Summary
holding time, inconvenience, potential difficulty, and expense insufficient to invoke certiorari jurisdiction
Summary of this case from Cruz v. Cooperativa De Seguros Multiples De Puerto Rico, Inc.Opinion
No. 2D07-687.
September 7, 2007.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Pinellas County, Walt Logan, J.
Michael J. Keane and Brandon S. Vesely of Keane, Reese, Vesely Gerdes, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Petitioners.
Eric C. Pinkard of The Robbins Law Firm, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Respondents.
Dennis R. DeLoach, Jr., and Peter T. Hofstra, cotrustees of the Bickley Trust, petition for a writ of certiorari. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(b)(2)(A), 9.100. The cotrustees ask us to quash the trial court's interlocutory order allowing the filing of a fourth amended complaint. Because the cotrustees have not presented an issue that invokes our certiorari jurisdiction, we dismiss the petition. See Parkway Bank v. Ft. Myers Armature Works, Inc., 658 So.2d 646, 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
Our record shows that the Bickley Trust owned the Bay Pines Mobile Home Park in Pinellas County. Litigation erupted when the Bickley Trust sold the park and the new owner evicted the residents. The Bay Pines Mobile Home Park Association sued the cotrustees. An amended complaint added the new owner of the park as a defendant. A second amended complaint was dismissed because it was filed without leave of court. A third amended complaint, purporting to proceed as a class action, also was dismissed. The trial court, however, granted the motion at issue here and allowed the filing of a fourth amended complaint naming well over 150 individual plaintiffs.
"[C]ommon law certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and should not be used to circumvent the interlocutory appeal rule which authorizes appeals from only a few types of non-final orders." Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097, 1098 (Fla. 1987). We may review an interlocutory order that is not appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 by petition for certiorari only when the petitioner establishes (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the trial (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal. See Parkway Bank, 658 So.2d at 648. We examine prongs two and three first to determine our certiorari jurisdiction. Id. at 648-49. "If the jurisdictional prongs . . . are not fulfilled, then the petition should be dismissed rather than denied." Id. at 649.
In their petition, the cotrustees argue that the time, inconvenience, potential difficulty, and expense associated with proceeding against the numerous new plaintiffs inflict irreparable harm on them. Yet, such travails, actual or perceived, are insufficient to invoke our certiorari jurisdiction. See Parkway Bank, 658 So.2d at 650 (holding consideration of expense and delay insufficient to support issuance of extraordinary writ of certiorari); Riano v. Heritage Corp. of S. Fla., 665 So.2d 1142, 1145-46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (reciting cases and emphasizing that it is not the function of the appellate court to review interlocutory orders in order to save the litigants time and expense).
Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed.
ALTENBERND and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.