Opinion
A144516
12-20-2017
ARTI DENTERLEIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JANE O'HARA GAMP et al., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. CGC-13-531393)
Plaintiff Arti Denterlein was a law student at San Francisco Law School (SFLS). Shortly before she was scheduled to graduate, she received low grades in two classes, and her grade point average (GPA) for her final year declined. SFLS informed her she was academically disqualified, and she was not allowed to graduate because her fourth-year GPA was too low.
Plaintiff brought this action against SFLS and two of its administrators for breach of contract, unfair trade practices, violation of her constitutional rights, fraud, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, and declaratory relief. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appeals from the ensuing judgment. We shall affirm the judgment.
The individual defendants are Jane O'Hara Gamp, SFLS's dean, and Pat Alley, SFLS's registrar.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Handbook Provisions
At the time plaintiff was disqualified from SFLS, the "San Francisco Law School Student Handbook 2007" (2007 student handbook) was in effect. Section 8.0, the first provision in the chapter governing "Academic Good Standing, Disqualification and Probation," provided: "It is the policy of San Francisco Law School that all students are required to maintain academic good standing during the course of their law study. Students failing to meet these requirements will be subject to academic probation or disqualification. The student's cumulative grade point average is used to determine whether a student is in good academic standing, academically disqualified, or will be placed on academic probation."
Section 8.1, entitled "Academic Good Standing," provided: "A student is in academic good standing if: [¶] 1. A student is in the Second, Third or Fourth Year, has a minimum cumulative grade point average [(CGPA)] of 70% and has no additional CGPA requirements, or [¶] 2. A student is in the Second, Third or Fourth Year, has a requirement for a minimum CGPA greater than 70% and has met that requirement, or [¶] 3. A student was admitted without a requirement that a GPA of greater than 70% be achieved at the end of the First Year and has attained a GPA of 70% at the end of the First Year, or [¶] 4. A student was admitted with a requirement that a GPA greater than 70% be attained at the end of the First Year and has met that requirement."
Section 8.2, headed "Academic Disqualification," provided: "Academic disqualification at San Francisco Law School will occur if: [¶] 1. A student's cumulative grade point average is less than 70% at the end of the First Year; [¶] 2. A student's grade point average for the Second, Third, or Fourth year is less than 70%; [¶] 3. A student's CGPA is less than 70%; [¶] 4. A student was accepted or readmitted with a requirement for a grade point average above 70% and has failed to attain the required grade point average."
Section 9.0, headed "Graduation Requirements," provided: "San Francisco Law School will confer a degree of Doctor of Jurisprudence (J.D.) upon students who have met all graduation requirements, including: [¶] 1. The student has a CGPA of at least 70%; and [¶] 2. A grade point average of 70 in the Fourth Year; and [¶] 3. Has successfully completed all required courses and all credit units necessary for graduation; and [¶] 4. Has completed a total of 84 semester units and has satisfied the residency requirements (Section 2.0, above); and [¶] 5. Has paid all fees, charges, and tuition due to San Francisco Law School."
Section 6.7, "Appeal of Grades," provided: "No grade will be changed after such grades are approved and either posted or mailed, except in the event of an objectively verifiable and material mistake or where a student demonstrates that the examination or course grade was the product of unfairness, or departure from established grading policy. It is the student's responsibility to present credible, factual support for such a claim. Any change in a grade may be made only upon written petition to the Dean/Administrative Dean. The petition will be referred to the Academic Standards Committee for review and a decision as to whether the grade should be changed. The decision of the Academic Standards Committee is final."
B. Plaintiff's Academic Disqualification
Plaintiff attended SFLS from fall 2005 until spring 2009. During each term until spring 2009, she maintained GPA's above 70. In spring 2009, however, she received a final grade of 64 in her commercial law class and a final grade of 63 in her choice of law class. As a result, her GPA for her fourth year was 67.20. Her cumulative grade point average was 72.76.
Plaintiff contends her commercial law grade should have been 68 percent.
Jane O'Hara Gamp, SFLS's dean, wrote a letter to plaintiff on May 26, 2009, informing her that she had been academically disqualified because her fourth-year GPA was below 70 percent, and that she would not be permitted to graduate during the commencement exercises that were to take place on May 31, 2009.
Gamp asked the professors who taught the classes in which plaintiff had performed poorly to review their students' exams, and they did not report any errors. Plaintiff's choice of law professor, Jonathan Gregory, testified in his deposition that he reviewed plaintiff's exam answers and concluded they had been scored properly. Plaintiff told her commercial law professor, William Webb, that there had been a mistake on her midterm grade and that she had submitted two papers for extra credit. Webb told Gamp that plaintiff had not visited him after the midterm exam or brought any mistakes to his attention. He also told Gamp that plaintiff had turned in two items that had not been assigned or approved for extra credit, that he had counted the assignments as one point each, and that plaintiff's final course grade already reflected the extra credit.
Plaintiff petitioned the SFLS academic standards committee (ASC) to allow her grades to be raised. Gamp recommended that the request be denied, and she informed the ASC that plaintiff's position was that receiving grades low enough to cause her to be disqualified was sufficient to show unfairness. Gamp explained that the examinations were graded anonymously; that both professors had confirmed that the tests were graded appropriately; and that plaintiff had not offered any facts to show the examinations were graded unfairly. SFLS notified plaintiff in June 2009 that her petition was denied.
In 2011, plaintiff told SFLS she had learned of a lawsuit brought against the school by another former student and the lawsuit had caused plaintiff to be concerned that she had been treated unfairly. In the ensuing correspondence with SFLS, plaintiff raised a variety of concerns: that she should have been offered a special project in the commercial law class after the final score came out; that the choice of law professor might not have been grading the correct blue books; that the choice of law class might have violated school policy if there was no midterm exam; that her grade in that class should have reflected her participation; that her examination grades did not reflect the quality of her work; that a professor had failed to provide feedback on a practice exam upon which the final exam was based; that her grades and GPA had been calculated incorrectly; that she should have had the opportunity to take remedial classes; and that the school might have singled her out for unfair treatment based on a review she had made of another teacher. She asked for the opportunity to present her case to the ASC. SFLS declined to rehear plaintiff's appeal.
C. Evidence in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
In her declaration in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff stated that on May 21, 2009, the school's registrar, Pat Alley, told her she could not graduate because her fourth-year grades were too low. Plaintiff told Alley the scores for her two extra credit papers had not been included in her commercial law grades. A few days later, Alley told her that Professor Webb had confirmed that, with the scores from the two extra credit papers included, her grade in commercial law was 68 percent.
Plaintiff averred that when she discussed the academic disqualification with Gamp in May 2009, she told Gamp that personal and health problems had affected her performance on the final exams; that in one of her exams, extra questions were erroneously stapled to her examination packet, causing her to misallocate her time; and that she had been distracted in one of the exams when another student made noise. Gamp told plaintiff she would provide the information to the ASC, but she did not do so. Gamp asked her to provide the names of students who had written negative reviews about another professor, a friend of Gamp's, and became agitated when plaintiff told her she did not know who had done so. When the ASC denied plaintiff's grade-review appeal, Gamp told her that she had not been involved in the decision, and she did not tell plaintiff she had written a memorandum recommending the ASC deny the appeal.
Plaintiff contended defendants made a number of false or inconsistent statements in May and June 2009: Gamp said plaintiff could not petition for readmission unless she first passed the bar exam and became an attorney; and Alley told plaintiff, incorrectly, that she was ineligible to seek readmission because her GPA was lower than 68 percent. Despite telling plaintiff she had not been involved in the grade-review appeal, Gamp wrote a memorandum recommending the ASC deny the petition and took part in the deliberations; and despite promising to provide the committee with plaintiff's transcript and plaintiff's specific complaints about her difficulties with the examinations, Gamp failed to do so, instead telling the committee plaintiff's appeal was based simply on claims of unfairness. Gamp also failed to tell the ASC that one of plaintiff's professors was willing to give an extra credit assignment if requested by the committee. Even before the committee denied the appeal, Alley wrote to the Committee of Bar Examiners to inform them plaintiff would not be graduating.
Gamp testified in her deposition that she did not provide plaintiff's transcript to the ASC because "[t]his was all about two grades in the fourth year," and plaintiff's earlier grades were "immaterial" to the issues before the ASC. A member of the ASC, however, testified that the school typically provided a student's transcript to the committee, and he always wanted to see all of the student's grades.
Plaintiff also averred that SFLS miscalculated her fourth-year grades and that her GPA for that year should have been at least 70 percent, but the evidence she cites does not support this contention.
Plaintiff presented evidence that Professor Webb asked SFLS to correct miscalculations he had made on the commercial law midterm examination; that he told the school to add extra points to the midterm exams of several students who had come to see him after the exam; and that he told the school to add extra credit to the overall grades of certain students (including plaintiff). On occasion the school allowed grades to be adjusted: In 2008, SFLS asked Professor Gregory to give extra credit assignments to two students to allow them to make up violations of the school's attendance policy. In 2006, a dean recommended to the ASC that it adjust grades for students in a constitutional law class taught by a new instructor, after numerous problems arose in the class, including inconsistent grading, failure to return midterm exams in a timely manner, and failure to ensure that supplemental course materials were available to all students.
On several occasions between 2006 and 2010, the ASC recommended readmission of students following academic disqualification. The record contains letters to other students informing them of their academic disqualification and explaining that they could petition the ASC for readmission. Gamp's letter to plaintiff informing her of her disqualification informed her that she could appeal her grades but not that she could petition for readmission.
The letter to plaintiff told her she would not be allowed to graduate because her fourth-year GPA was below 70 percent, but that she could appeal her grades. None of the other students who were invited to apply for readmission appeared to be in their final year at SFLS.
Plaintiff also submitted evidence she contended showed other students were treated more favorably than she was. One fourth-year student's transcript showed two grades for the community property class, once with a score of 54, and the second time with a score of 88. The student graduated in May 2009. One student whose GPA had fallen to 66.6 percent at the end of her second year was told to take summer courses in order to raise her grades, and she was allowed to advance to the third year after she successfully completed the summer courses. She was not required to petition for readmission. Other students also repeated courses during the summer to improve their GPA's.
Plaintiff and one other student—the classmate of plaintiff's who had also filed a lawsuit—were the only SFLS students with a cumulative GPA of 70 percent or higher who were academically disqualified and denied readmission between 2005 and 2009. Plaintiff avers that she and the other student were both older, female, minority students. The record does not disclose the demographics of the students who petitioned for readmission successfully.
D. Procedural History
Defendants moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication. Plaintiff brought a motion for summary adjudication of her cause of action for declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that under the 2007 student handbook, she was not subject to academic disqualification and that defendants violated the handbook's provisions when they disqualified her.
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the 2007 student handbook "unambiguously requires a student to maintain a grade point average of at least 70% in his/her fourth year to avoid disqualification," and that the remaining issues raised by the operative complaint—whether the grading was fair, and plaintiff's interactions with Gamp and Alley—did not show "arbitrary conduct that warrants court intervention." The court took plaintiff's motion for summary adjudication off calendar as moot.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
Plaintiff contends there are triable issues of material fact as to whether defendants acted in an arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory manner and whether they breached their contractual obligations to her. We review the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo, examining the record independently to determine whether a triable issue of fact exists. (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.) We view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the losing party, resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff's favor. (Ibid.)
In reviewing an educational institution's academic decisions, we are constrained by well-established legal principles, and "exercise a highly deferential and limited standard of review." (Banks v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1551 (Banks).) Our high court has explained that "[t]here is a widely accepted rule of judicial nonintervention into the academic affairs of schools." (Paulsen v. Golden Gate University (1979) 25 Cal.3d 803, 808 (Paulsen).) Under this rule, we may overturn a university's decision only "if we find it to be arbitrary and capricious, not based upon academic criteria, and the result of irrelevant or discriminatory factors." (Banks, at p. 1551, citing Paulsen, at pp. 808-809 and Wong v. Regents of University of California (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 823, 830 (Wong).) "We must uphold the university's decision 'unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.' " (Banks, at p. 1551, quoting Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing (1985) 474 U.S. 214, 225.) "An essential element of all claims such as appellant's, which seek to challenge an academic decision of a private university, is proof that the decision was arbitrary and capricious, because it was not based upon any discernible legitimate, rational basis." (Banks, at p. 1553.) Where there is no such showing, "summary judgment [is] not only proper, it [is] required by the applicable legal standards." (Ibid.)
"In keeping with this highly deferential standard of review, cases challenging academic dismissals often will appropriately be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment: 'In cases involving academic dismissal, educational institutions have the right to receive summary judgment unless there is evidence from which a jury could conclude that there was no rational basis for the decision or that it was motivated by bad faith or ill will unrelated to academic performance.' [Citation.] It is also well established that a litigant may not avoid summary judgment by attempting to generate disputes of fact as to issues which are not material to the legal theories and claims in issue: 'The presence of a factual dispute will not defeat a motion for summary judgment unless the fact in issue is a material one.' " (Banks, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1551.)
This rule has been applied in a number of cases since Banks was decided. The court in Lachtman v. Regents of University of California (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 187, 203-204, explained: "In deciding whether a student's substantive due process rights have been violated, we start with the 'widely accepted rule of judicial nonintervention into the academic affairs of schools.' [Citation.] ' "University faculties must have the widest range of discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of students and their entitlement to promotion or graduation." ' [Citation.] Judicial review of a university's academic decision is a 'narrow avenue' restrained by '[c]onsiderations of profound importance.' " Similarly, Kashmiri v. Regents of University of California (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 809, 825, teaches, "[I]t is well settled that contract law is not always rigidly applied, especially in actions challenging the academic decision of a university or a student's qualifications for a degree." And the court in Perez v. Hastings College of the Law (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 453, 459, noted, "Grades are the yardstick for performance in all academic institutions, and failure to maintain satisfactory grades is cause for expulsion or denial of readmission by any standard." The school has " 'absolute discretion in determining whether a student has been delinquent in his studies,' " and the student has the burden to show a dismissal " 'was motivated by arbitrariness, capriciousness or bad faith. The reason for this rule is that in matters of scholarship, the school authorities are uniquely qualified by training and experience to judge the qualifications of a student, and efficiency of instruction depends in no small degree upon the school faculty's freedom from interference from other noneducational tribunals. It is only when the school authorities abuse this discretion that a court may interfere with their decision to dismiss a student.' " (Wong, supra, 15 Cal.App.3d at p. 830, citing Connelly v. University of Vermont and State Agr. Coll. (D.Vt. 1965) 244 F.Supp. 156, 159-160.)
B. Analysis
With these principles in mind, we consider the evidence. The 2007 student handbook provides that a student will be disqualified under four circumstances, including if the "student's grade point average for the Second, Third, or Fourth year is less than 70%." It also lists five requirements that must all be met for graduation, including, "[a] grade point average of 70 in the Fourth Year." The undisputed facts show plaintiff did not meet these requirements.
Despite the plain language of these provisions, plaintiff contends that under other sections of the 2007 student handbook, she remained in good academic standing even though her fourth-year GPA was below 70. Section 8 of the handbook, entitled, "Academic Good Standing, Disqualification and Probation," begins with a general statement that "The student's cumulative grade point average is used to determine whether a student is in good academic standing, academically disqualified, or will be placed on academic probation." We do not read this to mean that if a student's cumulative GPA is more than 70, that student is not disqualified and may graduate regardless of his or her grades in the fourth year. Under section 8.2, a student may be disqualified either by failing to attain a GPA of at least 70 in the second, third, or fourth year, or by having a cumulative GPA of less than 70. Under section 9.0, a student must meet all of several graduation requirements, including achieving a GPA of 70 in the fourth year and having a cumulative GPA of at least 70. Thus, under the handbook, cumulative GPA is taken into account as one of several ways of determining whether a student is academically disqualified.
A closer question is presented by the 2007 student handbook's provisions regarding academic standing. Under section 8.1, among the circumstances in which a student is in good academic standing is: "A student is in the Second, Third or Fourth Year, has a minimum cumulative grade point average of 70% and has no additional CGPA requirements." This section does not mention any additional requirements for GPA's during the second, third, or fourth years. The handbook as a whole, however, makes clear that the school requires students to achieve minimum GPA's for each individual year at SFLS, in addition to maintaining a satisfactory cumulative GPA, in order to avoid disqualification and to graduate.
Plaintiff also points to the following statement in Gamp's declaration in support of the motion for summary judgment: "SFLS's policy regarding academic disqualification has been in place since at least 2003. It mandates that if a student's grade point average for the second, third, or fourth year, as well as cumulative average is less than 70%, the student will be academically disqualified. This same standard is required for graduation. Both of these policies are found in the 2003-2004 Student Handbook which was distributed to all students and have not materially changed since that time." (Italics added.) Plaintiff argues that this statement means that under SFLS's policies, a student was only disqualified if both the cumulative GPA and the GPA's for the specified years fell below 70 percent. She provides no authority, however, for the proposition that an administrator's declaration overrides the policies in a school's handbook. Moreover, Gamp's statement was based explicitly on the 2003-2004 student handbook, which provides that, to be eligible to graduate, a student must have both a minimum cumulative GPA of at least 70 and a fourth-year GPA of 70.
The 2003-2004 student handbook also provides that "[a]ny student whose grade point average for the second, third, or fourth year, as well as cumulative grade point average, is less than 70 will be academically disqualified." While this language may suggest that academic disqualification does not take place unless both those conditions occur, the handbook in effect at the time of the events we are considering is clear that to avoid disqualification, a student must attain a GPA of at least 70 in each of the second, third, and fourth years.
Plaintiff's fourth-year grades fell below this threshold. Her examinations were graded anonymously and, when she questioned the results, her professors reviewed her examinations again and confirmed that the grades were appropriate. Bearing in mind the deference we must give to a private educational institution's decisions on grades and on a student's qualifications, we conclude that the record does not contain evidence that defendants' decision "was not based upon any discernible legitimate, rational basis." (Banks, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1553.) Plaintiff cannot prevail on a theory that defendants violated the provisions of their own handbook.
Plaintiff points, however, to various communications from Gamp and Alley that she contends were misleading and showed defendants acted in a way that was arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory. She asserts her grade appeal was a "sham," that Gamp failed to inform the ASC of the basis for her appeal, and that Gamp failed to provide the ASC with plaintiff's transcript, as she had promised to do. The evidence does not, however, indicate that Gamp acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory manner—or that she was motivated by bad faith unrelated to academic performance—in informing the ASC of plaintiff's grades in her fourth-year classes and telling the ASC there were no facts to show that the examinations were graded unfairly. Indeed, the 2007 student handbook provided that grades could be changed after being posted or mailed only "in the event of an objectively verifiable and material mistake or where a student demonstrates that the examination or course grade was the product of unfairness, or departure from established grading policy."
Plaintiff also contends she received inaccurate information about her right to apply for readmission. The 2007 student handbook stated: "A student, who is academically disqualified under Section 8.2 above, may apply for readmission on academic probation by petitioning the Dean/Administrative Dean for a hearing by the Academic Standards Committee. The Petition must be in writing and delivered to the Administration Office. It should demonstrate good cause for readmission, including a showing of changed circumstances and a plan for remediation. The decision of the Academic Standards Committee is final." Gamp's May 26, 2009 letter to plaintiff informing her of her disqualification notified her she could appeal her grades, but did not mention that she could apply for readmission. Plaintiff sent Gamp and Alley an e-mail on June 7, 2009, asking for an explanation of the procedure to appeal from academic disqualification. Alley sent a letter in response telling plaintiff, "Technically, the appeal process does not apply to you. Your grade point average for the year was below 68%, the minimum GPA for an appeal." This information was erroneous: Alley acknowledged in her deposition that the 68 percent GPA cutoff for an appeal applied only to first-year students who were disqualified, and that she did not realize at the time she wrote the letter that the cutoff was inapplicable to plaintiff. While the information plaintiff received on her right to apply for readmission was mistaken, however, there is no basis to conclude it was anything other than simple human error, rather than the result of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or abuse of discretion.
Indeed, in her deposition Alley volunteered the information that she had been mistaken in telling plaintiff there was a 68 percent cutoff for applying for readmission, and said she had only recently realized her mistake.
Plaintiff argues that evidence defendants acted in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory is found in the difference between the way they treated her and the way they treated other students who faced academic disqualification. " 'Evidence that [a student] was treated radically different than others in a like situation' may be relevant to a claim that a university acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. [Citation.] But such evidence is not conclusive of the issue. The student must also show that the difference in treatment in [her] case was the result of an arbitrary or bad faith decision by the institution." (Paulsen, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 809.) Plaintiff points to one fourth-year student who was apparently allowed to take the community property exam twice, the first time with a grade of 54 and the second time with a grade of 88; the score of 88 was used to calculate the fourth-year GPA, and the student was allowed to graduate. But the record contains no information on what extenuating circumstances might have existed with respect to that student's performance in the examination to warrant allowing the student to retake it. In her declaration, plaintiff also points to another student who was allowed to graduate after earning a GPA of less than 70 during his fourth year. However, the accompanying decision from the ASC indicates that the student was not similarly situated to plaintiff: he had taken two traditional fourth-year courses during his third year at SFLS, and the ASC decided to use his grades from all traditional fourth-year courses—including those he took the previous year—to calculate the GPA for his fourth year.
Plaintiff does not point to any other students in her position—students who had failed to achieve the necessary fourth-year GPA for graduation—who were treated less favorably than she was. It appears that one other student in a similar position was also academically disqualified. Plaintiff states that she and the other student were both older, female, minority students, and that Gamp had suspected both were involved in writing negative reviews of another professor, who was a friend of Gamp. This evidence is too thin a reed to support a cause of action. There is no mention in the record of the demographic characteristics of any other students, no indication that any students in the same position as plaintiff were treated differently, and no basis to conclude defendants discriminated against plaintiff. In short, there is no evidence that defendants' treatment of plaintiff "was the result of an arbitrary or bad faith decision." (Paulsen, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 809.)
We emphasize again the limited, highly deferential, review we must apply to an action challenging a private university's decision on a student's qualifications for a degree. (Banks, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1551.) Plaintiff argues that the deficiencies of the student in Banks were more severe than her own, and attempts to distinguish the case on that basis. The plaintiff in Banks, a student teacher, was dismissed from a teaching program after exhibiting "erratic and sometimes disturbing episodes of unprofessional behavior," including leaving young students unattended, behaving inappropriately in the classroom, failing to perform routine teaching duties, engaging in an altercation with a student's grandmother, and pushing a student down into a chair. (Banks, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1548-1550.) The facts in Banks certainly are wholly distinguishable from those present here. But the principle remains the same—we may not overturn the decision of a private educational institution regarding a student's qualifications unless "we find it to be arbitrary and capricious, not based upon academic criteria, and the result of irrelevant or discriminatory factors," or " 'unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.' " (Id. at p. 1551.) While we, like the trial court, are discomfited by the harshness of the result, the record here does not support the findings necessary to overturn SFLS's decision.
We therefore conclude the trial court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. It necessarily follows that we reject plaintiff's contention that the court should have granted her motion for summary adjudication of her eighth cause of action, which sought a declaration that she was not subject to academic disqualification under the terms of the 2007 student handbook.
In connection with her motion for summary adjudication, plaintiff provided an expert declaration of Jon H. Sylvester, a professor and former associate dean at another local law school, who had taught at several other law schools. Sylvester explained that he was unaware of any law school at which it was possible for a student to be both in academic good standing and subject to academic disqualification; stating that this would be a "nonsensical" result; and opining that it was not clear whether the four bases for disqualification under the 2007 student handbook were each independently sufficient to trigger disqualification. "Unless resolution depends on the credibility of conflicting extrinsic evidence, the interpretation of a writing involves a question of law for de novo review by the appellate court." (Mayer v. C.W. Driver (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 48, 57; see also In re Tobacco Cases I (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 42, 51 ["[T]he interpretation of contractual language is a legal matter for the court. . . . and '[e]xpert opinion on contract interpretation is usually inadmissible.' "].) We have concluded that the terms of the 2007 student handbook as a whole show that a student must achieve both a minimum cumulative GPA and minimum GPA's for the individual academic years to avoid disqualification and to graduate. Plaintiff cannot create a triable issue of fact through an expert declaration to the opposite effect. --------
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Rivera, J. We concur: /s/_________
Ruvolo, P.J. /s/_________
Streeter, J.