Opinion
No. 01-03-00165-CV.
Opinion issued April 1, 2004.
On Appeal from the 239th District Court, Brazoria County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 20878*JG02.
Eugene J. Pitman, Houston for appellant.
Randall L. Telford, Irving for appellee.
Panel consists of Justices TAFT, HANKS, and HIGLEY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Wayne Gayer, appellee, filed a lawsuit in the trial court to quiet title to property held in his name. Appellant, Michael T. Davis, as administrator for the estate of Ken Davis, and E.J. Joe King, Sheriff of Brazoria County, Texas (collectively, "defendants"), were attempting to sell Gayer's property pursuant to a lien on the property. The lien arose from the filing of a judgment that Ken Davis had previously obtained against Jim Gibson, a former owner of the property in question. The trial court found that Gayer owned the property free and clear of any liens obtained against Gibson. Michael Davis now appeals the decision of the lower court. We determine whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that Gayer owned the property free and clear of any judgment liens filed against Gibson in his individual capacity. We affirm.
Sheriff King has not appealed the judgment of the trial court.
Facts
On March 12, 1993, Gibson, as trustee, took title to the tract of land at the center of the controversy. Gibson acquired title to the lot by deed from Hugh T. Echols. The deed conveyed the property to "Jim Gibson, Trustee for two (2) minor children, James R. Gibson, II and Adrian L. Gibson." In April 1994, Ken Davis, Michael Davis's decedent, took a judgment against Gibson individually. On July 14, 1994, the abstract of judgment was filed with the Brazoria County Clerk and recorded in the official public records of real property of that county. Gibson, as trustee, conveyed the property, and it was thereafter conveyed through mesne conveyances to Gayer. On December 30, 2002, following a bench trial, the trial court quieted title to the lot in Gayer, enjoined Michael Davis from causing or attempting sale of the lot under execution pursuant to the judgment described in the abstract, and released Gayer's bond. Davis timely requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were made and filed. Davis filed this appeal on February 21, 2003.Standard of Review
"A first or subsequent abstract of judgment . . . constitutes a lien on the real property of the defendant located in the county in which the abstract is recorded and indexed, including real property acquired after such recording and indexing." Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 52.001 (Vernon 1995).
When, as here, the trial court issues findings of fact and conclusions of law, we review the findings of fact on legal and factual sufficiency grounds and review the conclusions of law de novo, as a legal question. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). Conclusions of law are reviewable when attacked as a matter of law, but not on grounds of sufficiency of the evidence, as if they were findings of fact. See Arthur M. Deck Assocs. v. Crispin, 888 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). Although we cannot review the conclusions of law for factual insufficiency, we review the trial court's legal conclusions drawn from the facts to determine their correctness. Id.
Establishment of the Trust
In issue one, appellant contends that the trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Gayer owned the property free and clear of any judgment liens filed against Jim Gibson. Appellant asserts that, because there was no proof of a trust, Texas Property Code Section 101.002 does not insulate the property from the judgment lien against Gibson individually.
Appellant includes factual and legal sufficiency standards of review in his brief, but because appellant challenged only the trial court's conclusions of law and not its findings of fact, we do not analyze the sufficiency of the evidence. See Arthur M. Deck Assocs. v. Crispin, 888 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
"Although trust property is held by the trustee without identifying the trust or its beneficiaries, the trust property is not liable to satisfy the personal obligations of the trustee." Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 101.002 (Vernon 1995).
When a trust is created, the property held is not liable for the personal obligations of the trustee. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 114.0821 (Vernon 1995). No particular form or word is required to create a trust, as long as there is reasonable certainty as to the intended property, object, and beneficiary. See Fred Rizk Const. Co. v. Cousins Mortgage Equity Inv., 627 S.W.2d 753, 757 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this case, all deeds to the property involving Jim Gibson clearly identify that they were executed in Gibson's capacity as trustee for his two minor children. Therefore, on the face of the deeds, the property involved, the trustee, and the intended beneficiaries are clear. Although the object of the trust is not expressly stated, if a trust is set up for minor children, it is reasonable to conclude that the trust was intended for the general welfare of the children. See Barrientos v. Nava, 94 S.W.3d 270, 282 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
The trial court concluded that, "[w]hen a person designated as trustee in a vesting deed conveys the real property, a subsequent purchaser of the property is not required to offer evidence of the terms and conditions of the trust instrument designating the trustee." We note that there is a strong presumption in favor of the correctness of a deed as written and executed. See Carson v. White, 456 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This presumption controls unless the party alleging that the deed does not express the truth overcomes the presumption with clear, strong, and convincing evidence. See id.
Appellant relies primarily upon authority asserting that the use of the term "trustee" in a deed does not create a trust, but is merely a description and is of no effect. See Nolana Dev. Ass'n v. Corsi, 682 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. 1984); Jordan v. Exxon Corp., 802 S.W.2d 880, 883 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ); Spiritas v. Robinowitz, 544 S.W.2d 710, 715 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ. ref'd n.r.e.).
In Nolana Development Association, the dispute involved the trustee named on the deed and the beneficiaries. See id., 682 S.W.2d at 248. In that case, there was no mention of Nolana, the beneficiary, in the deed. Id. In Jordan, the trustor died without recording any formal document outlining beneficiaries, duties, or terms. See id., 802 S.W.2d at 882. In Spiritas, the court invalidated the trust because the document did not name a beneficiary; it merely designated one party as trustee. See id., 544 S.W.2d at 715. The facts of the present case are distinguishable from those in Nolana, Jordan, and Spiritas. Here, Hugh Echols expressly conveyed property by deed to Gibson, as trustee for Gibson's two minor children, and Gibson expressly conveyed the property, as trustee for his children, to David Medford. Consequently, the deeds in this case did not fail to identify the beneficiaries of the trust.
Appellant cites Clark v. Wisdom, 403 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.), for the proposition that, even if beneficiaries are named in the document, that document does not necessarily establish a trust. In Clark, the court asserted that, even if a trust was created, it was an equitable trust that terminated at the death of the life tenant. Id. at 883. Clark is thus not controlling in this case, which does not involve a life estate.
Appellant also contends that the facts of the present case are so similar to those in Rizk that the court's decision in Rizk should control here. However, in Rizk, the parties to the trust denied any intention to form a trust. See id., 627 S.W.2d at 757.
There is no evidence in the case before us that either party to the trust denied its existence. In fact, Kimberly Robison, Gibson's former wife, testified that Gibson did form a trust in his children's name. Therefore, there was evidence other than the recitation in the deed to support the formation of a trust.
The deeds of conveyance in appellee's chain of title provided sufficient proof of a valid trust to create a presumption that a trust was formed. See Carson, 456 S.W.2d at 215. Appellant has failed to overcome that presumption with clear, strong, and convincing evidence. See id. The property is thus not subject to any judgment lien against Gibson. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that appellee owns the property free and clear of any and all judgment liens filed against Jim Gibson in his individual capacity. We overrule appellant's sole issue.Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.