Opinion
2013-10-9
In the Matter of Martin DEKOM, appellant, v. Joseph N. MONDELLO, etc., et al., respondents.
Martin Dekom, Manhasset, N.Y., appellant pro se. Leventhal, Cursio, Mullaney & Sliney, Roslyn, N.Y. (Steven G. Leventhal of counsel), for respondents Anthony Santino and Joseph Ra, and Ryan, Brennan & Donnelly, LLP, Floral Park, N.Y. (John E. Ryan of counsel), for respondent Joseph N. Mondello (one brief filed).
Martin Dekom, Manhasset, N.Y., appellant pro se. Leventhal, Cursio, Mullaney & Sliney, Roslyn, N.Y. (Steven G. Leventhal of counsel), for respondents Anthony Santino and Joseph Ra, and Ryan, Brennan & Donnelly, LLP, Floral Park, N.Y. (John E. Ryan of counsel), for respondent Joseph N. Mondello (one brief filed).
In a proceeding denominated as one pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to invalidate the organizational meeting of the Nassau County Republican Committee held on September 20, 2011, the petitioner appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (K.Murphy, J.), entered *894April 2, 2012, as granted the respondents' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the petition and denied those branches of his motion which were to disqualify John E. Ryan as counsel and for recusal.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Pursuant to Election Law § 16–102(2), “a petition challenging ‘the validity’ of a county committee must be commenced ‘within 10 days after the ... organizational meeting of the Committee, at the latest’ ” (Matter of Kosowski v. Donovan, 18 N.Y.3d 686, 688, 943 N.Y.S.2d 796, 967 N.E.2d 174, quoting Sack v. Board of Elections of City of N.Y., 65 N.Y.2d 958, 959, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 483 N.E.2d 1152). The 10–day period applies equally to party meetings that only select party officers ( see Matter of Kosowski v. Donovan, 18 N.Y.3d at 689, 943 N.Y.S.2d 796, 967 N.E.2d 174). The Supreme Court properly concluded that, although the petition states that this proceeding was commenced pursuant to CPLR article 78, this proceeding was nevertheless subject to the 10–day limitations period set forth in Election Law § 16–102(2). Since the proceeding was commenced after that period expired, it was untimely ( see Matter of Kosowski v. Donovan, 18 N.Y.3d at 688–689, 943 N.Y.S.2d 796, 967 N.E.2d 174;Matter of Sayegh v. Castaldo, 287 A.D.2d 639, 731 N.Y.S.2d 865;Delanoy v. Faction, 287 A.D.2d 592, 731 N.Y.S.2d 882;Matter of Stabile v. DeFronzo, 231 A.D.2d 577, 577, 647 N.Y.S.2d 36;Matter of Leirer v. Suffolk County Comm. of Conservative Party of N.Y. State, 166 A.D.2d 449, 561 N.Y.S.2d 146). Moreover, the petitioner lacked standing to commence this proceeding as a person designated under Election Law § 16–102(1).
The parties' remaining contentions need not be addressed in light of our determination.