Opinion
Civil Action 2:23-03475-TMC-MGB
07-08-2024
DAWN W.,[1] Plaintiff, v. MARTIN O'MALLEY,[2] Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Dawn W. (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, (42 U.S.C. Section 405(g)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (the “Administration”) regarding her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). This matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner's decision be REVERSED, and that this case be REMANDED for an award of benefits.
RELEVANT FACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff was 43 years old on her date last insured, December 31, 2015. (R. at 302, 381, 397.) Plaintiff claims disability due to, inter alia, fibromyalgia, sciatica, and vascular problems. (R. at 381, 397.) Plaintiff has past relevant work as a vocational trainer, nurse aid, and medical records clerk. (R. at 335.)
Plaintiff initially filed an application for DIB on March 16, 2011, alleging a disability onset date of April 27, 2010. (R. at 82.) Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. (R. at 82, 84.) After a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on November 6, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision on March 15, 2013, in which the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 10-31, 49-81.) After the Appeals Council declined Plaintiff's request for review (R. at 16), Plaintiff filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The Court remanded Plaintiff's claim for a new hearing. (R. at 443-54.)
While Plaintiff's federal case was pending, she filed a subsequent claim for DIB on June 18, 2015. (R. at 381.) The Appeals Council ordered that Plaintiff's claims be consolidated and instructed the ALJ to issue a new decision on the consolidated claims. (R. at 457, 462.) After conducting a new hearing on Plaintiff's claims, the ALJ issued a decision in which he again found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 459-92.) Plaintiff appealed the decision, and the Appeals Council remanded the claim in an Order dated May 15, 2019. (R. at 503-04.)
Following a third hearing, the ALJissued a decision on December 3, 2019 in which the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 300-79.) After the Appeals Council declined Plaintiff's request for review of that decision, (R. at 290-96), Plaintiff filed this civil action. The December 2019 decision is the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review.
The first two ALJ decisions were issued by Administrative Law Judge Gregory Wilson. The third decision was issued by Administrative Law Judge J. Petri.
In making the determination that the Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits, the Commissioner has adopted the following findings of the ALJ:
(1) The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2015.
(2) The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date of April 27, 2010 through her date last insured of December 31, 2015 (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
(3) Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder; generalized anxiety disorder with panic attacks; fibromyalgia; left L5 nerve root irritation and lumbosacral neuritis; bilateral C5-6 nerve root interruption with sensory peripheral neuropathy; acromioclavicular joint posterior right shoulder capsule ligamentous strain and subscapularis tendinosis (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
(4) Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
(5) After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except she could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She could frequently climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She could frequently do overhead reaching with her right upper extremity, handle, and finger. She must avoid all exposure to hazards. She could do unskilled work (e.g., SVP 1 and 2) on a sustained basis (i.e., 8 hours a day, five days a week, in two-hour increments with breaks). She needs a low stress work environment, characterized as nonproduction work, with no fast-paced work or assembly line production.
(6) Through the date last insured, the claimant was unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).
(7) The claimant was born on December 22, 1972 and was 43 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 45-49, on the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1563).
(8) The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564).
(9) Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
(10) Through the date last insured, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have performed (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569(a)).
(11) The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from April 27, 2010, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2015, the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).(R. at 304-37.)
APPLICABLE LAW
The Act provides that disability benefits shall be available to those persons insured for benefits, who are not of retirement age, who properly apply, and who are under a “disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). “Disability” is defined in the Act as the inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To facilitate a uniform and efficient processing of disability claims, the Act has by regulation reduced the statutory definition of “disability” to a series of five sequential questions. An examiner must consider whether the claimant (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) has a severe impairment, (3) has an impairment which equals an illness contained in the Social Security Administration's official Listing of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, (4) has an impairment which prevents past relevant work, and (5) has an impairment which prevents him from doing substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If an individual is found not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
The claimant bears the burden of proof with respect to the first four steps of the analysis. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1983); Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995); Patterson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 846 F.3d 656, 659 (4th Cir. 2017). Once the claimant has established an inability to return to his past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant-considering his age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity-can perform alternative jobs and that such jobs exist in the national economy. SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *3; Grant, 699 F.2d at 191; Pass, 65 F.3d at 1203; Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2016).
The scope of judicial review by the federal courts in disability cases is narrowly tailored to determine whether the Commissioner supported his findings with substantial evidence and applied the correct law. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015); Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 691 (4th Cir. 2018); Arakas v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 983 F.3d 83, 94 (4th Cir. 2020); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Consequently, the Act precludes a de novo review of the evidence and requires that the court uphold the Commissioner's decision as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Pyles v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 846, 848 (4th Cir. 1988); Bird v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012); Mascio, 780 F.3d at 640; Dowling v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2021); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383 (citing Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015)). It is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” Pearson, 810 F.3d at 207 (citing Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)). In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court does not undertake to “reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472; Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95; Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383. “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled,” the reviewing court must defer to the ALJ's decision. Shinaberry v. Saul, 952 F.3d 113, 123 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472).
However, the court does not “reflexively rubber-stamp an ALJ's findings.” Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383 (citing Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 870 (4th Cir. 2017)). An ALJ may not cherrypick, misstate, or mischaracterize material facts. Arakas, 983 F.3d at 99 (citing Lewis, 858 F.3d at 869). Rather, ALJs “must ‘build an accurate and logical bridge' from the evidence to their conclusions.” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95 (quoting Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed reversible error by: (1) failing to properly evaluate Plaintiff's fibromyalgia; (2) failing to adequately explain and support Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (3) failing to appropriately consider opinion evidence. (See generally Dkt. No. 24.) In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. (See generally Dkt. No. 26.) For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned cannot conclude that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner's decision be REVERSED. Further, in light of the record evidence, the procedural history of this case, and the fact that Plaintiff's claim has been pending for over thirteen years, the undersigned recommends that this case be REMANDED for an award of benefits.
I. ALJ's Consideration of Plaintiff's Fibromyalgia
Plaintiff first argues that “[d]espite finding fibromyalgia a severe impairment, the ALJ failed to properly evaluate this impairment pursuant to the Commissioner's own rulings.” (Dkt. No. 24 at 24.) More specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not consider the waxing and waning of Plaintiff's condition, cherry-picked select examination findings, improperly assessed Plaintiff's daily activities, and impermissibly rejected Plaintiff's reported symptoms based on a lack of objective evidence. (Id. at 25-28.) As set forth in greater detail below, the undersigned agrees with Plaintiff's contentions and finds that the ALJ committed reversible error when evaluating Plaintiff's fibromyalgia. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner's decision be REVERSED, and that this case be REMANDED for an award of benefits.
A. Legal Standard
“Although there is no medical listing for fibromyalgia, Titles II and XVI of Social Security Ruling 12-2p provide[] guidance on how the Commissioner develops evidence to establish that a person has a medically determinable impairment of fibromyalgia, and how to evaluate fibromyalgia in disability claims and continuing disability reviews.” Smith v. Colvin, No. 2:14-cv-00042, 2015 WL 7571946, at *7 (W.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2015) (citing SSR 12-2p, 77 Fed.Reg. 43,640 (July 25, 2012), available at 2012 WL 3104869). Pursuant to SSR 12-2p, a claimant can establish a medically determinable impairment of fibromyalgia by demonstrating (1) a diagnosis of fibromyalgia from an acceptable medical source, and (2) evidence that satisfies either the 1990 American College of Rheumatology Criteria for the Classification of Fibromyalgia, or the 2010 ACR Preliminary Diagnostic Criteria. See SSR 12-2p; see also Conrad v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:20-cv-00256-MR-WCM, 2021 WL 9036993, at *4 (W.D. N.C. Nov. 12, 2021), adopted sub nom. Conard v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 821078 (W.D. N.C. Mar. 17, 2022).
SSR 12-2p states that when making an RFC determination, an ALJ should “consider a longitudinal record whenever possible because the symptoms of [fibromyalgia] can wax and wane so that a person may have ‘good days and bad days.'” SSR 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869, at *6. When determining whether a claimant can do any past relevant work or other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, SSR 12-2p instructs an ALJ to consider “widespread pain and other symptoms associated with [fibromyalgia]” and to “be alert to the possibility that there may be exertion[al] or nonexertional limitations (for example, postural or environmental) that erode a person's occupational base.” Id. The ruling advises that “[i]f objective medical evidence does not substantiate the person's statements about the intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of the symptoms,” “all the evidence in the case record will be considered.” Id. at *5. Courts throughout this circuit have “noted that fibromyalgia poses particular challenges to credibility analyses due to the limited available objective medical evidence.” Elburn v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., No. CIV. CCB-14-0887, 2014 WL 7146972, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 12, 2014); see also Arakas, 983 F.3d at 96 (explaining that fibromyalgia is a disease that presents with subjective symptoms); Dowell v. Colvin, No. 1:12-cv-1006, 2015 WL 1524767, at *3 (M.D. N.C. Apr. 2, 2015) (mentioning that numerous courts have recognized that fibromyalgia's symptoms are entirely subjective and that there are no laboratory tests that can confirm the presence or severity of the syndrome).
In light of these challenges, the Fourth Circuit sought to clarify how ALJs should consider fibromyalgia and its symptoms in a recent decision, Arakas v. Commissioner, 983 F.3d 83 (4th Cir. 2020). In Arakas, the Fourth Circuit explained that ALJs apply an incorrect legal standard by requiring objective evidence of symptoms, even when they also consider other evidence in the record. Id. at 97. The Fourth Circuit noted that this holding is doubly true when applied to consideration of fibromyalgia-“a disease whose symptoms are entirely subjective with the exception of trigger-point evidence.” Id. at 96. In other words, the Fourth Circuit determined that “ALJs may not rely on objective medical evidence (or the lack thereof)-even as just one of multiple factors-to discount a claimant's subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia or some other disease that does not produce such evidence.” Id. at 97.
B. ALJ's Decision
As Plaintiff accurately notes, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's fibromyalgia was a severe impairment at Step Two of the sequential evaluation process. (R. at 304-05.) At Step Three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's fibromyalgia did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. (R. at 305-09.) The ALJ continued on to consider how Plaintiff's fibromyalgia impacted her RFC. (R. at 309-35.) In doing so, the ALJ first recounted Plaintiff's subjective statements regarding her fibromyalgia symptoms. (R. at 310-11.) The ALJ summarized:
On September 30, 2011, the claimant said she hurts all the time, is up and down through the night with fatigue, nausea, headaches and trying to concentrate. She said she could only walk 500 yards but then needed to rest for about 10 minutes. Inconsistent with this, she then described doing extensive physical and mental activities of daily living (Ex. 10E).
During the 2012 hearing, the claimant testified that after a work injury, she had chronic pain. Her physical therapist noticed knots and tenseness, and Dr. Sellman observed pressure points, and diagnosed fibromyalgia. Some days she has pain and some days she does not[. S]he could go for two weeks and not have a good day, but could not state how often that happened. Pain interferes with her sleep. Her pain medication (Lyrica) is “okay” but does not work all the time. In addition to medication, she does morning stretching exercises, and being active (e.g., doing things around the house, sitting on a stool and working in her flowerbed) helps her pain. She can do activities 30 to 60 minutes but then has to stop.
During the hearing in November 2016, the claimant testified that she sees Dr. Schwartz twice a week. His office is three to five minutes away, and she drives. He
told her not to just sit around, so while it take[s] her longer to do things because of pain, she gets up at 6:30 am, makes breakfast and does small things around the house (washes clothes, sweeps, mops). She walks the dog in her yard. She shops with her daughter for up to 30 minutes at the grocery store, but others unload the groceries. She needs help cooking big meals. She can sit for one hour but then has to get up: sitting too long bothers her back and the pressure points from fibromyalgia. She can't lift heavy things or [hold] things overhead long.
She had nerve damage with torn muscle and ligaments from a right shoulder work injury in 2010. She also has residual neck problems from that injury; it hurts to hold her head up long, like when looking at the sky. Twisting her neck for long periods causes a crick in her neck. She has not had surgery, but has been treated with injections for problems in her back, shoulder and neck. She has had onset of depression and anxiety, with panic attacks, but hasn't had a panic attack in a couple of months. She cries all the time, and began going to Mental Health because she had suicidal thoughts all the time, but being a Christian, she would never act on that. She has -fibrofog- i.e., she has difficulty with focus, forgets appointments, and things she should have done yesterday. Her family helps her keep up with that.
During the hearing on October 22, 2019, the claimant testified her condition is worse since 2015. She stated she now suffers more pain in her neck and back, and that the numbness in her fingers is worse. She stated she had pain when sitting or standing, and that she has fallen three times in 2019. She further reported she experienced numbness in her right arm and right leg.
As for her condition prior to 2015, the claimant testified she could not have performed a stand up and walk around job because she could not function. As for performing at a sitting at a desk job typing and writing prior to 2015, such job would have made her hand condition worse. She said she could not have assembled parts because such job involve[s] touching and feeling.
The claimant also testified she had problems with concentration, attention and comprehension prior to 2015. She also said her body simply did not allow her body to function.(R. at 310-11.)
After recounting Plaintiff's subjective complaints, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence in the record. (R. at 311.) The ALJ then noted various record evidence pertaining specifically to Plaintiff's fibromyalgia, including: multiple fibromyalgia diagnoses; “[f]ibromyalgia trigger point testing [that] was positive at all of the test points aside from the right epicondyle, and at all of the control points aside from the right arm;” a fibromyalgia treatment regimen consisting of injections, oral medications, and physical therapy; and consistent reports of tenderness upon examination. (R. at 310-15.) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff sometimes reported significant pain and symptoms relating to her fibromyalgia but reported that she was doing well with her treatment regimen at other times throughout the record. (R. at 310-15.) Ultimately, the ALJ concluded:
I find the evidence of record supports a finding that the claimant's fibromyalgia meets the Social Security Administration['s] criteria for that diagnosis, but indicates that it is not severe enough to satisfy the agency's criteria for disability. During the current hearing, the claimant testified that her activities of daily living include cooking, washing dishes, doing laundry and folding clothes, sweeping, mop[p]ing, vacuuming, dusting, and cleaning the living room. She no longer babysits her grandchild, but changes diapers, feed[s], and dress[es] the child. The claimant drives, goes out to eat, attends church, and sees friend[s] and family. She does no [internet] research, but uses Facebook to stay in touch with family. She texts, and emails. Her activities of daily living as well as her physical examinations showing full strength and range of motion in all areas (Exs.2F, 15E[,] 17F, 21F), and normal gait and station (Exs.2E[, ]15F[,] 18,17E[,] 20F, 21F), are consistent with medium exertional work.(R. at 315.)
C. Analysis
The ALJ's decision reflects various errors in the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's fibromyalgia. (R. at 310-35.) First, the ALJ relied on objective medical evidence to discount Plaintiff's subjective complaints about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her fibromyalgia symptoms, (see, e.g., R. at 311, stating “claimant's 2012 testimony is not entirely consistent with the medical record”), and therefore used an improper legal standard in making Plaintiff's disability determination. Arakas, 983 F.3d at 96. For example, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were inconsistent with the record as a whole because: (1) Plaintiff's physical examinations occasionally indicated normal findings, (2) not all of Plaintiff's doctors conducted “physical examinations,” “imaging,” and/or “diagnostic studies” to confirm that Plaintiff had fibromyalgia, and (3) Plaintiff's treatment notes were generally routine. (R. at 311-15.) As the Fourth Circuit has explained, all of these objective medical findings are irrelevant to the severity of Plaintiff's fibromyalgia and should not have been considered by the ALJ in evaluating the same. Arakas, 983 F.3d at 97-98 (“Objective indicators such as normal clinical and laboratory results simply have no relevance to the severity, persistence, or limiting effects of a claimant's fibromyalgia, based on the current understanding of the disease.”).
In addition, the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff's subjective statements about her fibromyalgia symptoms and the effects of those symptoms on her ability to work an eight-hour day. (R. at 310-15.) The regulations provide for a two-step process in evaluating a plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain in the disability determination. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; see also SSR 16-3p. First, the ALJ must determine “whether objective medical evidence presents a ‘medically determinable impairment' that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's alleged symptoms.” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b); SSR 16-3p). Second, “after finding a medically determinable impairment, the ALJ must assess the intensity and persistence of the alleged symptoms to determine how they affect the claimant's ability to work and whether the claimant is disabled.” Id. The ALJ must consider all available evidence in this determination. Id. The claimant does not need to produce objective evidence to satisfy this second prong. Id. Indeed, a plaintiff is allowed to rely entirely on subjective evidence of pain to demonstrate that an impairment is sufficiently persistent and severe. See Arakas, 983 F.3d at 96; see also Shelley C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 61 F.4th 341, 360-61 (4th Cir. 2023). As noted, this standard is of particular importance in cases involving fibromyalgia because fibromyalgia symptoms that are “entirely subjective” and objective indicators such as laboratory tests do not indicate the presence or severity of such symptoms. Arakas, 983 F.3d at 91, 96 (citing Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 1996)). The Arakas Court held that in a fibromyalgia case, “ALJs may not rely on objective medical evidence (or the lack thereof)-even as just one of multiple factors-to discount a claimant's subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia.” Id. at 97 (emphasis added). If objective medical evidence is considered at all in fibromyalgia cases, “such evidence- along with consistent trigger-point findings-should be treated as evidence substantiating the claimant's impairment.” Id. at 97-98; see also SSR 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869 (explaining how ALJs should evaluate evidence related to fibromyalgia).
Here, as in Arakas, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's fibromyalgia was a severe impairment but then “failed to appreciate the waxing and waning nature of fibromyalgia and to consider the longitudinal record of [Plaintiff's] symptoms as a whole.” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 100. The ALJ largely discounted Plaintiff's subjective statements because her complaints of pain were inconsistent and unreliable-in other words, Plaintiff reported that she was doing well at some points but reported that she experienced significant pain at others. (R. at 310-15.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was diagnosed with and consistently treated for fibromyalgia throughout the longitudinal record yet concluded that Plaintiff's fibromyalgia was not disabling because she, at times, produced normal physical examinations showing full strength and range of motion. (R. at 310-15.) However, this conclusion “reveals [a] misunderstanding of fibromyalgia, which does not produce such evidence other than trigger points.” Id. at 16.
Further, the ALJ improperly relied on Plaintiff's daily activities to support the conclusion that Plaintiff was capable of medium work with certain limitations. (R. at 310-15.) Though the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's daily activities were limited in scope and duration, the ALJ failed to provide any explanation of how or why those activities could support a conclusion that Plaintiff was capable of substantial gainful activity. (R. at 310-15, noting that Plaintiff takes longer to do things like washing dishes and folding clothes because of pain, can shop for only 30 minutes at a time, needs help cooking, can sit for only one hour at a time, and needs her family to help her remember tasks and appointments.) Critically, activities of daily living and activities in a full-time job differ in that “a person has more flexibility in scheduling the former than the latter, can get help from other persons . . ., and is not held to a minimum standard of performance as she would be by an employer.” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 101 (citing Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012)). Plaintiff testified that she tries to do as much as she can but often needs help and requires breaks. (R. at 310-11.) The ability to make meals and complete chores in a limited capacity does not indicate that Plaintiff is able to maintain full-time employment. See Cline v. Kijakazi, No. 5:22-cv-02121-DCN, 2023 WL 5767708, at *10 (D.S.C. Sept. 7, 2023) (“The ability to do chores without considering whether others helped [] with those chores or whether those chores were undertaken daily, weekly, or monthly does not by itself suggest that [a claimant] can work eight-hour days.”); see also Arakas, 983 F.3d at 101 (“[D]isability claimants should not be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives in the face of their limitations.”). What is more, Plaintiff testified that her activities vary because she has good days and bad days-which is entirely consistent with the waxing and waning nature of fibromyalgia symptoms, and with the overall record depicting periods of “doing fine” and periods of severe discomfort. (R. at 310-15.)
Based on the above, the ALJ “improperly increased [Plaintiff's] burden of proof” by effectively requiring Plaintiff's “subjective descriptions of [her] symptoms to be supported by objective medical evidence,” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 96, and failed to provide substantial evidence in support of the disability determination. See Piacitelli v. O'Malley, No. 7:22-cv-193-FL, 2024 WL 996740, at *8 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 12, 2024), adopted, 2024 WL 992232 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 7, 2024) (“The Fourth Circuit found that [s]ubstantial evidence does not support the ALJ's conclusion that Arakas's subjective complaints were inconsistent with her daily activities, because the record, when read as a whole, reveals no inconsistency between the two.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Put simply, the ALJ's decision does not comport with the unambiguous standards established in Arakas. In keeping with post-Arakas decisions of district courts throughout the Fourth Circuit, the ALJ's decision must be REVERESED. See, e.g., Cline, 2023 WL 5767708, at *8 (reversing and remanding because the ALJ relied on objective medical evidence to discount the plaintiff's subjective complaints concerning fibromyalgia); Gadsden v. Saul, No. 2:20-cv-01421-DCC, 2021 WL 2914981 (D.S.C. July 12, 2021) (same); Bryson v. Berryhill, No. 1:20-cv-00169-MOC, 2021 WL 2517682, at *5 (W.D. N.C. June 18, 2021) (same); Jamoya A. v. O'Malley, No. 3:22-cv-00804-RCY, 2024 WL 897606 (E.D. Va. Mar. 1, 2024) (same); Suzanne O. v. Saul, No. 3:20-cv-00061, 2021 WL 1195930, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2021) (same).
As noted, Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff's RFC and weighing certain opinion evidence. Because the ALJ's improper evaluation of Plaintiff's subjective complaints regarding her fibromyalgia symptoms constitutes reversible error sufficient to warrant remand, the undersigned need not address these additional arguments. However, the undersigned notes that the errors discussed herein permeated the ALJ's entire decision, including the overall RFC and opinion evidence analyses. For example, the ALJ discounted a 2011 Function Report indicating that Plaintiff had serious problems concentrating due to her fibromyalgia and discounted several medical opinions indicating disability (including opinions from Plaintiff's treating physicians) on the basis that the opinions were inconsistent with Plaintiff's daily activities and the objective evidence in the record. (R. at 310-35.)
II. Recommendation to Remand with Award of Benefits
In light of the foregoing errors in the ALJ's decision, remand is appropriate. The undersigned further recommends that this case should be remanded with an order to award benefits. Though the Court's general practice is to remand for further proceedings, the Court nonetheless maintains authority to award benefits where the record is fully developed and it is clear that the Commissioner would be required to award benefits on remand. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bouchette v. O'Malley, No. 5:23-cv-00002-RMG, 2024 WL 549799, at *8 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2024) (reversing the Commissioner's decision and remanding for an award of benefits where the plaintiff's benefits application had been pending for over nine years and the ALJ's decision was thrice reversed).
Here, Plaintiff filed for benefits over thirteen years ago, multiple hearings have been held on Plaintiff's application, and the ALJ's decision has now been reversed several times. Remand would serve no useful purpose here, as no reasonable interpretation of the evidence would support a conclusion that Plaintiff could sustain ongoing competitive work activity. Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1012 (4th Cir. 1974) (noting that it is appropriate for a federal court to “reverse without remanding where the record does not contain substantial evidence to support a decision denying coverage under the correct legal standard and when reopening the record for more evidence would serve no purpose”). Rather, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff experienced disabling symptoms due to fibromyalgia throughout the relevant period. This case therefore constitutes a rare instance in which it is “clear that an ALJ decision denying benefits, properly explained, could not be supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Carr v. Kijakazi, No. 20-2226, 2022 WL 301540, at *5 (4th Cir. 2022). As such, the undersigned recommends that the case should be remanded with an order to award benefits. Id. at 3 (“A court may . . . reverse and direct the award of benefits only in the unusual case in which it can be determined, even in the absence of an explanation, that there is no account on which substantial evidence could support a denial of benefits.” (internal citations omitted)).
CONCLUSION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED, for the foregoing reasons, that the Commissioner's decision be REVERSED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and that the case be REMANDED for an award of benefits.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).