Opinion
No. TTD FA04 0083873-S
January 6, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR CONTEMPT
This matter comes before the court on plaintiff's motions for contempt (#164.00, 164.10, 165.00 and 165.01). For the following reasons, plaintiff's motions are denied.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
By complaint dated April 6, 2004, plaintiff commenced this action for dissolution of marriage. After a trial to the court, on August 2, 2005, the court (White, J.) entered a judgment of dissolution. Thereafter on September 23, 2005, defendant filed these motions for contempt. The court heard argument at short calendar on November 7, 2005, and, after reviewing the relevant pleadings and exhibits, now issues this opinion.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant claims that plaintiff is in contempt in that in violation of the judgment of dissolution, he has refused to transfer to the defendant certain property, to wit: his interest in a Las Vegas timeshare; title to a 1999 Mazda Protege; and $40,000.00 in cash. Defendant responds that in October 2005, he filed a petition for bankruptcy, that as of the date of oral argument, the petition remained pending and that the petition operates as an automatic stay of this court's enforcement of its transfer orders.
As such, the present case is distinguishable from Lewis v. Lewis, 35 Conn.App. 622 (1994), relied upon by plaintiff.
"State courts of general jurisdiction have the power to decide cases involving federal rights where . . . neither the Constitution nor statute withdraws such jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Larson v. Larson, 89 Conn.App. 57, 60, 872 A.2d 912 (2005). Generally, except as otherwise provided, "the district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). Absent certain exceptions, "a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of [title 11] . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities of . . . (1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; (2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title; [and] (3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(3). Such a petition, however, does not operate as a stay for "the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding for . . . the establishment or modification of an order for alimony, maintenance, or support; or . . . [for] the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate . . ." (Emphasis added.) 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (B).
Voluntary filings.
Joint filings.
Involuntary filings.
Title 11 has also defined the term "property." "The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held: . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
In Eden v. Robert A. Chapski, Ltd., 405 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2005), the court determined that it "had concurrent jurisdiction [with the state divorce court] to determine whether [the plaintiff's] debt for [his ex-wife's] attorney fees was dischargeable" in his chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. Id., 588. As an initial matter the court recognized that under the Bankruptcy Code a "divorce proceeding [is] a proceeding to establish an order for alimony, maintenance, or support. As such, it [is] exempt from the automatic stay." Eden v. Robert A. Chapski, Ltd., supra, 405 F.3d 588. The court went on to distinguish, however, between the exemption accorded to the establishment of an alimony or support order and any of the postjudgment efforts to enforce those orders from the property of the estate, noting that "any effort to enforce the judgment of dissolution [is] subject to the automatic stay (unless and until the stay [is] modified by the bankruptcy court) insofar as [the defendants seek] to collect from resources that [are] property of the bankruptcy estate. [11 U.S.C.] § 362(b)(2)(B) . . ." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Id.
Other jurisdictions are in accord with the decision of the Eden court. In Peare v. Jackson, 777 A.2d 822 (2001), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that "[a]lthough a bankruptcy filing does not stay an action to establish a right to support or to collect support from property outside the debtor's estate, [the defendant's] filing of a petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code . . . stayed his contempt adjudication, because that adjudication was calculated to compel him to pay support from sources encompassed within the debtor's estate." Id., 823. "The contempt . . . did not come within the exception to the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B) for collection of support, because it was not targeted to compel payment from property that is not property of the estate." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 826.
Additionally the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama determined that a "trial court violated the automatic stay [of a bankruptcy petition] by ordering the husband to pay the wife for the amount she had paid to satisfy [an] automobile loan." Hill v. Hill, 730 So.2d 248, 251 (1999). The court noted that the majority rule is that "[t]he filing of a bankruptcy petition stays the determination in a divorce case of the interests of the debtor in property of the estate, any exercise of control over such property, and any monetary claims against a debtor other than for alimony, maintenance and support. Other aspects of a divorce case, such as the dissolution of the marriage . . . are not stayed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 251. The court concluded that "[b]ecause the payment of the automobile loan was part of the property division . . . the trial court erred by ordering the husband to pay the wife the amount she had paid to satisfy the automobile loan. That order [sought] enlargement of [the wife's] property rights at the expense of the husband/debtor's property rights; it therefore violate[d] the automatic stay." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 251-52.
Likewise the Texas Court of Appeals held that "[d]uring the pendency of a federal bankruptcy action, a state court has jurisdiction to hear matters pertaining to the dissolution of a marriage but not to hear matters relating to the property that is part of the bankruptcy estate . . . Thus, all issues in the underlying litigation related to property in the bankruptcy estate are stayed as a matter of law." In re Bowen, No. 2-03-338-CV (Tex.App. Fort Worth 2004).
Also in Peters v. Peters, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. FA 94 0360792 (January 23, 1996, Alander, J.) ( 18 Conn. L. Rptr. 112), the court held that during the pendency of the automatic bankruptcy stay, it lacked authority to address the issue of the division of the marital home.
The present case is indistinguishable from the authorities cited above. There can be no serious dispute as to whether the subject property is a part of plaintiff's estate. As such when plaintiff filed his petition in bankruptcy, he lost control over the disposition of that property and a stay of the enforcement of the court orders in the present case was effected. Thus this court is unable to find that plaintiff wilfully and deliberately refused to comply with the property orders issued by the court in the judgment of dissolution. Further even assuming wilful refusal to comply, this court's power to hold plaintiff in contempt has been preempted by federal law.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motions for contempt are denied.