Opinion
No. 70-445
Decided November 23, 1971. Rehearing denied December 28, 1971. Certiorari granted March 27, 1972.
Personal injury action resulting from automobile accident. Trial court determined general release of all claims executed by plaintiffs was valid. Plaintiffs appealed.
Affirmed
1. RELEASE — Only Mistake — Plaintiffs' Beliefs — Severity of Injuries — Date of Recovery — Not Void Document. Where only mistake of fact — if it can be called that — under which plaintiffs were operating when they executed general release of their personal injury claims was in respect to their individually-held beliefs regarding the severity of plaintiff-wife's injuries and the expected date of her complete recovery, such mistake is not the type of mistake or misconception for which the law will void a document.
2. Medical Advice — Plaintiffs' Doctors — Mistaken — Not Relieve Plaintiffs — Contract Executed. Where there is nothing in the record to impugn fact that medical advice concerning plaintiff-wife's injuries was given to plaintiffs by their own doctors, acting in good faith, the fact that doctors may have been mistaken in some of their conclusions will not operate to relieve plaintiffs of legal effect of contract they executed while relying upon such advice.
Appeal from the District Court of Larimer County, Honorable J. Robert Miller, Judge.
Fischer Wilmarth, Gene E. Fischer, Timothy W. Hasler, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Warberg Mast, Sonja E. Warberg, D. Chet Mast, Yegge, Hall Evans, Don R. Evans, for defendant-appellee.
Appellants instituted this action against appellee to recover damages for personal injuries and loss of consortium resulting from a two-vehicle automobile accident. Appellee's principal defense to the action was that the appellants were estopped from asserting any claims by reason of their having executed a written general release of all of their claims arising out of the accident. Appellants then asserted that the release upon which the appellee relied was invalid and should be declared void.
The issue of the validity of the general release was tried separately to the court. Upon the conclusion of the trial of such issue, the trial court ruled that there was no evidence of any fraud, misrepresentation, or overreaching on the part of the insurance claims service which had secured the release in question; that the release was valid; and that there was insufficient evidence of any mutual mistake which would justify voiding the release. In this appeal, the appellants contest the validity of these rulings by the trial court.
Principally, it is the contention of the appellants that, because they executed the release in question in exchange for a sum equal only to their out-of-pocket losses for property damage and medical expenses incurred up to the time of its execution, they and the insurer who negotiated the release must have been acting under a mutual mistake as to the severity of Mrs. Davis' injuries and as to the future date of her recovery from these injuries. In support of this position, they point to the facts that Mrs. Davis did incur injury to her back in the accident; that she underwent medical treatment for that injury; and that prior to execution of the release, her doctors advised her further treatment would not be necessary, but that nonetheless later surgery to her back was required.
In addition to these facts, the record reveals without contradiction that the appellants initially executed a general release of all their claims on May 11, 1967, prior to the time that Mrs. Davis was aware that she had suffered any injuries in the subject accident. This is not the release relied upon by the appellee. Following the execution of that release, and at the suggestion of an employee of the insurance claims service handling her claim, Mrs. Davis underwent examination and treatment by doctors of her own selection. She was, as she contends, informed by them on June 30, 1967, that she did not require additional medical treatment; however, her doctors testified that this statement was made on the belief that Mrs. Davis' discomfort from the injuries had ceased. However, at trial the Davises testified that Mrs. Davis was still in pain from her injuries in June of 1967 and also in early July 1967, at which time, at the request of Mrs. Davis, new general release forms were transmitted to the Davises by the insurance claims service which was servicing their claim. On July 22, 1967, the Davises executed the general release which is in question in this case. Subsequently, in August 1967, the appellants received, endorsed, and negotiated a draft in payment of their claims. This draft also contained language of general release above the place where the appellants signed it. We also note from the record that Mrs. Davis had extensive experience as a medical secretary, and no contention is made that either she or Mr. Davis did not fully understand the total effect of the general release which they executed.
[1,2] From these undisputed facts, it is obvious that, at the time the appellants executed the general release in question, the only mistake of fact under which they were acting — if it can be called that — was their own individually-held beliefs with respect to the severity of Mrs. Davis' back injuries and with respect to the date upon which her recovery from such injuries would be complete. This is not the type of mistake or misconception for which the law will void a document. There is nothing within the record to impugn the fact that the medical advice concerning Mrs. Davis' injuries was given to the Davises by doctors of their own selection, acting in good faith. The fact that such doctors may have been mistaken in some of their conclusions does not operate to relieve the Davises from the legal effect of their release contract. Colorado Springs Interurban Ry. Co. v. Huntling, 66 Colo. 515, 181 P. 129. Considering the above facts, the trial court's finding that, "if there was a mistake, it was unilateral or a mistake self-induced on the part of plaintiffs," was well-grounded, as is the legal conclusion of the trial court that the general release could not be vitiated on such basis.
We also concur in the trial court's finding that there was no fraud, misrepresentation, or overreaching with respect to the execution of this general release. To the contrary, the record before us indicates that the release obligation was executed under conditions of fairness and in good faith and that, accordingly, it is a valid and binding contract which operates as an effective bar to the plaintiffs' action for damages. Goff v. Boma Investment Co., 116 Colo. 359, 181 P.2d 459.
Judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE DWYER and JUDGE ENOCH concur.