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Summary of this case from Bowman v. Hodge Mgmt. Grp., LLCOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:10cv459-MHT (WO).
August 26, 2010
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Robert Phillip Dendy brings federal claims against defendant Decker Truck Line, Inc., for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) ( 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 — 12117), discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) ( 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 — 634), and interference and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) ( 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 — 2654). Dendy also brings state claims against Decker Truck for discrimination under the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act (AADEA) (1975 Ala. Code §§ 25-1-20 through 25-1-29), and for negligence and wantonness in general as well as negligent-and-wanton supervision and training under Alabama common law.
The case is now before the court on Decker Truck's motion to transfer this lawsuit to either the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama or the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in that the lawsuit will be transferred to the Northern District of Alabama.
I. BACKGROUND
Dendy worked as an over-the-road truck driver for Decker Truck. In September 2008, he was given an EKG during a physical and the results showed an abnormal reading. He had a follow-up appointment with James S. Lee, M.D., a cardiologist who practices in Cullman, Alabama. Dr. Lee determined that Dendy needed triple bypass surgery, and Dendy had the heart surgery at the University of Alabama at Birmingham Medical Center in Birmingham, Alabama.
Dendy requested and received a 12-week FMLA leave for the period of September 4 through November 27, 2008. On November 26, Dr. Lee provided Dendy with a full medical release and told him he was clear to return to work without restrictions. Dendy states that his wife called Decker Truck that day to provide this information, and that the company requested that Dr. Lee forward the medical release to a company doctor on the following Monday, December 1, due to the Thanksgiving holidays. On December 1, Dr. Lee forwarded Dendy's medical information to the company doctor. Dendy asserts that the company doctor called him on December 2, and said that she saw no problems with his medical paperwork, but that she was not sure how the company would respond to the fact that he would need to wear a heart monitor for 30 days.
On December 3, Decker Truck terminated Dendy's employment. According to Dendy, the company stated that his termination was based on his failure to return to work prior to the expiration of his medical leave, but Dendy alleges that he had presented a full medical release prior to the expiration of his leave, and that Decker Truck knew he was ready, willing, and able to return to his regular job. Dendy also contends that after he challenged his dismissal and requested an extension of his leave if necessary, the company retaliated against him in several different ways. For example, he alleges that the company refused to reinstate him to his former position; refused to extend his leave; attempted to deny him unemployment benefits based on knowingly false information; and did not pay him a bonus that was due to him.
II. DISCUSSION A. Standard for Motion to Transfer
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that, "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." Because federal courts normally accord deference to a plaintiff's choice of forum in a § 1404 motion, the burden is on the movant to show that the suggested forum is more convenient or that litigation there would be in the interest of justice. In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). The district court has "broad discretion in weighing the conflicting arguments as to venue," England v. ITT Thompson Industries, Inc., 856 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1988), and a court faced with a motion to transfer must engage in an "individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness." Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988). A district court may properly transfer a case to "the forum in which judicial resources could most efficiently be utilized and the place in which the trial would be [easiest, and] most expeditious and inexpensive." C.M.B. Foods, Inc. v. Corral of Middle Ga., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1286 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (Thompson, J.) (alteration in original).
Resolution of a § 1404(a) motion requires a two-step process. First, the court must determine whether the action could "originally have been brought in the proposed transferee district court," Folkes v. Haley, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1155 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (DeMent, J.). Then, the court must determine whether the action should be transferred "for the convenience of the parties [and] in the interest of justice." Id.
B. Propriety of Transferee District
On a § 1404(a) motion, the court first must ask whether the proposed transferee districts, the Northern District of Alabama and the Northern District of Iowa, are districts where the action originally "might have been brought." Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), venue is proper "(1) in a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all the defendants reside in the same State[.]" Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), a "corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time that the action is commenced[.]" Decker Truck is the only defendant and was subject to personal jurisdiction at the time that the action was commenced in both the Northern District of Alabama (where the company maintains a terminal) and the Northern District of Iowa (where the company has its headquarters). Both districts, therefore, are appropriate transferee districts.C. Balance of Justice and Convenience
The court must next consider whether the balance of justice and convenience favors transfer. Factors to consider when making this determination include:
"(1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the convenience of the parties; (4) the locus of operative facts; (5) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) a forum's familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded a plaintiff's choice of forum; and (9) trial efficiency and the interests of justice, based on the totality of the circumstances."Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2005). Also, "when the operative facts underlying the cause of action did not occur within the forum chosen by the Plaintiff, the choice of forum is entitled to less consideration." Gould v. National Life Insurance Co., 990 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (Albritton, J.) (internal quotations omitted).
As an initial matter, this court denies Decker Truck's motion to transfer this lawsuit to the Northern District of Iowa. It is evident that this transfer would pose a significant financial hardship to Dendy, given that he is an individual with limited resources. Thus, it would be neither just nor convenient to transfer the lawsuit to that district.
In contrast, the balance of justice and convenience militates in favor of transferring this case to the Northern District of Alabama. First, most of the critical, operative facts in this case occurred in the Northern District while none occurred in the Middle District. Dendy is challenging a number of Decker Truck's decisions concerning his employment. These decisions were all made by Decker Truck employees in either Birmingham, in the Northern District, or in Fort Dodge, Iowa.
Second, several material witnesses are located in the Northern District. Dendy himself resides in Arab, Alabama, a city in the Northern District that is about 70 miles north of Birmingham, and many of the witnesses from Decker Truck who would testify in this case are located in Birmingham, Alabama, Decker Truck's only Alabama terminal. In addition, several potential non-party witnesses are also located in the Northern District. For instance, Dr. Lee practices medicine in Cullman, Alabama, which is located about 50 miles north of Birmingham, and Dendy's wife lives with Dendy in Arab.
Arab is about 160 miles north of Montgomery. Birmingham, therefore, lies between Arab and Montgomery.
The other witnesses from Decker Truck who might testify are located in Fort Dodge, Iowa.
Third, and finally, many of the documents to be produced will come from the Northern District, while few, if any, will come from the Middle District. For example, many of the records relating to Dendy's employment with Decker Truck are located at the Decker Truck terminal in Birmingham. Similarly, many documents to be produced by Dendy's medical providers are also located in the Northern District. As noted above, Dr. Lee practices medicine in Cullman, and Dendy underwent heart surgery at a medical center in Birmingham. This court recognizes that advances in technology have made it easier to transmit documentary evidence. See Mohamed v. Mazda Motor Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 757, 778 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (Heartfield, J.) (noting that access to documents has "been given decreasing emphasis due to advances in copying technology and information storage"). Nonetheless, the fact "[t]hat access to some sources of proof presents a lesser inconvenience now than it might have absent recent developments does not render this factor superfluous." In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 316 (5th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, this factor provides some additional weight in favor of transfer.
The remaining documents relating to Dendy's employment with Decker Truck are located at its corporate headquarters in Fort Dodge, Iowa.
Arguing against these factors, Dendy contends that his choice of forum "should not be disturbed unless it is clearly outweighed by other considerations." Robinson v. Giarmarco Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 260 (11th Cir. 1996). The normal heft of Dendy's choice is lessened in this case, however. Because the Middle District is not Dendy's "home forum," the "presumption in the plaintiff's favor applies with less force, for the assumption that the chosen forum is appropriate is then less reasonable." Sinochem Intern. Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Intern. Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007).
Denby also argues that it would be inconvenient for him to travel to Birmingham. He asserts that, due to his financial circumstances, he is particularly concerned about the cost of litigation and that it is less expensive for him to meet with his attorney in Montgomery as opposed to paying his attorney to meet with him in his home. Although courts generally consider a party's "financial ability to bear the cost of the change" when determining whether the balance of justice and convenience favors transfer, Lasalle Bank N.A. v. Mobil Hotel Properties, LLC, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1301 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (Granade, J.), this court is not persuaded by Denby's argument. Even if this court transfers this lawsuit to the Northern District, Denby can continue to meet with his attorney in Montgomery.
On a related note, Dendy also argues that this court should consider the fact that his counsel's law office is in the Middle District, and that it would thus be less expensive for Dendy to try his case here rather than in the Northern District. In this case, however, transfer to the Northern District is unlikely to cause a significant increase in Dendy's litigation costs, given its proximity to the Middle District and the fact that most of the critical evidence is in the Northern District.
Finally, this court recognizes that Dendy has two potential witnesses who, if they testified, would find it more convenient to appear in this court. One of these witnesses, a former co-worker who might testify to the manner in which Decker Truck handled his own health problems, lives in Brundidge, Alabama, about 40 miles south of Montgomery. The other witness, a relative with whom Dendy shared his concerns when the company's actions and omissions were allegedly taking place, lives in Mobile, Alabama, in the Southern District of Alabama. Nonetheless, the court concludes that the locus of operative facts occurred outside this district and that most of the essential witnesses and documents to be produced are located in the Northern District of Alabama, while few, if any, are located in this District.
***
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court that defendant Decker Truck Line, Inc.'s motion to transfer venue (doc. no. 6) is granted and this lawsuit is transferred in its entirety to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effect the transfer.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: 28 U.S.C. § 158Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1 365 1 28 U.S.C. § 636 In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, 54Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885 885-86 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co., 108 S.Ct. 1717 1721-22 100 L.Ed.2d 178LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832 837 Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: 28 U.S.C. § 1292 Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 546 93 L.Ed. 1528Atlantic Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 157 85 S.Ct. 308 312 13 L.Ed.2d 199 2. Time for Filing: Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276 1278 4 Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): 3 THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): 28 U.S.C. § 1746 3. Format of the notice of appeal: See also 3pro se 4. Effect of a notice of appeal: 4
Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute: (a) Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under , generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." , 368 (11th Ci r. 1 983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. (c). (b) a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. (b). , (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. 486 U.S. 196, 201, , , (1988); , (11th Cir. 1998). (c) Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. (d) The certification specified in (b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable. (e) Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: , , 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, (1949); 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); , , , , (1964). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. , (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. (a) and (c) set the following time limits: (a) A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below. (b) "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later." (c) If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion. (d) Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension. (e) If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid. Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. Fed.R.App.P. (c). A notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant. A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. (a)(4).