Opinion
No. 351610
01-21-2021
JOSEPH DEFINA and DANIELLE DEFINA, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants-Appellants, v. THERESA DELINCK, also known as THERESA WALTERS, Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellee.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Hillsdale Circuit Court
LC No. 19-000385-CZ Before: REDFORD, P.J., and MARKEY and BOONSTRA, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs, Joseph and Danielle Defina, appeal as of right the part of the trial court's order granting defendant, Theresa Delinck, the mother of Danielle Defina, summary disposition on the ground that res judicata barred plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred by sua sponte ordering additional relief to defendant. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case stems from a property and contract dispute between the Definas and Delinck who are family members. In 2016, Delinck made a no interest mortgage loan to the Definas who acquired the subject property and in turn granted Delinck a second mortgage and also conveyed by quitclaim deed a life estate in the property to Delinck. They all lived together in the same house until discord arose, ultimately causing Delinck to move out. During 2018, Delinck sued the Definas and raised multiple claims related to the property and the parties' contractual relations. After Delinck dismissed all but her breach-of-contract claim, the case went to trial and concluded when a jury returned a verdict on April 11, 2019, finding that the parties had a contract but the Definas had not breached it. Delinck moved back into the house with her new husband.
The Definas then filed this lawsuit against Delinck on May 22, 2019, seeking rescission of the parties' agreement because Delinck allegedly abandoned her life estate and breached the contract governing her life estate by not contributing to the payment of household expenses and by bringing her new husband to live in the house. Delinck counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of the parties' original contract, the status and scope of defendant's life estate, the parties' respective legal interests in the house, and she requested that the trial court geographically partition the house. Delinck moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(C)(8), on the ground that res judicata barred plaintiffs' claims because plaintiffs could have raised, by defense or counterclaim, that defendant breached the agreement in the previous action, but failed to do so. The Definas countered with a summary disposition motion of their own.
Plaintiffs also moved for a temporary restraining order, but the trial court denied the request.
The trial court conducted a hearing at which it implored the family members to work out their problems. Nevertheless, the trial court found that the claims were subject to the res judicata doctrine. The trial court entered an order that in relevant part stated as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that both parties' Motions for Summary Disposition shall be granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) as res judicata. The same parties addressed the same issues the prior year as reflected in File No. 18-337 CZ. The Plaintiff's herein, Defendants previously, specifically arguing to the jury that the Defendant herein, Plaintiff previously, was welcome to the real property in which the Defendant held a Life Estate, at any time. It being clear to the Court, based on the pleadings, that the Defendant has no responsibility to pay any further funds to the Plaintiff's and that the Defendant is entitled to unrestrained enjoyment of the entire premises for which she has been granted a Life Estate by the Plaintiffs.
The Definas now appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"We review de novo both a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition and its application of the legal doctrine of res judicata." Garrett v Washington, 314 Mich App 436, 440-441; 886 NW2d 762 (2016) (citation omitted). "In determining whether summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appropriate, a court considers all documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accepting as true the contents of the complaint unless affidavits or other appropriate documents specifically contradict them." Id. at 441 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint." Id . at 451. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "The motion should be granted if no factual development could possibly justify recovery." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In Linton v Arenac Co Rd Comm, 273 Mich App 107, 111; 729 NW2d 883 (2006) (citations omitted; ellipsis in original), this Court explained:
Although, generally, when considering a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8), the legal basis of the complaint is tested by the pleadings alone, when considering a motion brought under both MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8), it is proper for the court to review all the material submitted in support of, and in opposition to,
the plaintiff's claim. Neither party is required to file supportive material, but any documentation that is provided to the court must be admissible evidence. Further, the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations, affidavits, and other admissible documentary evidence are accepted as true and construed in the plaintiff's favor, unless contradicted by documentation submitted by the movant. Additionally, "where material facts are not in dispute . . . , the MCR 2.116(C)(7) analysis parallels the MCR 2.116(C)(10) analysis and is a question of law for the trial court."
III. ANALYSIS
The Definas argue that the trial court erred by determining that res judicata barred their claims on the ground that the doctrine did not apply because Michigan does not have a compulsory counterclaim rule. We disagree.
In King v Munro, 329 Mich App 594, 600-601; 944 NW2d 198 (2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted), this Court recently explained:
The purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to prevent multiple suits litigating the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. The doctrine bars a second, subsequent action when (1) the first action was decided on the merits, (2) the matter contested in the second action was or could have been resolved in the first, and (3) both actions involve the same parties or their privies. Michigan courts apply the doctrine broadly to bar not only claims already litigated, but also every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not.
Our Supreme Court has indicated that courts should apply a broad transactional test to determine if the res judicata doctrine applies. Adair v Michigan, 470 Mich 105, 124-125; 680 NW2d 386 (2004). In Adair, our Supreme Court explained that the determinative question is whether the claims in the instant case arose as part of the same transaction as did the claims in the first case. Id . at 125. "Whether a factual grouping constitutes a transaction for purposes of res judicata is to be determined pragmatically, by considering whether the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation, [and] whether they form a convenient trial unit . . . ." Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted, alteration in original).
MCR 2.203(A) governs the joinder of claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims, and provides as follows:
In a pleading that states a claim against an opposing party, the pleader must join every claim that the pleader has against that opposing party at the time of serving the pleading, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the action and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.MCR 2.203(E) provides, in relevant part, that "[a] counterclaim or cross-claim must be filed with the answer or filed as an amendment in the manner provided by MCR 2.118." In Garrett, this Court explained:
In determining whether two claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence for purposes of MCR 2.203(A), res judicata principles should be applied. See Marketplace of Rochester Hills v Comerica Bank, 309 Mich App 579, 586; 873 NW2d 332 (2015) (construing MCR 2.203(A) using res judicata principles), vacated in part on other grounds 498 Mich 934 (2015); Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc v Keeler Brass Co, 460 Mich 372, 394 n 12; 596 NW2d 153 (1999) (TAYLOR, J., dissenting) ("MCR 2.203(A) requires, consistent with res judicata principles, a party to join every claim that the pleader has against the opposing party."). [Garrett, 314 Mich App at 451.]
In this case, the trial court correctly determined that the res judicata doctrine barred the claims asserted in this case. Notably, the Definas do not dispute that the elements of res judicata are met, but they nevertheless argue that res judicata did not apply because they were not required to file a counterclaim in the previous action. The Definas' argument lacks merit.
De novo review of the record indicates that the first action unquestionably involved the same parties, claims related to the property, and claims related to the parties' contractual relations respecting the property and Delinck's life estate. The claims related to their contractual relationship were decided on the merits. Both the first action and this suit alleged a breach of various aspects of the same contractual agreement between the same parties, Delinck's loan to the Definas for their purchase of the property, and Delinck's life estate which arose in relation to the loan transaction. Further, Delinck admitted in the first action that she left the property, albeit because the Definas' conduct forced her to leave. The claims raised in this action all arose from the same transaction or occurrence for purposes of res judicata and MCR 2.303(A). The operative facts and the same transactional foundation existed to form the basis of the Definas' claims asserted in this action, and Delinck's counterclaims. Accordingly, the trial court properly held that res judicata barred the Definas' claims.
The Definas also argue that the trial court erred by determining the existence and scope of Delinck's life estate. We disagree. Because this issue is unpreserved, our review is for plain error affecting substantial rights. See Kloian v Schwartz, 272 Mich App 232, 242; 725 NW2d 671 (2006). Delinck requested a declaratory judgment in Count I of her counterclaim to determine whether she had a life estate, and if so, its scope. The documents submitted by the parties in this action reflect that the Definas conveyed a life estate to Delinck without restrictions and no contract required Delinck to make any payments as alleged by the Definas. The record supported the trial court's determinations and the Definas have failed to establish the existence of plain error.
Affirmed.
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra