Opinion
No. 15–P–881.
09-01-2016
John DEFALCO v. OFFICE OF COURT MANAGEMENT & another.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Employees who are unable to work because of injuries sustained on the job can seek benefits in lieu of salary under the Workers' Compensation Act. See G.L. c. 152, §§ 29, 34, 34A, 35. However, such benefits generally are significantly less than the employee's full salary. Pursuant to G.L. c. 30, § 58, inserted by St.1998, c. 463, § 32, a State employee who is unable to work because of work-related injuries is entitled to additional benefits when the injuries were caused by “acts of violence of patients or prisoners in his custody.” Where that statute applies, the injured employee is entitled to his full salary, with such benefits commonly known as “assault pay.”
The Workers' Compensation Act places limitations on the period for which payments in lieu of salary will be made, and even for such periods, available benefits typically amount only to approximately sixty to sixty-seven percent of average weekly wages prior to the injury. See G.L. c. 152, §§ 34, 34A, 35, 69.
As the Commonwealth pointed out in a letter submitted pursuant to Mass.R.A.P. 16(l), as amended, 386 Mass. 1247 (1982), the Legislature has amended G.L. c. 30, § 58, effective July 1, 2016. See St.2016, c. 133, §§ 42, 203. Specifically, the Legislature struck the words “his custody” in § 58 and replaced them with the following language: “the employee's custody or, in the case of a court officer, receives bodily injuries resulting from acts of violence in the courtroom or public areas, holding areas and other designated areas of the courthouse or from subduing or apprehending escaping prisoners.” St.2016, c. 133, § 42. The Commonwealth points out that generally “an amendment to a statute presumably intends a change in the law.” Boyle v. Weiss, 461 Mass. 519, 525, 962 N.E.2d 169 (2012), quoting from DiMarzo v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 389 Mass. 85, 102, 449 N.E.2d 1189 (1983). Certainly, the textual change prospectively broadened the reach of the statute somewhat: going forward, a court officer would be entitled to assault pay if he was injured by an act of violence in the court room regardless of whether the person committing the violence was at that time a “prisoner[ ] in his custody.” However, that prospective broadening of the statute does not affect the question presented by the case before us: whether the plaintiff is entitled to assault pay under the language in effect at the time of his injury (which turns on whether the person who injured the plaintiff was a “prisoner[ ] in [the plaintiff's] custody”). We proceed to analyze that question, while cognizant that our answer will have little precedential effect given the prospective change to the statute.
The case before us involves a court officer who seeks assault pay based on injuries he sustained while helping to subdue a court-room spectator who was arrested for causing a disturbance. The defendants (collectively, Commonwealth) filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 755 (1974), arguing that the plaintiff's claim failed as a matter of law, because the person who injured the plaintiff could not be considered a “prisoner[ ] in [the plaintiff's] custody.” Treating the motion as one for summary judgment, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974), a Superior Court judge ruled in the Commonwealth's favor and dismissed the action. He reasoned that under both the plain language of the statute and common sense, “spectators who are arrested for in-court acts of violence” could not be considered “prisoners.” For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
Standard of review. The judge treated the Commonwealth's motion as one for summary judgment because he relied in part on a contemporaneous “Incident Report” in which the plaintiff recounted the court-room melee. That incident report was one of two documents attached to the plaintiff's first amended complaint. The amended complaint states that the two appended reports contained “[t]he specifics and details of the [plaintiff's] allegations.”
As the Commonwealth acknowledges on appeal, its motion to dismiss should not have been converted to one for summary judgment, because the parties were not provided a “reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.” Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). Compare Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 466 Mass. 156, 158–159, 993 N.E.2d 684 (2013) (allowing motion for judgment on the pleadings to be treated as a motion for summary judgment under particular circumstances). Moreover, judges may consider exhibits attached to a complaint without converting a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. Johnston v. Box, 453 Mass. 569, 581–582 n. 19, 903 N.E.2d 1115 (2009). See Mass.R.Civ.P. 10(c), as amended, 456 Mass. 1401 (2010) (“A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes”). Because the judge did not consider any factual material other than the incident report, which he could take into account anyway, we proceed to evaluate his ruling as one on a motion to dismiss. For purposes of our review, we therefore accept the plaintiff's pleaded factual allegations as true, and consider whether they “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636, 888 N.E.2d 879 (2008), quoting from Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
Background. The amended complaint alleges in summary form that the plaintiff “suffered severe personal injuries as a result of placing a civilian into custody along with the Cambridge Police Department.” As noted, the plaintiff's detailed allegations regarding the incident are set forth in the incident report appended to the amended complaint. The factual recitation that follows is drawn from that report.
On December 31, 2010, the plaintiff was assigned to a particular court room of the Middlesex division of the Probate and Family Court Department. When a certain case was called, eighteen to twenty people followed one of the litigants into the court room in apparent support of her. After that litigant started “talking loudly” and “getting unruly,” the plaintiff and another court officer, Willie Donahue, positioned themselves to calm her down. Her supporters at that point stood up, and one of them “started telling the Judge she had to answer to a higher court, The People of the Republica Du Jour Grand Jury of the Commonwealth.” Officer Donahue called for back-up.
Unable to calm the parties down, the judge declared a recess to clear the court room and restore order. “The entire mob began yelling that she [the judge] was in contempt and that she would have to ans[w]er to a [previously referenced] higher court.” Other court officers arrived, the judge was ushered to safety, and the spectators were repeatedly ordered to leave the building. The crowd became increasingly “volatile” and “insubordinate” despite repeated warnings that “they would be arrested for trespassing and disturbing a court proceeding” if they did not leave.
Cambridge police officers arrived to assist and repeated the same warning that the spectators would be arrested if they did not leave. The police specifically asked, “Are you refusing to leave?” to which the members of the crowd responded, “Yes, we are refusing to leave.” At that point, the police began the process of placing the people under arrest. One police officer went to arrest “the biggest guy,” who was standing next to the plaintiff. As a result, the man “became even more belligerent and started pushing [the plaintiff and the police officer].” The plaintiff became “pinned between [the man] and the policeman and the benches.” The man then “swung his arms, he hit [the plaintiff] in the mouth, [and] pushed the [police officer].” Although told by the police officer to stop “resisting,” the man “was escalating the situation further.” The plaintiff, together with the police officer and other court officers, “brought him down.” The plaintiff described the final takedown, during which he alleges he was injured, as follows:
“We all fell to the ground, he was Still fighting. I got out of the pile up, the man was on all fou[r]s, so I pulled his leg, with the other officers trying to get his Arms to be cuffed, he hit the floor again. [Cambridge police department] finally got him in custody.”
After other spectators were dealt with and order finally restored, the plaintiff was taken to the hospital by ambulance.
There was also a second report of the incident appended to the amended complaint, the “EMPLOYER'S FIRST REPORT OF INJURY OR FATALITY” (completed by the Commonwealth on a form provided by the Department of Industrial Accidents). Although that report contains little detail about the incident, it does include one notable statement in the section of the form that addresses how the injury occurred. Specifically, the Commonwealth reported that the injury occurred when the plaintiff “and police officers were taking [a] person into custody [who] had been placed under arrest by [C]ambridge PD.”
Discussion. It has long been established that the Workers' Compensation Act is “a remedial statute [that] should be given a broad interpretation, viewed in light of its purpose and to ‘promote the accomplishment of its beneficent design.’ “ Neff v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Industrial Accs., 421 Mass. 70, 73, 653 N.E.2d 556 (1995), quoting from Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349, 106 N.E. 1 (1914). Although § 58 of G.L. c. 30 is not itself part of the Workers' Compensation Act, it supplements that act's remedial provisions by providing even greater benefits to certain injured workers. We therefore interpret its language broadly to effectuate its remedial purposes. See O'Connell's Case, 78 Mass.App.Ct. 761, 765–766, 942 N.E.2d 988 (2011) (interpreting the Worker's Compensation Act consistently with the Unemployment Insurance Act where they “provide parallel worker protection schemes”). See generally Boswell v. Zephyr Lines, Inc., 414 Mass. 241, 247, 606 N.E.2d 1336 (1993) (courts should look to related statutes for interpretive guidance). Support for the conclusion that § 58 should be interpreted liberally is provided by case law interpreting G.L. c. 126, § 18A, an assault pay statute applicable to county employees in correctional institutions that has parallel language. See Presby v. Commissioners of Bristol County, 69 Mass.App.Ct. 902, 903–905, 868 N.E.2d 949 (2007) (prison guard injured while running down stairs to reach altercation in a prison yard entitled to compensation under statute allowing assault pay for injuries caused by acts of violence by prisoners in his custody).
Of course, this does not mean that the coverage provided by the two statutory schemes has to be interpreted as substantively coterminous. See Marchand v. Department of Correction, 475 Mass. 1006, 1008, 55 N.E.3d 964 (2016) (rights to assault pay terminate upon employee's separation from employment even though rights to workers' compensation benefits would continue).
See also Conroy v. Boston, 392 Mass. 216, 217–219, 465 N.E.2d 775 (1984) (rejecting argument that correction officer injured while chasing a prisoner trying to escape was not injured by an act of violence).
With the proper interpretive lens in place, we turn to the particular language at issue. The principal term in dispute is “prisoner[ ].” Although a narrow interpretation of that term could be taken as referring only to people who already have been committed to a penal institution, the Commonwealth does not rely on such an argument. In fact, quoting from Black's Law Dictionary, the Commonwealth acknowledges in its brief that “prisoner[ ]” can refer to “[a] person who has been apprehended by a law-enforcement officer and is in custody, regardless of whether the person has yet been put in prison.” Black's Law Dictionary 1314 (9th ed.2009).
Notwithstanding that concession, the Commonwealth notes that the term “prisoner” was narrowly construed in Commonwealth v. Gillis, 448 Mass. 354, 357–358, 861 N.E.2d 422 (2007) (individual detained civilly at the State treatment center is not a “prisoner” for purposes of the statute providing commitment of sexually dangerous persons), and Commonwealth v. Shaheed, 76 Mass.App.Ct. 598, 599–602, 924 N.E.2d 758 (2010) (individual civilly committed to State hospital not a “prisoner” within meaning of statute regarding assault and battery on a correction officer). However, those cases involved the interpretation of statutes that had to be strictly construed because they were in derogation of liberty. Gillis, supra at 357, 861 N.E.2d 422 ; Shaheed, supra at 600, 924 N.E.2d 758. Moreover, in discussing the common usage of the term “prisoner,” the Supreme Judicial Court in Gillis expressly referenced the definition in Black's Law Dictionary that makes clear that someone apprehended by law enforcement and in custody can be a prisoner “regardless of whether the person has yet been put in prison.” Id. at 358–359, 861 N.E.2d 422, quoting from Black's Law Dictionary 1213 (7th ed.1999).
Based on the facts recounted above, it requires no linguistic lassitude to view the man in the court room as already having been arrested and placed in custody when he injured the plaintiff. See Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 145, 741 N.E.2d 25 (2001), quoting from Commonwealth v. Cook, 419 Mass. 192, 198, 644 N.E.2d 203 (1994) (“An arrest occurs where there is (1) ‘an actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person, [2] performed with the intention to effect an arrest and [3] so understood by the person detained” ’); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 469 Mass. 531, 539–540, 21 N.E.3d 901 (2014), quoting from Commonwealth v. Hilton, 443 Mass. 597, 609, 823 N.E.2d 383 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 173, 877 N.E.2d 545 (2007) (“custody” occurs at the moment when a “defendant reasonably believe[s] that he [is] not free to leave”). Indeed, according to the Commonwealth's own report of the incident, the plaintiff was injured by someone who “had been placed under arrest.” That the man already had been placed under arrest is not ified by the fact that he continued to resist that arrest and was still in the process of being subdued when he injured the plaintiff. See Commonwealth v. Soun, 82 Mass.App.Ct. 32, 34, 969 N.E.2d 1156 (2012) (arrest is a process that “does not begin and end at the moment an individual is placed in handcuffs”). In sum, the Commonwealth is unable to establish, as a matter of law, that the man detained in the court room was not a “prisoner[ ]” at the relevant time.
As the Commonwealth accurately points out, the case law defining when someone has been placed in “custody” or is under “arrest” arises in contexts different from the one before us, e.g., for determining at what point someone is entitled to a Miranda warning or whether someone can be prosecuted for resisting arrest. However, the Commonwealth has not provided a persuasive reason why that different context matters.
As a fall-back argument, the Commonwealth argues that even if the plaintiff can show that he was injured by an act of violence by a “prisoner [ ],” that prisoner was not in “his” custody. According to the Commonwealth, the man instead was in the custody of the Cambridge police officer who arrested him. Such textual parsimony is inappropriate, especially in light of the remedial purposes served by the assault pay statute. See Presby v. Commissioners of Bristol County, 69 Mass.App.Ct. at 904–905, 868 N.E.2d 949 (correction officer entitled to assault pay under statute that required injury to have resulted from an act of violence of a prisoner in his custody even though the prisoners in question were nowhere near the employee when he was injured). Needless to say, an individual can be in more than one person's custody at a time. Although it appears undisputed that, in this case, it was the Cambridge police officer who formally arrested the man, the Legislature has authorized court officers to be designated to make arrests. See G.L. c. 221, § 70A. Where, as here, court officers are injured when they are working together with police officers to subdue a person who has been placed under arrest, we are loathe to ascribe to the Legislature an intent that a court officer's entitlement to assault pay turns on which officer formally arrested the person. The plaintiff's allegations in the complaint, coupled with supporting facts in the incident report, at the very least “ ‘plausibly suggest [ ] ... ‘an entitlement to relief.” Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. at 636, 888 N.E.2d 879, quoting from Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The record is silent as to whether the plaintiff was among those court officers who had been designated to make arrests. For the sake of clarity, we note that our decision does not rest on resolution of that factual question.
Because the judge erroneously dismissed the amended complaint, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.
So ordered.