Opinion
No. CV06-5002937S
July 24, 2007
MEMORANDUM RE MOTION TO STRIKE #106
FACTS
On December 29, 2006, the plaintiffs, Ralph Delbuono and Constantine Kotsaftis, filed a two-count complaint against the defendants, James Upham, Roseanne Upham, James Visconti, and Clifford Development, LLC. In count one, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants defaulted on a promissory note they executed in the amount of $100,000. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants owe the principal sum of $72,627.20 plus interest at the rate called for in the note. The plaintiffs also claim that the defendants must reimburse them for costs of collection, including reasonable attorneys fees as allowed by the law. In count two, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants leased property and a business known as "The Bungalow" from them. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants were responsible for all bills related to the operation of the property, including electricity and taxes. The plaintiffs allege that at the present time, and despite the demand for payment, full satisfaction of all bills and obligations has not been made and there remains an outstanding total principal balance of $14,819.27 plus interest. The plaintiffs claim monetary damages pursuant to General Statutes § 36a-785(g) and such further relief as provided by the statute pertaining to wage garnishment.
On February 7, 2007, the defendant, Visconti, filed an answer with three special defenses and three counterclaims. In the second special defense, Visconti asserts the following: (1) the plaintiffs' counts are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands; (2) the plaintiffs intentionally misled and fraudulently induced the defendant to sign the promissory note and lease the property by materially misrepresenting the value and operation of the business known as "The Bungalow"; and (3) the plaintiffs' conduct has not been fair, equitable and honest towards the defendant.
The two remaining special defenses and the three counterclaims are not relevant to the motion before the court.
On April 24, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a motion to strike Visconti's second special defense on the ground that it is legally insufficient. The plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in support of their motion. On May 9, 2007, Visconti filed a memorandum of law in opposition. On May 14, 2007, the parties presented oral argument to this court.
DISCUSSION
"A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225, 229, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006). "[A] plaintiff can [move to strike] a special defense . . ." Nowak v. Nowak, 175 Conn. 112, 116, 394 A.2d 716 (1978); see also Practice Book § 10-39(a)(5). "The purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., 249 Conn. 1, 17, 730 A.2d 1128 (1999); see also Practice Book § 10-50. "In . . . ruling on [a] . . . motion to strike [a special defense], the trial court [has an] obligation to take the facts to be those alleged in the special [defense] and to construe the [defense] in the manner most favorable to sustaining [its] legal sufficiency." Connecticut National Bank v. Douglas, 221 Conn. 530, 536, 606 A.2d 684 (1992).
In the memorandum of law in support of their motion to strike, the plaintiffs argue that Visconti cannot raise, as a special defense, the doctrine of unclean hands because unclean hands is only applicable in suits brought in equity and their suit seeks only remedies at law. In response, Visconti argues that it is well settled that equitable defenses may be raised in an action at law. Visconti further argues that courts in Connecticut have recognized the special defense of unclean hands in a breach of contract case. Finally, Visconti maintains that it is not proper to decide the issue of the applicability of the doctrine of unclean hands in the context of a motion to strike.
"It is . . . well settled that equitable defenses or claims may be raised in an action at law." Kerin v. Udolf, 165 Conn. 264, 269, 334 A.2d 434 (1973), citing General Statutes § 52-1. In Kerin, our Supreme Court held that the defendant could raise equitable defenses to the action even though the plaintiff brought the action at law to collect on a promissory note, rather than at equity to foreclose the mortgage. Id. Additionally, in Fleet National Bank v. Squillacote, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 99 0497487 (October 30, 2003, Cohn, J.) (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 270, 273), the court stated: "Courts consider foreclosure actions to be in equity while collection actions are at law . . . However, the Supreme Court has allowed equitable defenses to be raised in an action at law . . . [I]t is a sound principle that in a foreclosure case, equitable relief can be accorded even when the action is solely to collect the mortgage note." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Section 52-1 provides in relevant part: "The Superior Court may administer legal and equitable rights and apply legal and equitable remedies in favor of either party in one and the same civil action so that legal and equitable rights of the parties may be enforced and protected in one action."
Moreover, many courts have held that the equitable defense of unclean hands in particular may be applied in an action at law. See First Fairfield Funding, LLC v. Goldman, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 02 0465799 (November 3, 2003, Thompson, J.) (35 Conn. L. Rptr. 726, 727); Masopust v. Citizens National Bank, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. 062846 (March 8, 2001, Foley, J.); Perkins v. Gibson Financial, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 98 0167156 (May 19, 2000, Mintz, J.); Richards v. O'Neil, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV 99 0059813 (April 26, 1999, Sferrazza, J.); Robarge v. Patriot General Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 91 0393211 (December 4, 1991, Walsh, J.) (5 Conn. L. Rptr. 323); Giuliano v. Bourgoin Ins. Agency Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. 344205 (July 20, 1990, Hammer, J.) (2 Conn. L. Rptr. 190).
"The doctrine of unclean hands exists to safeguard the integrity of the court . . . The integrity of the court is no less worthy of protection in an action at law, than in actions in equity." (Citation omitted.) First Fairfield Funding, LLC v. Goldman, supra, 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 727. In addition, "[w]hether the doctrine of unclean hands should or should not be applied must be determined by the trier and cannot be determined on a motion to strike." Id.
Therefore, in the present case, the equitable defense of unclean hands is available to Visconti and is legally sufficient. The plaintiffs' motion to strike is denied.