Opinion
D070175
09-27-2017
DEL RAYO ESTATES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GEORG LINGENBRINK, as Trustee etc., Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Rodney L. Donohoo, Rodney L. Donohoo and Kevin T. Rhine for Defendant and Appellant. Limandri & Jonna, Charles S. Limandri and Teresa Mendoza for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2014-00036934-CU-BC-NC) APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Earl H. Maas, III, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions. Law Offices of Rodney L. Donohoo, Rodney L. Donohoo and Kevin T. Rhine for Defendant and Appellant. Limandri & Jonna, Charles S. Limandri and Teresa Mendoza for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In the complaint in this action, plaintiff Del Rayo Estates Homeowners Association (Association) alleges that it is a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation, serving as the owners' association of Del Rayo Estates, a " 'common interest development' " under California law. The Association filed the underlying complaint to collect what it alleges is a "disciplinary fine" or "monetary penalty" that it had imposed against the Petra Krismer Living Trust (Trust), the record owner of a specified lot within the Del Rayo Estates development (Property). The Association further alleged that the Trust "operates through its Trustee, defendant Georg Lingenbrink" and prayed for "judgment against defendant Georg Lingenbrink, Trustee of the [Trust]." Lingenbrink, in his capacity as trustee of the Trust, appeared in the action and eventually obtained a summary judgment in his favor.
In postjudgment proceedings, the trial court ruled that the judgment is void and granted the Association's motion to set it aside. More specifically, the court made a factual finding that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust and, on that basis, concluded that the court "lacked authority to enter a judgment in favor of [Lingenbrink]."
We conclude that the Association did not meet its burden of establishing that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust, and thus, did not meet its postjudgment burden of establishing that the judgment is void. In any event, because the judgment would not have been void even if the Association had established that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust, the court erred as a matter of law in granting the motion. Accordingly, we reverse the order setting aside the judgment.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
"Statements of fact that are not supported by references to the record are disregarded by the reviewing court." (McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 947, citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Accordingly, we have not considered factual statements that are (1) unsupported by accurate citations to the appellate record (including the Association's citation to a register of actions in a different case); or (2) based on a request for judicial notice that Lingenbrink cited in his opening brief, but did not file with this court. To the extent a party's argument is thereafter unsupported by sufficient facts, we deem the argument to be forfeited. (Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 28.)
In a complaint filed in 2014, the Association sued Lingenbrink in his capacity as trustee of the Trust that held title to the Property to enforce certain provisions of the "Amended Declaration of Restrictions" (Declaration) that contain covenants, conditions and restrictions applicable to all lots in Del Rayo Estates — including the Property. The Association alleged that Petra Krismer had held title to the Property in her own name from approximately 2008 until early August 2011, at which time she transferred the Property to the Trust, and that at all relevant times both Lingenbrink and Krismer lived at the Property.
The Association further alleged that, during specified time periods, the Property had not been in compliance with certain requirements of the Declaration, that Lingenbrink and Krismer had ignored the Association's notices of noncompliance, that the Association had imposed $98,000 in disciplinary fines or monetary penalties as a result of the noncompliance, and that Lingenbrink and Krismer had refused to pay any portion of the $98,000 owed. The Association prayed for judgment against Lingenbrink, in his capacity as trustee of the Trust, as follows: general damages according to proof, prejudgment interest on these damages, incidental damages according to proof, attorney fees, costs of suit, and such additional relief as the court deems appropriate.
In its complaint, the Association described the noncompliance as follows: (1) "the Property's front lawn area was weed-infested, overgrown, and turning brown in spots"; and (2) "the Property's gates were in dire need of repair and paint."
Lingenbrink answered the Association's complaint and eventually moved for summary judgment on the basis that, because the Association had failed to comply with the procedures required by the Declaration at the time the Association imposed the fines that it was trying to collect in the lawsuit, the fines were unenforceable. The Association opposed Lingenbrink's motion, arguing that the Association's procedures complied with the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, Civil Code section 4000 et seq., which trumped the procedures required in the Declaration. The trial court ruled that the Association's failure to establish compliance with the Declaration was fatal to its lawsuit and granted summary judgment in favor of Lingenbrink.
The trial court entered judgment against the Association and in favor of Lingenbrink. In the judgment, the court also ruled that Lingenbrink was the prevailing party and that he was entitled to an award of attorney fees and statutory costs upon proper application.
Civil Code section 5975 deals with the enforceability of covenants and restrictions in a governing document of a common interest development and provides in relevant part that "[i]n an action to enforce the governing documents, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs." (Id., subd. (c).) The predecessor to this provision, Civil Code former section 1354, subdivision (c), was a reciprocal mandatory fee-shifting statute (Tract 19051 Homeowners Assn. v. Kemp (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1135, 1144, 1143-1153), and current Civil Code section 5975 continues Civil Code former section 1354 without change (Law Rev. Comm. com., 12B Pt. 2 West's Ann. Civ. Code (2016 ed.) foll. Civ. Code, § 5975, p. 236). As explained at footnote 5, post, the potential award of attorney fees is what is now controlling the lawsuit.
Less than a week later, the Association filed a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) (Motion). The Association contended that the judgment is "void on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction." Specifically, the Association argued that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust and, as a result, did not have standing to defend the complaint.
"The court may, . . . on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order." (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).)
The Association expressly stated that it brought its motion in part to avoid a motion for attorney fees by Lingenbrink. Indeed, after the Association filed its Motion, Lingenbrink filed his motion for prevailing party attorney fees.
The Association based its contention primarily on events in another lawsuit, Lingenbrink v. Del Rayo Estates Homeowners Association (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2013, No. 37-2013-00078036-CU-OR-NC) (View Action) — an action that Lingenbrink had filed and in which he had obtained a judgment against the Association two weeks earlier. In support of its Motion, the Association informed the trial court that, in the View Action, in response to its informal request that Lingenbrink provide evidence that he is the trustee of the Trust, he had produced only "a durable power of attorney dated April 8, 2011[,] pursuant to which [Krismer] appointed Lingenbrink as her 'attorney-in-fact ("Agent")' " (Power of Attorney). In addition, the Association submitted an excerpt of a deposition from the underlying proceedings in the present case in which Lingenbrink stated that he would provide the Association with proof that he is the trustee of the Trust and a follow-up e-mail exchange in which the Association requested such documentation and Lingenbrink said that he would respond the following day.
In the View Action, following a court trial, Lingenbrink successfully obtained a mandatory injunction that directed the Association to enforce a specific provision of the Declaration requiring Lingenbrink's Del Rayo Estates' neighbor, who was subject to the Declaration, "to trim his trees so that they do not interfere with [Lingenbrink's] westerly view."
The record on appeal contains only the Association's attorney's argument — which is not evidence (Villacorta v. Cemex Cement, Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1433) — to support the Association's explanation of how it received the Power of Attorney and, accordingly, the extent to which Lingenbrink relied on the Power of Attorney to demonstrate that he is the trustee of the Trust. The Association repeats this argument, as if it were evidence, on appeal.
Again by way of argument, not evidence, the Association also informed the trial court — and tells us on appeal — that it never received any additional proof from Lingenbrink that he is the trustee of the Trust. In response, Lingenbrink explained to the trial court that, because the court had issued its tentative ruling granting Lingenbrink's motion for summary judgment by the next day, there was no need to provide further informal discovery to the Association.
The Association then presented legal authority to the effect that every action must be prosecuted by the real party in interest (Code Civ. Proc., § 367), the related concept that a plaintiff who lacks standing cannot state a cause of action because such a situation presents " 'jurisdictional challenges,' " and finally, that only a trustee (and not an agent or attorney in fact) can defend claims against a trust. Relying on the Power of Attorney, the Association argued that, because this document establishes that "Lingenbrink is merely the agent of the trustee of the [Trust]," Lingenbrink cannot defend the Association's allegations against the Trust; that his attempt to do so "is a jurisdictional defect"; that such a defect "render[s] the judgment entered in Lingenbrink's favor void"; and that the judgment must therefore be set aside. (Some capitalization omitted.)
In addition to designating Lingenbrink as her " 'Agent,' " by the Power of Attorney, Krismer "relinquish[ed] all of [her] powers as trustee in the [Trust] forever" and authorized Lingenbrink "to act on [her] behalf as trustee of the [Trust]" and perform "any . . . act with respect to [the Property]."
Lingenbrink opposed the Motion. Factually, Lingenbrink established: (1) in its complaint in this action, the Association affirmatively alleged that Lingenbrink is the trustee of the Trust and prayed for judgment against Lingenbrink in his capacity as trustee of the Trust; (2) in the summary judgment proceedings that resulted in the judgment in Lingenbrink's favor in this action, the Association replied "Undisputed" to Lingenbrink's proposed undisputed fact and evidence that, "as [t]rustee of the Trust," Lingenbrink resided at the Property and is a member of the Association (italics added); (3) in the (unsuccessful) summary judgment proceedings in the View Action, the Association replied "Undisputed" to Lingenbrink's proposed undisputed fact and evidence that, "Lingenbrink is the [t]rustee of the Trust" that owns the Property (italics added); and (4) at the trial in the View Action, Lingenbrink testified without objection or contradictory evidence that he is "the trustee" of the Trust that holds title to the Property.
Among the legal arguments that Lingenbrink presented in opposition to the Motion, he contended: (1) the Association failed to make a sufficient evidentiary showing that Lingenbrink is not in fact trustee of the Trust; (2) "standing," at least for jurisdictional purposes, applies only to the plaintiff — i.e., whether the plaintiff has a right to the relief being sought, yet Lingenbrink is the defendant in the underlying action; and (3) because a lack of standing does not result in a lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction, a judgment in which a party lacks standing is not void, but merely erroneous and potentially voidable.
At the hearing on the Motion, Krismer was present and available to testify. In addition, Lingenbrink had a declaration from Krismer and made an offer of proof as to Krismer's understanding and intent regarding her resignation as trustee and the appointment of Lingenbrink as a successor trustee. The trial court did not accept the offer of proof, did not allow Krismer to testify, and did not consider her declaration. The court heard the argument of counsel, took the matter under submission and issued a written minute order a few days later (Order).
In the Order, the trial court granted the Motion and set aside the judgment, ruling in relevant part:
"The judgment is void as a matter of law because the court lacked authority to enter a judgment in favor of [Lingenbrink] as [t]rustee of the [Trust]. The Court concludes, based on the record before it in th[e M]otion, that [Lingenbrink] is not the trustee. The [Power of Attorney], upon which [Lingenbrink] relies, does not constitute a substitution of trustee as a matter
of law. Only the trustee of a trust has the power to defend an action on behalf of the trust."In the Order, the court also denied Lingenbrink's pending motion for prevailing party attorney fees.
Lingenbrink timely appealed from the Order.
II.
DISCUSSION
Although Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) provides that a trial court "may" set aside a void judgment, the question in this appeal is not whether the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the judgment. Instead, we are concerned with whether the Association met its burden of establishing that the judgment is in fact void for purposes of relief under section 473, subdivision (d). We review de novo a trial court's determination that a judgment is void. (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 496.)
Lingenbrink presents numerous arguments on appeal. At least two support reversal of the Order. First, the Association did not meet its burden of establishing that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust and, thus, did not meet its burden of establishing that the judgment is void. Second, even if Lingenbrink were not the trustee of the Trust, what the Association characterizes as a "lack of standing" would not render the judgment void and thus subject to being set aside under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). A. The Association Did Not Meet Its Burden of Establishing That Lingenbrink Is Not the Trustee of the Trust
Since we are reversing the Order, Lingenbrink's requests that we take evidence and make factual findings under Code of Civil Procedure section 909 and California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(b)-(c), are moot and are accordingly denied.
As the sole determinative fact in granting the Motion, the trial court found that "based on the record before it[,] . . . Lingenbrink is not the trustee" of the Trust. Given this finding, the court concluded that "[t]he judgment is void as a matter of law because the court lacked authority to enter a judgment in favor of [Lingenbrink] as [t]rustee of the [Trust]." However, we conclude that the Association had the burden of proving that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust, and the Association did not meet its burden.
As the moving party, the Association had the burden of proof. (Evid. Code, § 500 ["a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting"]. Thus, the burden was on the Association to establish that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust. Contrary to the Association's position and the trial court's ruling, the burden was not on Lingenbrink to prove that he is the trustee.
In support of its Motion, the Association presented the Power of Attorney that Lingenbrink informally delivered to the Association in the View Action. That document sets forth the resignation by Krismer as trustee of the Trust and the appointment of Lingenbrink as her attorney-in-fact (or agent) to act on her behalf as trustee of the Trust specifically, and to perform any act with respect to the Property generally.
On appeal, the Association maintains that Lingenbrink produced the Power of Attorney "when asked to substantiate his position as [t]rustee of the [Trust]" in this case. However, this is one of the many statements without a record reference that we have disregarded. (See fn. 1, ante.)
In further support of its Motion, the Association also presented evidence of disagreements between the parties in both the View Action and the present case as to whether Lingenbrink would provide a copy of the Trust or a document indicating that Lingenbrink is the trustee. The evidence of discovery disagreements or allegedly incomplete discovery responses from Lingenbrink in either case is irrelevant to the postjudgment proceedings in this case, in which the Association had the burden of proving that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust.
With no explanation of the basis of its statement, the Association informed the trial court that "Lingenbrink relies solely on the . . . Power of Attorney to support his contention that he is the [t]rustee of the [Trust]." The Association then argued that the resignation language and agency language in the Power of Attorney do not suggest, let alone establish, that Lingenbrink is the trustee of the Trust. The Association makes the same argument on appeal. Regardless of the accuracy of the Association's analysis of the legal effect of the Power of Attorney (on which we express no opinion) and regardless of whether Lingenbrink relies on the Power of Attorney as evidence that he is the trustee of the Trust (see fns. 7 & 12, ante), the issue before the trial court in the Motion was not whether Lingenbrink could establish that he is the trustee of the Trust. The issue is whether the Association could prove that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust.
As we explained at footnote 7, ante, the record on appeal contains no evidence that, in the View Action, Lingenbrink relied on the Power of Attorney as proof that he is the trustee of the Trust; the Association's statements to the contrary in the trial court and again on appeal are merely arguments in briefs. From the evidence in the record, we know only that, in the View Action: The Association informally requested to "see some documentation" that Lingenbrink is in fact the trustee of the Trust before the Association would agree either to stipulate to substitute Lingenbrink as the appropriate plaintiff or to mediate the dispute; in response, Lingenbrink forwarded to the Association "the document" — an unidentified document — appointing him as trustee of the Trust. The Association has not provided evidence either that the document Lingenbrink provided was the Power of Attorney or that Lingenbrink contended that the Power of Attorney constituted proof that he is the trustee of the Trust. Even if we were to assume that the Association had submitted such evidence, however, the substantive analysis in the text, post, remains the same: The burden was not on Lingenbrink to establish that he is the trustee; rather, the burden was on the Association to establish that Lingenbrink is not the trustee.
To obtain the set-aside, the Association was also required to prove that the judgment against someone who is not the trustee of the Trust is void. As we explain in part II.B., post, however, even if the Association had established that Lingenbrink were not the trustee of the Trust, the judgment would not have been void.
The record does not contain substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust. We review for substantial evidence any factual findings on which the court relied in reaching its conclusion that the judgment is void. (Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 828.) The only evidence cited by the trial court in support of its finding is the Power of Attorney. However, as just explained, the Power of Attorney does not prove that Lingenbrink is not the trustee; thus, the record does not contain substantial evidence to support a finding that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust.
Further, the Association's judicial admissions in both the present case and the View Action required the trial court to deny the Motion. First, in the complaint in this action, the Association affirmatively alleged that Lingenbrink is the trustee of the Trust that owned the Property. In addition, in summary judgment proceedings in both the present case and the View Action, the Association affirmatively asserted as an undisputed fact that Lingenbrink is the trustee of the Trust. Each of these three statements by the Association is a "judicial admission" in a pleading — which is "conclusive against the pleader and precludes the consideration of contrary evidence." (Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1158 (Thurman); accord, Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 187 [" 'allegations in the complaint are binding on the plaintiff' "].) Judicial admissions " 'may not [be] ignore[d]' " by the trial court in later proceedings (Bucur, at p. 187), and the court may not receive contrary evidence unless the party who judicially admitted the fact(s) at issue is permitted to amend its earlier pleading(s) (Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272 (Valerio)) — which the Association did not attempt here. Given that the Association judicially admitted these facts, the Association's arguments based on Lingenbrink's alleged failure to have provided documentation to prove that he is the trustee of the Trust are irrelevant, if not disingenuous.
For the foregoing reasons, the Association did not meet its burden of establishing that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust. Without such a finding, the trial court erred in proceeding to determine that the judgment is void. B. In Any Event, the Judgment Is Not Void
In its brief on appeal, the Association acknowledges that, within approximately 10 days of initiating the present appeal, Lingenbrink provided the Association with sufficient documentation such that the Association "did not believe it could disprove Lingenbrink's status as [t]rustee." In other words, the Association essentially admits that Lingenbrink is, in fact, the trustee of the Trust. Thus, for more than a year, the Association has known that the controlling factual finding of the trial court in this matter — namely, "that [Lingenbrink] is not the trustee" — is incorrect, yet has continued to defend the Order in this appeal.
Regardless of the presumptions in favor of the Order (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564) and the appellate court's limitation to the record that was before the trial court (Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813), once the Association and its counsel became aware of evidence that established to their satisfaction that the Motion should not have been granted, they should have reassessed their position before continuing to defend what they had since determined was defenseless. Like a trial, an appeal " 'is not a game where the spoils of victory go to the clever and technical regardless of the merits, but a method devised by a civilized society to settle peaceably and justly disputes between litigants. The rules of the contest are not an end in themselves.' " (Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 120.)
Even if the Association had met its burden and proven that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust, the trial court would still have erred in granting the Motion on the basis that the judgment is void.
A judgment is void if, at the time it is issued, "the court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in granting relief which the court had no power to grant." (Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239; accord, Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 288.) Even when a judgment goes "beyond the sphere of action prescribed by law," it is not necessarily void. (Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency v. McGrath (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1101.) A judgment that is void for lack of jurisdiction must be distinguished from a judgment that is merely erroneous, "because '[a]ction "in excess of jurisdiction" by a court that has jurisdiction in the "fundamental sense" (i.e., jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties) is not void, but only voidable.' " (Ibid.; accord, Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 752, 767 (Fireman's Fund).)
"Familiar to all lawyers are such examples as these: A state court has no jurisdiction to determine title to land located outside its territorial borders, for the subject matter is entirely beyond its authority or power. . . . A court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the marital status of persons when neither is domiciled within the state. [Citations.] A court has no jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against one not personally served with process within its territorial borders . . . . A court has no jurisdiction to hear or determine a case where the type of proceeding or the amount in controversy is beyond the jurisdiction defined for that particular court by statute or constitutional provision." (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288, citations omitted (Abelleira), quoted in In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 478, fn. 22.)
The argument that the Association presented to the trial court, that the court followed, and that the Association repeats on appeal is: The Trust, as the owner of the Property, is responsible for the unpaid fines and penalties that the Association assessed; the Trust may appear in and defend the Association's lawsuit to collect these fines and penalties only through its trustee; because Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust, Lingenbrink lacked standing to defend the Association's complaint; lack of standing is a jurisdictional defect; a judgment in an action with a jurisdictional defect is void; and Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) provides for the setting aside of a void judgment.
The Association and the trial court have confused errors in excess of the court's jurisdiction with errors of substantive law within the court's jurisdiction.
The Association relies on two statutes and two reported decisions for the proposition that only a "real party in interest" has standing to sue or defend an action. None of these authorities is persuasive, since each refers and applies only to the standing of a party that is prosecuting, not defending, an action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 367 ["Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute." (Italics added.)]; id., § 369, subd. (a)(2) ["trustee of an express trust" "may sue without joining as parties the persons for whose benefit the action is prosecuted" (italics added)]; Schmier v. Supreme Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 703, 707 ["A person who invokes the judicial process lacks standing if he, or those whom he properly represents, 'does not have a real interest in the ultimate adjudication because [he] has neither suffered nor is about to suffer any injury of sufficient magnitude reasonably to assure that all of the relevant facts and issues will be adequately presented.' " (Italics added.)]; Cloud v. Northrop Gruman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 1004 ["a complaint by a party lacking standing fails to state a cause of action by the particular named plaintiff, inasmuch as the claim belongs to somebody else" (italics added)].) In short, a defendant has a statutory right to have a claim against the defendant prosecuted by the real party in interest — i.e., the party with standing — "to save a defendant, against whom a judgment may be obtained, from further harassment or vexation at the hands of other claimants to the same demand." (Giselman v. Starr (1895) 106 Cal. 651, 657, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 367.) There is no similar reason or requirement for a defendant to have "standing" to defend against a claim.
Notably, the failure to state a cause of action is a "nonjurisdictional error[]." (Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942, 950; accord, Fireman's Fund, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.)
The Association contends otherwise, citing (without discussion) Perry v. Brown (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1116 and arguing that the standing requirement applies to a defendant, as well. In Perry, the federal district court agreed with the plaintiffs and declared unconstitutional a voter initiative measure that had been passed by the voters of the State of California. (Perry v. Brown, supra, at p. 1130, citing Perry v. Schwarzenegger (N.D. Cal. 2010) 704 F.Supp.2d 921.) The district court had allowed the proponents of the proposition to intervene as defendants (Intervenors) on the basis that the named defendants (the Governor of California, the Attorney General of California and other state and local officials) would not adequately represent the interests of those who supported the measure. (Perry v. Brown, supra, at pp. 1128-1129.) None of the named defendants appealed from the adverse judgment, but the Intervenors did; and the federal appellate court requested guidance from our Supreme Court in order to determine whether the Intervenors "ha[d] standing to appeal the district court's ruling." (Id. at p. 1131.) In deciding that the Intervenors did have standing under California law to defend the measure, the court described this standing as the ability "to assert the state's interest in the initiative's validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure" — "when the public officials who ordinarily defend a challenged measure decline to do so." (Id. at p. 1152, italics added.) Very simply, the fact that the Supreme Court ruled that the Intervenors had standing to defend the voter initiative measure when the state officials would not does not support the Association's argument that a defendant named by the plaintiff must establish standing before the defendant can prevail on the merits.
The underlying litigation in which the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the measure was filed in the federal district court and appealed to federal court of appeals. (Perry v. Brown, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 1128, 1130.) During the appeal, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.548, the federal appellate court requested a decision from the California Supreme Court on the following question of California law: " '[w]hether . . . under California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure possess either a particularized interest in the initiative's validity or the authority to assert the State's interest in the initiative's validity, which would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, when the public officials charged with that duty refuse to do so.' " (Perry v. Brown, supra, at p. 1124, italics added; see Perry v. Schwarzenegger (9th Cir. 2011) 628 F.3d 1191, 1193.) The California Supreme Court agreed to decide the question (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548(f)), ultimately answering it in the affirmative as follows: "In a postelection challenge to a voter-approved initiative measure, the official proponents of the initiative are authorized under California law to appear and assert the state's interest in the initiative's validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure when the public officials who ordinarily defend the measure or appeal such a judgment decline to do so." (Perry v. Brown, supra, at p. 1127, italics added; accord, id. at p. 1165.)
As explained in the text ante, because the Association judicially admitted that Lingenbrink is the responsible party authorized to appear on behalf of the Trust, the admission is conclusive against the Association. (Thurman, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158.) Unless and until the court allowed the Association to amend the pleadings that contained its judicial admissions, the Association was precluded from offering evidence contrary to those admissions. (Valerio, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1272.)
Moreover, a judgment against Lingenbrink would not have been in excess of the superior court's jurisdiction. The contention that formed the basis of both the Motion and the Order — namely, that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust — if true, would not have affected the power of the court to act, but instead, would have constituted at most an error in allowing the Trust to appear in the action by someone other than the designated trustee, who has the statutory "power to . . . defend actions" under Probate Code section 16249. (See Portico Management Group, LLC v. Harrison (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 464, 467, 474, 479 [judgment against trust "meaningless and cannot be enforced," but not void; suggestion that judgment against nontrustee could be amended to add trustees as judgment debtors].)
The Association does not contend that the judgment is void as a result of a lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction, but only that "the trial court lacked the power to enter judgment against Lingenbrink."
For these reasons, even if admissible evidence had established that Lingenbrink is not the trustee of the Trust, the judgment would not have been void.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The Order is reversed, and the matter is remanded for the court to consider and rule on Lingenbrink's motion for prevailing party attorney fees that the court denied in the Order after setting aside the judgment. Lingenbrink is entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
AARON, J. WE CONCUR: HALLER, Acting P. J. O'ROURKE, J.