Summary
stating that, in order to prove retaliatory discharge claim arising from a workers' compensation claim, the employee must demonstrate that filing the claim was "the determinative factor" in the employer's decision to terminate employment
Summary of this case from Tjelmeland v. United Rentals, Inc.Opinion
No. 5-236 / 04-1332
Filed May 25, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hardin County, Dale E. Ruigh, Judge.
A plaintiff appeals from a district court entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant upon the plaintiff's claims of national origin discrimination and retaliatory discharge. AFFIRMED.
John Haraldson of the Law Office of Roger J. Kuhle, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant.
Ann Holden Kendell James H. Gilliam of Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross, Baskerville and Schoenebaum, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
Plaintiff Genaro DeLeon appeals from the district court ruling that granted Defendant Iowa Select Farms, L.P. (Iowa Select) summary judgment and dismissed DeLeon's claims of national origin discrimination and retaliatory discharge. We affirm the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
DeLeon worked intermittently for Iowa Select between October 1996 and May 2000. On his final return to Iowa Select in December 1999, and consistent with company policy, DeLeon was rehired as an introductory worker earning a starting salary of $8.00 per hour.
In the spring of 2000 DeLeon was made a "crew leader" of a wash crew. The work to be performed by the wash crew was unique and unpleasant. Accordingly, crew members, nearly all of whom were individuals of Mexican origin, were paid a bonus. DeLeon, who is also of Mexican origin, was not. It is disputed whether DeLeon ever performed the same work as the crew members, but it is undisputed that DeLeon was supervising the work and that, even if DeLeon did perform some of the work, he did not do so to the same extent as the crew members. Other crew leaders earned more money than DeLeon. Some of these crew leaders were of Mexican origin, others were not. There is no evidence that any of these crew leaders had an intermittent work history with Iowa Select.
On May 18, 2000, DeLeon was injured at work. DeLeon met with his supervisor on May 18 and 19. During the meetings DeLeon requested an increase in pay to match that of his crew members, and informed his supervisor of his work injury. The supervisor denied DeLeon's request for a pay increase, and advised DeLeon to make a report of his injury and to see a doctor.
According to DeLeon the supervisor told him to be at the office the following Monday, May 22, fifteen or twenty minutes before the 7:00 a.m. start time, so that they could further discuss the pay issue. According to the supervisor, he simply informed DeLeon that if he wanted to continue his employment at his current wage, he should arrive at work on Monday morning with his crew at their worksite.
On May 22 DeLeon did not pick up his crew and take them to their worksite. DeLeon was terminated later that day. Iowa Select's stated reason for termination was that DeLeon did not pick up his crew or report for work on Monday, and thus was a "no call-no show" employee.
DeLoen contends he told his supervisor's secretary he was not feeling well and therefore someone else would need to take his crew to the work site. The supervisor asserts he was never informed that DeLeon would be unable to transport his crew.
In September 2002, after receiving a right to sue letter, DeLeon filed a petition against Iowa Select, alleging that (1) Iowa Select had refused to pay him compensation and terminated his employment on the basis of his national origin, in violation of Iowa Code chapter 216 (2001) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; and (2) his termination was retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. The district court granted Iowa Select summary judgment, and dismissed both claims. DeLeon appeals.
DeLeon's petition also made claims under Iowa Code chapter 91A and 42 U.S.C. section 1981. However, those claims were voluntarily dismissed.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
Our review is for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. The district court's grant of summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3); City of West Branch v. Miller, 546 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1996). When a motion for summary judgment is supported, a resisting party may not simply rely upon the pleadings, but must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered." Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5). In determining whether summary judgment was appropriate, we view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bearshield v. John Morrell Co., 570 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa 1997).
III. Discussion.
Applying the foregoing standards, we conclude the district court properly granted summary judgment, and its ruling should be affirmed. The court's opinion is thorough, and we find it unnecessary to fully repeat the court's well-reasoned analysis. Rather, we will focus on the key issues in this appeal.
A. Employment Discrimination.
The district court analyzed DeLeon's employment discrimination claims under both McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989), applying Price Waterhouse as it existed both before and after the United State Supreme Court's pronouncement in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 156 L. Ed. 2d 84 (2003). The court correctly determined that DeLeon could not recover under any legal framework.
Under McDonnell Douglas DeLeon was required to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination based upon his national origin. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105, 116 (2000); Fuller v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 576 N.W.2d 324, 328 (Iowa 1998). In relevant part DeLeon was required to produce evidence that he was treated differently than a similarly situated employee outside of his protected class, raising at least an inference of discriminatory motivation. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S. Ct. at 2106, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 117; Smidt v. Porter, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2005). If DeLeon establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Iowa Select to produce legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for DeLeon's lower pay and termination. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43, 120 S. Ct. at 2106, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 117. Once this burden is met, DeLeon must demonstrate the proffered reasons were pretextual and that the real reason for the lower pay and termination was unlawful discrimination. Id.
Here, the summary judgment record is devoid of evidence that DeLeon's lower pay or termination was due to national origin discrimination. There is no evidence DeLeon's termination was due to his national origin. In fact, the only evidence relied upon by DeLeon is the timing of his termination, which occurred shortly after he complained about the disparity between his pay and that of other employees. However, many of those employees were, like DeLeon, of Mexican origin. Moreover, there is no evidence that, as among the higher-paid workers, those of Mexican origin were paid less than those of non-Mexican origin. An inference of national origin discrimination is not raised merely because some of the workers who were paid at a higher rate than DeLeon were not Mexican.
DeLeon also points out that his termination was close in time to his work-related injury, a fact that is clearly unrelated to DeLeon's national origin.
The record does not contain any facts, much less disputed material facts, which would allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that DeLeon had established a prima facie case of discrimination. See Hall v. Barrett, 412 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (noting a disputed fact is one that might affect the outcome of a case, in that a reasonable fact finder could decide in the nonmoving party's favor). Moreover, even if DeLeon had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, Iowa Select proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for DeLeon's lower pay and termination — he was not performing the same work as his crew, his pay was impacted by the fact he had not been a continuous employee of Iowa Select, and he was terminated for being a "no call-no show" employee. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43, 120 S. Ct. at 2106, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 117 (noting employer's burden to offer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason is a burden of production, not persuasion, and no credibility assessment is involved).
Once Iowa Select proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, the burden shifted back to DeLeon to demonstrate the proffered reason was pretextual. Id. Under the summary judgment record, it is a burden DeLeon cannot meet.
Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in a case such as this one will depend upon a number of factors, including the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case and the probative value of the proof the employer's explanation is false.
Smidt, ___ N.W.2d at ___. Here, there is simply inadequate evidence of discriminatory motive for a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Iowa Select's true motivation in failing to pay DeLeon the same wage as his crew members or the other crew leaders, or in terminating his employment, was his Mexican origin.
A similar conclusion is reached under either Price Waterhouse or Desert Palace. Prior to Desert Palace a plaintiff relying on Price Waterhouse was required to present direct evidence that unlawful discrimination played a motivating part in the challenged employment decisions. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 245, 109 S. Ct. at 1787, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 284. Desert Palace eliminated the requirement that proof of unlawful motive be shown by direct evidence. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02, 123 S. Ct. at 2155, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 95-96.
We need not decide which framework is applicable to DeLeon's federal claim or state claim. For all the reasons previously stated, we conclude the summary judgment record, even viewed in the light most favorable to DeLeon, does not contain evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that national origin discrimination played a motivating part in Iowa Select's pay or termination decisions.
B. Retaliatory Discharge.
In order to establish that Iowa Select terminated his employment in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim, DeLeon must demonstrate, in relevant part, that filing the claim was "the determinative factor" in Iowa Select's decision to terminate his employment. See Teachout v. Forest City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 584 N.W.2d 296, 301-02 (Iowa 1998) (emphasis deleted) ("A factor is determinative if it is the reason that `tips the scales decisively one way or the other,' even if it is not the predominant reason behind the employer's decision."). We agree with the district court that the retaliatory discharge claim fails as a matter of law. DeLeon did not present evidence, disputed or otherwise, from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that filing a workers' compensation claim was the determinative factor in the termination decision.
When DeLeon informed his supervisor of his injury, he was in fact advised to make a report and to see a doctor. There is no evidence anyone at Iowa Select discouraged DeLeon from filing a report or seeing a doctor. The only evidence DeLeon points to is the fact that he was terminated shortly after reporting his injury. We agree with the district court that the timing of the termination, without more, is insufficient to generate a jury question on retaliation. See Phipps v. IASD Health Services Corp., 558 N.W.2d 198, 203 (Iowa 1997); see also Brown v. Farmland Foods, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 961, 982 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
IV. Conclusion.
Based upon the summary judgment record, we agree the evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory motivation is simply inadequate to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Iowa Select's pay and termination decisions were improperly motivated by DeLeon's national origin or his filing of a workers' compensation claim. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision to enter summary judgment in favor of Iowa Select, and to dismiss DeLeon's claims.