Opinion
Civil Action No. 3: 19-cv-0113
05-13-2020
JEFFERY DEAN, Plaintiff, v. ERIC TICE, Superintendent, SCI-Somerset, et al., Defendants.
United States District Judge Stephanie L. Haines REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 37) be granted in part and denied in part.
II. Report
A. Procedural Background
This is an action brought by Jeffery Dean, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") inmate housed at SCI-Somerset, who alleges that prison officials have unlawfully confiscated or denied him access to a book and fourteen comic books because Defendants have determined that the publications contain "explicit sexual material" or "nudity" in violation of DC-ADM 803. Dean contends Defendants' conduct has violated his First Amendment right to freedom of the press and freedom of expression. He also claims that the denials violated DOC policy because Defendants misapplied the definitions of "explicit sexual material" and "nudity" to fictional images in comic books. The defendants have moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") (ECF No. 34), which Plaintiff opposes. (ECF No. 43). The matter is ripe for resolution.
The Second Amended Complaint is Dean's operative pleading. "In general, an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity." Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. pending No. 19-867 (filed Jan. 8, 2020). "Thus, the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading." Id.
B. Relevant Factual Background
Dean alleges that the Institutional Publication Review Committee ("IRPC") has improperly denied him access to fourteen comic books he ordered and that on December 27, 2018, C/O Redmond improperly confiscated a book he had ordered. He has sued fifteen defendants, including, several officials and staff members at SCI-Somerset, including, the Superintendent, Deputy Superintendent, Mailroom Supervisor, Captain, the three members of the IRPC, and a corrections officer; the Chief Grievance Officer and Grievance Office Representative; and five DOC employees who are employed in the DOC Office of Policy, Grants, and Legislative Affairs. As damages he seeks,
There is an inconsistency in the SAC on the dates the denials occurred. In Paragraph IV(C), the dates of the denials are listed as 1/3/2019, 4/4/2019, 9/16/2019, 10/31/2019, 12/5/2019, and 12/12/2019. The Statement of Claim attached to the SAC, however, has slightly different dates: 4/4/2019; 9/16/219; 10/31/2019; 12/5/2019; 12/12/2019; 1/16/2020; and 1/23/2020. SAC at p. 12.
compensatory damages of reimbursement for the purchase of the books and shipping and handling costs, and the maximum allowable punitive damages. I also seek to have the PA DOC revise DC-ADM 803 § 2 and implement the denial criteria outlined in 28 CFR Section 540.71(b). I also seek to either eliminate the IPRC's in the PA DOC or at the very least, replace the IPRC at SCI-Somerset and Sup. Tice and DSCS Houser with personnel who will show more professional behavior on the job and not bring their personal opinions, views, or religious beliefs to work. All costs incurred by Plaintiff will be reimbursed by Defendants if settled or jury rules in favor of Plaintiff.Second Amended Complaint, VI. Relief (ECF No. 34).
C. Standard of Review
The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well settled. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This "'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary elements." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Even so, the court need not accept as true "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences," Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000), or the plaintiff's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court's role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000). In short, a motion to dismiss should not be granted if a party alleges facts, which could, if established at trial, entitle him to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8.
Courts generally consider the allegations of the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record in deciding motions to dismiss. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Factual allegations within documents described or identified in the complaint also may be considered if the plaintiff's claims are based upon those documents. Id. (citations omitted). In addition, a district court may consider indisputably authentic documents without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004); Lum v. Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2004) (in resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally should consider "the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters
D. Discussion
With these standards in mind, the Court accepts as true the facts as they appear in the SAC and draws all possible inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Pro se pleadings, however "inartfully pleaded" must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Id. Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court may consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
1. Claims For Monetary Damages Against Defendants In Their Official Capacities Should be Dismissed
Dean seeks compensatory and punitive damages from Defendants in both their individual and official capacities as state actors. Unless consented to by a state, the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiffs from suing a state or any of its agencies in federal court. Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). The Supreme Court has long held that a suit brought against an individual acting in his or her official capacity as a state actor is the equivalent of a suit against the state, and is therefore also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Eleventh Amendment immunity can be abrogated only by an act of Congress or state consent. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-55 (1996). Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in this field, Jones v. Hashagen, 512 F. App'x 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2013), and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has, by statute, expressly withheld consent to suit in federal court. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b). Thus, any monetary claims that Dean has sought to bring against the Defendants in their official capacities as state actors should be dismissed.
2. Claims for First Amendment Violations
Defendants attack the SAC on three grounds. First, they argue that Defendants Davis, Onstead, and Ritenour should be dismissed because none is alleged to have been personally involved in the alleged violations. Next, Defendants argue that Defendant Redmond should be dismissed "because inmates have no right to possess pornography as defined by Department policy." And last, Defendants argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction over decisions of the prison publication review committee. The Court finds all three arguments unavailing at this early stage of the litigation.
First, the Court finds that it would be premature to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Davis, Onstead, and Ritenour as it appears from the SAC that these three defendants were members of the IPRC, and it was the IPRC's decision to prohibit Dean from possessing the publications at issue. Similarly, as to Defendant Redmond, the SAC states that he improperly confiscated Plaintiff's book on December 27, 2018. It therefore would be premature to dismiss Plaintiff's claim against Redmond at this early stage of the litigation. And as to Defendants' third argument, Dean responds that "the issue is not just about individual publications alone. It is about an entire category/class/genre of publications that are being improperly denied from me and they have been graphic novels and comics, and more specifically Japanese manga comics." Pl's Br. at 6. It appears that Dean is not challenging DC-ADM 803 insomuch as it bans "explicit sexual material" and "nudity" as depicted "by real, actual people," but is challenging DC-ADM 803 to the extent that Defendants have applied the ban to fictional images of "comic book characters or any fictional form of art."
To evaluate whether prison regulations violate an inmate's First Amendment right to possess publications, a court must employ the "reasonableness" test set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The Turner analysis is exceedingly fact-intensive and does not lend itself to resolution on a motion to dismiss. Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 2004). Thus, Plaintiff's claims require additional factual development to be fairly considered. For these reasons, the Court finds that Dean's claims should not be dismissed at this time without the parties being afforded the opportunity to engage in discovery and submit a fully developed factual record.
III. Conclusion
For all the above reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the pending motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. It is recommended that the motion be granted as to any claims for monetary damages that Dean has sought to bring against Defendants in their official capacities as state actors. It is recommended that the motion be denied in all other respects.
Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiff, because he is a non-electronically registered party, may file objections to this Report and Recommendation by June 1, 2020. and Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, may file objections, if any, by May 27, 2020. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe "will waive the right to appeal." Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Dated: May 13, 2020
s/Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
Chief United States Magistrate Judge cc: JEFFERY DEAN
HB7038
SCI Somerset
1600 Walters Mill Road
Somerset, PA 15510
(via U.S. First Class Mail)
Abby N. Trovinger
Pennsylvania Office of General Counsel
(via ECF electronic notification)