It was not until July 24, 1996 that Plaintiff returned to the Doctor to complain of pain. There is no evidence that Plaintiff suffered any serious injury from the first accident. Since Plaintiff's needs were not serious, Defendants Wilson, Kentucky Parole Board, and Comacho could not have been deliberately indifferent in violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1992) (a prisoner who only needed a mild pain medication the day after being injured by a stun gun did not have a serious medical need requiring immediate medical attention).
It is unclear exactly when Plaintiff was seen by a doctor after the first accident. Someone had already prescribed ibuprofen and Parafon-Forte for Plaintiff when he was seen by Dr. Comacho on April 19, 1996.
A disagreement with the medical treatment received is not a constitutional violation. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1985). Generally, when a prisoner receives medical attention, courts do not second guess the judgment of medical professionals. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). Plaintiffs allegations of medical negligence after both accidents do not state a cause of action under § 1983. Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1989). There is no evidence that Plaintiff received substandard medical care from the State Defendants.
Likewise, Plaintiff cannot prove the subjective component of the test. The conduct for which a Defendant may be held liable must be "more culpable than mere negligence; it must demonstrate deliberateness tantamount to intent to punish. Knowledge of the asserted needs, or of circumstances clearly indicating the existence of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference." Horn v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 1994). The subjective component requires that Plaintiff must demonstrate the objective manifestations of the prison authorities' intent. It "cannot be proved by factually unsupported, conclusory opinions of the court or of the prisoners or their representatives." United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 154 n. 7 (6th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff's claims arising from the second accident lack subjective deliberateness on the part of the Defendants. Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a constitutional violation with regard to the care he received after the second accident. He was treated immediately at the prison and sent to the hospital, with follow-up treatment at Roederer. He saw a physical therapist at Roederer. He was offered more extensive physical therapy at Kentucky State Reformatory ("KSR"), but he chose not to go. He did not want to go because of an alleged conflict with another inmate at KSR. Whether Plaintiff had a documented conflict with an inmate at KSR is not a material fact as to whether Dr. Comacho was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Dr. Comacho did not knowingly and unreasonably disregard "an objectively intolerable risk of harm." Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1983 (1994). The Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
The claims arising from the second car accident are mere negligence claims. Plaintiff cannot prove that Defendant Johnson drove him across the farm with a deliberate indifference to his safety. His claims that Defendants Sapp, Seabold, and Adams had full knowledge of dangerous conditions also fail. Even if other inmates had been injured on the farm, the evidence does not prove "deliberateness tantamount to intent to punish."
Furthermore, Plaintiff's claims against Sapp, Seabold, and Adams are based on those Defendants' supervisory authority. A theory of liability based on respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions. Taylor v. Michigan Dep't. Of Corrections, 69 F.3d 76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants are merely conclusory, as he presents no evidence that they were directly involved in, implicitly authorized, or knowingly acquiesced to any unconstitutional acts.
Since Plaintiff fails in his § 1983 claim, he cannot prevail on a § 1985(3) claim based on the same substantive rights. Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1994). There are no genuine issues of material fact as to any claims against the state defendants and they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
B. Transcor Defendants' Motion to Dismiss § 1983 claim
Although Transcor Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), matters outside the pleadings were presented by both parties, and the Court shall treat the motion as one for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Both parties have had ample opportunity to present pertinent evidence and have done so.
The Transcor Defendants do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment Immunity. While Transcor was operating under color of state law for § 1983 purposes, it is a private corporation, seeking to maximize profits. Since a private corporation's employees are working to maintain the profitability of the company rather than for the good of the state, the corporation and its employees do not have immunity reserved for government employees. See McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff's claims against Cochran and Defreitas are mere negligence claims and do not state a constitutional violation. Assuming Cochran fell asleep while driving, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that his actions rose to level of a constitutional violation. Likewise, his claims against Transcor Agents #1 and 1A do not state a constitutional claim. They transported Plaintiff before the accident and had no contact with him after the accident. There is no evidence that they knowingly and unreasonably disregarded an "objectively intolerable risk of harm." Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1983 (1994).
Plaintiff's claims against the remaining Transcor agents involve deliberate indifference to medical needs. Plaintiff fails both prongs of the deliberate indifference test. As stated earlier, his medical needs were not serious enough to require immediate medical attention. When he was treated shortly after the accident, the Doctor did not find a serious injury. Also, the Transcor agents did not act wantonly. He was offered ibuprofen after the accident. He was only in the care of Transcor agents for less than twenty four hours after the accident. When he was delivered to the Jefferson County, Kentucky Jail, the Transcor employees told the jail of the accident. While Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1992), does not stand for a general rule that prison officials can wait up to a day to respond to a prisoner's request for medical treatment, as Transcor implies, it does suggest that these circumstances do not show deliberate indifference on the part of Transcor's agents.
Plaintiff argues that Transcor America, Inc. had a policy or custom of transporting prisoners in unsafe conditions, such as requiring drivers to drive long hours with no sleep. However, the occurrence of two separate vehicle accidents allegedly cause by the negligence of Transcor drivers is not enough evidence to show a "custom" on the part of Transcor to transport prisoners in a manner that violates the constitutional rights of prisoners.
C. Transcor Defendants' motion to dismiss § 1985 claim
To state a claim under 1985(3), a complaint must allege a conspiracy as well as "some class-based discriminatory animus behind the conspirator's action" Newll v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 86 (6th Cir. 1992). A class must possess the characteristics of a discreet and insular minority, such as race or gender. Haverstick Enterprises v. Financial Federal Credit, 32 F.3d 989, 994 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff clearly does not plead any class-based discrimination, so his § 1985(3) claim must fail.
ORDER
Upon Defendants' motions, and the Court being sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Defendants', Wally Wilson, Kentucky Parole Board, Commissioner Doug Sapp, Dr. Ernest Comacho, Chester Adams, Don Johnson and William Seabold, motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 51) is GRANTED.
(2) Defendants' Transcor America Inc. and its corporate agents' partial motion to dismiss (doc # 40) is GRANTED.
(3) Defendants' Transcor America Inc and its corporate agents' motion to dismiss the 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim is GRANTED.
This case is dismissed.
This is a final and appealable order. There is no just cause for delay.