Opinion
9:18-CV-789 (LEK/TWD)
02-03-2020
MICHAEL A. DEMUTH, Plaintiff, v. ERNEST CUTTING, LT. CHRIS MILES, SR., SGT. SICKMOND, CORPORAL HAYNES, CHENANGO COUNTY, Defendants.
APPEARANCES: MICHAEL A. DEMUTH Plaintiff, pro se 19-B-1439 Collins Correctional Facility P.O. Box 340 Collins, New York 14034 OFFICE OF FRANK W. MILLER Counsel for Defendant 6575 Kirkville Road East Syracuse, New York 13057 OF COUNSEL: FRANK W. MILLER, Esq.
APPEARANCES: MICHAEL A. DEMUTH
Plaintiff, pro se
19-B-1439
Collins Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 340
Collins, New York 14034 OFFICE OF FRANK W. MILLER
Counsel for Defendant
6575 Kirkville Road
East Syracuse, New York 13057 OF COUNSEL: FRANK W. MILLER, Esq. THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
Michael A. Demuth ("Demuth" or "Plaintiff") commenced this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding alleged violations of his constitutional rights. (Dkt. No. 1.) According to Demuth, he was not permitted to wear his wedding band while confined at Chenango County Correctional Facility without proof of marriage despite other non-married individuals being able to do so. Id. at 3. Given the foregoing, he raises an Equal Protection Clause claim against Chenango County and a related claim seeking injunctive relief against supervisors Ernest Cutting, Lt. Chris Miles, Sr., Sgt. Sickmond, and Corporal Haynes to permit him wear his wedding ring. (Dkt. No. 13.)
Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and his claims are meritless. (Dkt. No. 35.) Moreover, the supervisory Defendants argue Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief is moot because Plaintiff is no longer in their custody. Id. Plaintiff did not respond to the motion for summary judgment despite several extensions of time to do so. Therefore, the Court considers the motion unopposed. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends granting Defendants' motion on exhaustion grounds and dismissing this case with prejudice.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing, through the production of admissible evidence, no genuine issue of material fact exists. Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2006). A dispute of fact is "genuine" if "the [record] evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.
Only after the moving party has met this burden is the nonmoving party required to produce evidence demonstrating genuine issues of material fact exist. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 273 (citations omitted). As noted above, Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's failure to oppose Defendant's motion results in the admission of properly supported facts, however the Court must still ensure those facts show Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Jackson v. Federal Express, 766 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2014) (a non-response to a summary judgment motion does not risk default because the district court must ensure that each statement of material fact is supported by the record evidence sufficient to satisfy the movant's burden of production even if the statement is unopposed) (citing Vermont Teddy Bear Co., Inc. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 242-46 (2d Cir. 2004) (even when a motion for summary judgment is not opposed, the district court is not relieved of its duty to decide whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law)).
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was booked into the Chenango County Correctional Facility on ten occasions between December 4, 2017, and October 23, 2018. (Dkt. No. 35-2 at ¶ 4.) He reported his marital status as "single" or "divorced" at the time of each admission. Id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff was not permitted to wear his wedding band while confined at Chenango County Correctional Facility because he indicated he was single or divorced. Id. at ¶ 4, 13.
The statement of material facts includes two paragraphs numbered "13." This reference is to the first numbered paragraph "13."
Plaintiff filed an informal and formal grievance concerning his request to wear his wedding ring on June 3, 2018. Id. at ¶ 10. The formal grievance was denied and Plaintiff later indicated he no longer wished to pursue this grievance on June 5, 2018. Id. Plaintiff filed an additional informal complaint on June 20, 2018, regarding his wedding band. Id. at ¶ 13. His grievance was denied on June 21, 2018. Id. Plaintiff did not appeal. Id. at ¶ 14.
This reference is to the second numbered paragraph "13."
Therefore, it is undisputed that (1) Plaintiff submitted two grievances regarding his wedding band on June 3, 2018, and June 20, 2018; (2) Plaintiff's grievances were denied; and (3) Plaintiff did not appeal those determinations.
III. EXHAUSTION
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is required for "all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
Because non-exhaustion is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of showing that a prisoner has failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirements. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Whether a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies is a question of law. Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1999). Thus, an inmate's failure to exhaust administrative remedies is properly considered on a motion for summary judgment. Crichlow v. Fischer, No. 6:15-CV-06252 EAW, 2017 WL 920753, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2017) (citing Mckinney v. Prack, 170 F. Supp. 3d 510, 514 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (granting a motion for summary judgment made in lieu of an answer where inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies)).
To properly exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA, inmates are required to complete the administrative review process in accordance with the rules applicable to the institution to which they are confined. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)); see also Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2011) (exhaustion necessitates "using all steps that the [government] agency holds out, and doing so properly").
The Chenango County Correctional Facility has a seven-step inmate grievance procedure. (Dkt. No. 35-6 at 26-28.) First, the inmate must "attempt to reach a solution with the Corrections Officer assigned" to his housing area. Id. at 27. Second, the inmate may request an informal complaint form. Id. Third, the inmate may request a formal grievance form. Id. Fourth, the grievance is investigated and the Investigating Grievance Officer provides a written determination within five business days of receiving the complaint. Id. Fifth, the inmate may appeal to the Jail Administrator or his or her designee within two business days of receiving the Grievance Officer's decision. Id. Sixth, the Jail Administrator responds within five business days. Id. Seventh, the inmate may appeal to the State Commission of Corrections, which responds within forty-five days. Id.
Here, it is undisputed Plaintiff failed to avail himself of the full panoply of administrative remedies at Chenango County Correctional Facility. As noted above, Plaintiff filed two grievances on June 3, 2018, and June 20, 2018. (Dkt. No. 35-2 at ¶¶ 10, 13.) Those grievances were denied, and Plaintiff never appealed. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11, 13-14. Thus, the Jail Administrator and the State Commission on Corrections never had a chance to review Plaintiff's grievances. For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Nevertheless, while the PLRA mandates exhaustion of administrative remedies, it also "contains its own, textual exception to mandatory exhaustion." Ross v. Blake, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016). More specifically, Section 1997e(a) provides only those administrative remedies that "are available" must first be exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1858 ("[T]he exhaustion requirement hinges on the availability of administrative remedies[.]" (quotation marks and citations omitted)). In the PLRA context, the Supreme Court has determined "availability" means "an inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that are capable of use to obtain some relief for the action complained of." Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Ross Court identified three circumstances in which a court may find internal administrative remedies are not available to prisoners under the PLRA. Id. at 1859-60. First, "an administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates." Id. at 1859. "Next, an administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use." Id. Finally, an administrative remedy is not "available" when "prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation." Id. at 1860.
In Williams v. Correction Officer Priatno, the Second Circuit noted "the three circumstances discussed in Ross do not appear to be exhaustive[.]" 829 F.3d 118, 123 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016). The illustrations of unavailability in Ross nonetheless guide the Court's inquiry. See Mena v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-2430 (RJS), 2016 WL 3948100, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2016).
There is no evidence in the record showing the Chenango County Correctional Facility grievance procedure "operate[d] as a simple dead end" to Plaintiff, nor is there any evidence that prison administrators prevented Plaintiff from using the grievance procedure due to "machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation." See Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859-60. The only Ross factor that could potentially be raised is unavailability due to an "opaque" administrative scheme. See id. However, even if the Court were to be extremely deferential to Plaintiff's pro se status, there is no evidence to establish an issue of fact as to the program's opacity.
Moreover, Plaintiff's original complaint was signed on June 28, 2018, and filed July 2, 2018—well before he possibly could have exhausted his administrative remedies had he tried. In the Second Circuit, if a prisoner files suit in federal court before exhausting administrative remedies, the federal court must dismiss the complaint—suspending or continuing the action until administrative remedies are exhausted cannot "save a case from dismissal." Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2001), abrogated in part on other grounds by Porter, 534 U.S. 516.
Therefore, the Court recommends granting the motion for summary judgment on exhaustion grounds.
It is appropriate for the Court to dismiss a claim without prejudice for failing to exhaust administrative remedies "[i]f the time permitted for pursuing administrative remedies has not expired." Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Snider, 199 F.3d at 111-12). However, the Court may dismiss the claim with prejudice if the plaintiff had the opportunity to exhaust administrative remedies, failed to do so, and is unable to cure his failure to exhaust. Id. at 88.
Here, more than a year has passed since Plaintiff should have appealed the grievance. As Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies is incurable at this point, the Court recommends dismissing Plaintiff's action with prejudice. See Castineiras v. Helms, No. 9:17-CV-1084 (BKS/ATB), 2019 WL 2870300, at *5-6 (N.D.N.Y. June 6, 2019).
As noted above, Defendants alternatively move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim and on his claim for injunctive relief on mootness grounds. The Court declines to consider the merits at this time given the clear record regarding exhaustion. With respect to mootness, Defendants argue Plaintiff's claim is moot because he was transferred to State custody. (Dkt. No. 35-16 at 25-26.) While such a fact would ordinarily moot a request for injunctive relief, Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 2002), here, however, Defendants failed to establish Plaintiff is no longer in their custody. Rather, Defendants' contention that "Plaintiff was received into custody of the New York Department of Corrections on June 14, 2019[,]" is only found in the memorandum of law and is devoid of citation to any evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully considering the record, the Court finds Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 35) be GRANTED; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiff, along with a copy of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6(a). Dated: February 3, 2020
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
Syracuse, New York
/s/_________
Thérèse Wiley Dancks
United States Magistrate Judge