Opinion
No. 96 Civ. 6064
June 3, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jessie Davis brings this Title VII action against her former employer, the New York City Board of Education ("the Board"), alleging that she was fired from her teaching position because of her race. Plaintiff represented herself for most of the six years this case has been pending, but she recently retained counsel for the purpose of opposing the Board's motion for summary judgment. Because plaintiff has not proffered any evidence creating a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether she was fired because of her race, the court hereby GRANTS the Board's motion.
Plaintiff originally asserted additional claims against both the New York City Human Rights Commission and the United Federation of Teachers, but she later dropped her claims against both of these parties. The Board is the lone remaining defendant.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who is an African-American woman, began working as a teacher at Community Elementary School ("CES") 230X in the Bronx in October 1984. Dr. Rose Gallo, who is a white woman, became the principal of CES 230X in August 1992. For the first two years, plaintiff and Dr. Gallo enjoyed a cordial and productive working relationship. Dr. Gallo gave plaintiff satisfactory ratings on her evaluations at the end of the 1992-93 and 1993-94 school years.
Beginning in the fall of 1994, however, a major conflict between plaintiff and Dr. Gallo began brewing. According to Dr. Gallo, plaintiff did not return to school from summer vacation on time, and her classroom had not been properly cleaned out before the summer recess began. Soon after the term began, there allegedly was an incident in which plaintiff allowed two of her kindergarten students to wander unsupervised outside of the school building. Plaintiff also developed punctuality and attendance problems and, according to Dr. Gallo, reacted insubordinately when confronted with these accusations. Dr. Gallo also accused plaintiff of teaching her students things that simply are not true, such as that the dinosaurs became extinct because meat-eating dinosaurs ate all of the plant-eating dinosaurs. Dr. Gallo memorialized these and numerous other complaints about plaintiff's performance by writing her a series of no less than fourteen letters between September 1994 and March 1995, copies of which were placed in plaintiffs personnel file.
In November 1994, plaintiff filed a complaint with the New York City Human Rights Commission, alleging that Dr. Gallo had discriminated against her because of her race in violation of Title VII and the New York City Administrative Code. The Commission rejected plaintiff's claim in April 1995, finding that plaintiff had endangered the safety of her students, had threatened Dr. Gallo, had ongoing attendance problems, and that plaintiff had failed to correct these problems despite repeated warnings by Dr. Gallo.
In December 1994, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Board's Office of Equal Opportunity, alleging that Dr. Gallo was discriminating against her because of her race. The Board rejected plaintiff's claim in March 1995, concluding that her discrimination claim was unfounded. The Board found that Dr. Gallo's numerous written complaints about plaintiff's performance were legitimate and warranted warnings about violations of established procedure, not the pretext for race discrimination.
On March 15, 1995, Dr. Gallo terminated plaintiffs employment. Dr. Gallo explained to plaintiff that she was being terminated because, despite repeated warnings, she had continued to engage in disruptive behavior including insubordination, threatening supervisors, and failing adequately to fulfill her teaching responsibilities. Dr. Gallo then gave plaintiff an unsatisfactory performance evaluation for that portion of the academic year. Plaintiff appealed the unsatisfactory rating to the Board's Office of Appeals and Reviews, but the Board sustained the rating in a detailed opinion, concluding that Dr. Gallo's description of plaintiffs behavior was supported by the evidence.
Plaintiff filed this Title VII action pro se in 1996. The case was assigned to Judge Batts, who denied plaintiffs motion for the appointment of counsel, finding that plaintiff had not demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious claim. Plaintiff managed to retain counsel some six years later, however, for the purpose of opposing the Board's instant motion for summary judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD
In disparate treatment cases, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). A plaintiff meets this burden by showing, through direct or circumstantial evidence, (1) that she was within a protected group; (2) that she was qualified for the position; (3) that she was discharged; and (4) that "the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." Burger v. New York Inst. of Tech., 94 F.3d 830, 833 (2d Cir. 1996). The burden of making out the prima facie case is minimal." Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 446 (2d Cir. 1999).
Once a plaintiff demonstrates evidence sufficient to support a prima facie case, the employer must produce evidence showing plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142. The plaintiff then has the ultimate burden of proving "by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
"[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated."Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. Importantly, however, such a showing is by no means always adequate to survive summary judgment because "proof that the employer's proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiffs proffered reason . . . is correct." Id. After Reeves the court must examine the entire record in each case to "determine whether the plaintiff could satisfy his ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2000). Showing that the employer's proffered explanation for termination is not worthy of belief is one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may or may not be sufficiently persuasive to preclude summary judgment depending upon the specific facts of each individual case.
DISCUSSION
In opposing the Board's summary judgment motion, plaintiff points to no evidence at all suggesting that Dr. Gallo fired her because of her race. Plaintiff concedes that Dr. Gallo never spoke to her in a racially hostile manner, alleging only that Dr. Gallo's discrimination manifested itself through "her actions, not her words." Yet plaintiff cannot point to any action by Dr. Gallo suggesting that race played a role in plaintiffs termination. To be sure, plaintiff points to her deposition testimony in which she stated that some of Dr. Gallo's asserted reasons for terminating her were false. During her deposition, for example, plaintiff denied that she was guilty of excessive absenteeism, she denied that she ever threatened Dr. Gallo, and she denied that she ever endangered the welfare of her students. However, even putting aside the fact that plaintiffs deposition testimony does not respond to all (or even most) of Dr. Gallo's accusations, plaintiff points to noaffirmative evidence suggesting that race was the reason she was fired. The record suggests that plaintiffs teaching performance was far from perfect and that she reacted with overt hostility to any criticism made by Dr. Gallo. Dr. Gallo may have fired plaintiff for legitimate performance reasons or simply because she did not like her, but the record is entirely devoid of evidence — beyond the mere fact that plaintiff is African-American and Dr. Gallo is white — that reasonably could support a finding that race was a motivating factor.
The only evidence in the record that even begins to hint at racism is plaintiffs deposition testimony that she was reprimanded for tardiness while two other white teachers who sometimes came to work late were not similarly reprimanded. The court holds, however, that this evidence does not create a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Dr. Gallo terminated plaintiff because of her race. The record is teeming with evidence of plaintiffs repeated performance problems, problems far more serious than occasional tardiness, but there is no evidence that the two white teachers plaintiff cites were the subject of similarly serious misconduct allegations. Even assuming it is true that Dr. Gallo reprimanded plaintiff for her tardiness but let slide the tardiness of these two white teachers, there is no reason to believe that the white teachers would have been treated differently than plaintiff if they had been accused of the kind and degree of misconduct of which plaintiff was accused. The mere fact that Dr. Gallo did not reprimand two white teachers for isolated incidents of tardiness is not a sufficient basis for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Dr. Gallo terminated plaintiff because of her race.
The inadequacy of plaintiff's opposition to the Board's motion flows directly from the fact that her papers do not rely on any record evidence other than excerpts from her deposition testimony. Plaintiff took no discovery in the six years this case has been pending. She did not depose any school teachers or administrators. She did not even bother to draft an affidavit of her own, much less obtain affidavits from any of the supposedly numerous teachers who she insists would offer testimony corroborating her claim that Dr. Gallo is a racist. Indeed, plaintiffs counsel seemed to acknowledge this evidentiary void at oral argument, stating to the court that it was "regretful" that he was "unable to coordinate with plaintiff" regarding procuring affidavits. Instead of offering evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial, counsel offered his assurance that if plaintiff "gets her day in court" he would be able to prove her claim at trial by calling the witnesses plaintiff has identified.
Obviously, this is not the way the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure work. A defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in advance of trial where, as here, the plaintiff fails to respond to a summary judgment motion with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Board's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED, and plaintiffs complaint is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.