Opinion
Case No. 3:16-cv-410-NJR-DGW
08-23-2018
QUINTEN DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN KIMBERLY BUTLER, KENT BROOKMAN, MICHAEL KEYS, MICHAEL HOF, MAJOR ZIEGLER, B. WESTFALL, and T. RUBACH, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
WILKERSON, Magistrate Judge :
This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson by United States District Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all Defendants except Defendant Brookman on February 23, 2018 (Doc. 51) and the Motion for Leave to Join filed by Defendant Brookman on August 14, 2018 (Doc. 64). For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that the motion for summary judgment be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, that the motion to join be DENIED and that the Court adopt the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
BACKGROUND
It is undisputed that from 2009 to 2016, Plaintiff, Quinten Davis, was an inmate incarcerated by the Illinois Department of Corrections. In 2015, he was housed at the Menard Correctional Center when a fight broke out in the recreation yard. Plaintiff, who was in the yard at the time, was interviewed as part of the investigation on the day of the fight, March 2, 2015, and two weeks later. He was subsequently issued a disciplinary ticket, found guilty on the ticket, and sentenced to 1 year in segregation, among other things. After serving 361 days in segregation, the Administrative Review Board expunged the disciplinary ticket, released Plaintiff from segregation, and reversed the other discipline imposed (most notably loss of good conduct credit). In this matter, Plaintiff claims that he was improperly ticketed and disciplined for the March 2, 2015 fight in violation of his due process rights (Count 1).
FINDINGS OF FACT
All material facts are taken in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff was not involved in the fight in the recreation yard on March 2, 2015 (Doc. 52-1, p. 2). When it broke out near the telephones, Plaintiff was on the weight pile, some 20 feet away (Id. 2-3). A warning shot was fired and Plaintiff got onto the ground (Id. 3). He was then taken to the church and interviewed by an officer and then taken to segregation (Id.). He then was interviewed by another officer, Officer Rugrouge, two weeks later (Id.). Rugrouge challenged Plaintiff's assertion, during the first interview, that he was on weight pile and his subsequent statement that he was on the telephone (which are next to each other) at the time of the fight (Id. 3-4).
In his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he was on the weight pile waiting to use the telephone and that his place in line for the telephone was being held by another inmate. Thus, he claims his statements to investigators were not inconsistent (Doc. 52-1, p. 6).
On March 28th, Defendant Hof penned a disciplinary report that described the incident on March 2nd (Doc. 52-2, p. 1): The report states that one offender (A) assaulted another offender (B) near the handball/basketball courts. Offender A then attempted to blend into a group of other offenders who were near the phones. Other offenders, who observed the altercation, including Offender C, went to aid Offender B. Offender C then confronted Offender A and a second altercation ensued involving 15 to 20 other offenders.
The disciplinary report charged Plaintiff with various violations: "105-Dangerous Disturbance, 110-Impeding an Investigation, 301-Fighting." It is unclear from the body of the report whether Plaintiff is one of the enumerated inmates (A, B, or C), whether he was one of the 15 to 20 inmates involved in the melee, or in what manner he impeded the investigation. Indeed, the "observation" section of the disciplinary report does not mention Plaintiff at all nor does it indicate in what manner he could have been either fighting, causing a dangerous disturbance, or impeding an investigation. The report was signed by Defendants Ziegler and Westfall (who agreed that Plaintiff should be temporarily confined) and was served upon Plaintiff by Defendant Rubach on April 3, 2015. Plaintiff asked Rubach to list his witnesses on the ticket but Rubach ignored him (Doc. 52-1, p. 10). There is no other evidence, other than Plaintiff's deposition testimony, about his involvement in the events of March 2, 2015.
A disciplinary hearing was held on April 7, 2015 and was presided over by Defendants Brookman and Keys, members of the Adjustment Committee (Doc. 52-4, pp. 1-2). The written decision at once states that "No Witness Requested" but then notes that Plaintiff requested two witnesses, inmates "Lumar Parish" and "Demetrius Jones." The decision repeats the information contained in the ticket and then states Plaintiff's involvement:
Inmate Parish Laura (i.e. Lumar Parish) appeared before the Adjustment Committee (also comprised of Brookman and Keys) on April 1, 2015, before Plaintiff. There is no evidence that he made any statement to the Adjustment Committee with respect to Plaintiff (Doc. 52-6, pp. 1-2). Inmate Demetrius Jones was placed on investigatory status. There is no evidence that he made any statements about Plaintiff to any of the Defendants (Doc. 52-7).
The Court notes that the information contained in the report is inadmissible hearsay. The only admissible evidence as to the events in this matter is Plaintiff's deposition testimony.
Following the altercations the investigations unit began to conduct interviews with all offenders who were on the yard. Offender DAVIS was identified by responding security staff as being in the direct vicinity of the altercation and subsequently placed on Investigative Status. During the first interview with offender DAVIS he stated he was on the weight pile doing a chest workout when the altercation occurred, during a second interview he claimed he was on the telephone when the altercation occurred. Offender DAVIS was not on the weight pile and his phone records were searched. The phone records reflected offender DAVIS made zero phone calls that day. Due to offender DAVIS's unwillingness to cooperate and provide truthful information he is being charged with 110: Impeding an Investigation, 105: Dangerous Disturbance, and 301: Fighting.Plaintiff was ultimately found guilty of Dangerous Disturbances and Fighting, but was curiously found not guilty of Impeding or Interfering with an Investigation. Neither of Plaintiff's witnesses were called to provide testimony. During the hearing, Brookman and Keys told Plaintiff, and others, that they should not have been issued disciplinary tickets because they were not involved in the altercation (Doc. 52-1, p. 8). As stated above, they nonetheless found him guilty and he was sentenced to one year of segregation.
Plaintiff filed a grievance on April 24, 2015 regarding the discipline (Doc. 52-5, pp. 1-2). Plaintiff believes that each of defendants conspired together with respect to the ticket and opines that it is because they believed he was being untruthful during the investigation (Doc. 52-1, p. 9). He also wrote a letter to Defendant Butler explaining the error of the disciplinary action but received no response directly from her (Doc. 52-1, p. 8). Instead, the Assistant Warden, Jackie Lashbrook, told Plaintiff that the letter had been forwarded to her by Butler for resolution and that Plaintiff should talk to the grievance officer (Id.). On February 18, 2016, the Administrative Review Board recommended that the grievance be affirmed and that Plaintiff be released from segregation (Doc. 52-8). The Director of the IDOC (or his designee) concurred with the decision on February 23, 2016 (Id.).
Plaintiff was released from segregation after serving approximately 361 days (Doc. 52-1, p. 7). Six months of that time was in the segregation unit at Menard Correctional Center and the remainder was at the Pontiac Correctional Center (Id.). While at Menard CC, he was in the North 2 cellhouse (Id.). In comparison to the West cellhouse where Plaintiff was previously housed, North 2 cellhouse had "no ventilation," had smaller cells, solid metal doors, and unbearable heat ("There is no ventilation. They don't open the chuck holes. They don't open the doors. There is no air.") (Id.). Additional differences include increased vermin ("extreme bugs"), dirty cells, mold, uncleanliness (only one shower per week as oppose to three), and less socialization (Id. 7-8).
When he was later transferred to the segregation unit at Pontiac CC, he was placed in the West House (Id. 8). In that cell house, Plaintiff had difficulty sleeping because of the constant noise and the inmates throwing feces (Id.). In his response to the motion for summary judgment, which is not in the form of an affidavit, Plaintiff indicated that while in segregation he was subjected to so much noise and disturbance from other inmates that it took a toll on his mental state and resulted in increases in medication to deal with the stress (Doc. 63).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). See also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005); Black Agents & Brokers Agency, Inc. v. Near North Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 409 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no material facts are in genuine dispute; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970). See also Lawrence v. Kenosha County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the non-moving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. The Seventh Circuit has stated that summary judgment is "the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events." Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (other citations omitted)).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated when he was issued a false disciplinary ticket, convicted on that ticket without the opportunity to call witnesses and based on faulty evidence, and subjected to intolerable conditions of confinement in segregation for almost one year. He further states in his deposition that each of Defendants conspired to deprive him of his due process rights. In the Order referring this matter, the District Court found that Plaintiff did not assert a conspiracy claim (Doc. 15). As such, Plaintiff only is proceeding on a claim that this due process rights were violated by each individual Defendant.
In Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2017), the Seventh Circuit set forth the requirements of a due process claim:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to deprivations of life, liberty, and property. Otherwise states are free to act summarily. We undertake a two-part analysis in procedural due-process cases: first, we determine whether the plaintiff was deprived of a protected interest; if so, we determine what process was due under the circumstances. Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to remain in the general population; but both the duration and the conditions
of the segregation must be considered in determining whether due process is implicated.With respect to the first showing, a liberty interest only exists when prison officials restrain the freedom of inmates in a manner that "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). In Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., the Seventh Circuit noted that other circuits have held that "periods of confinement that approach or exceed one year may trigger a cognizable liberty interest without any reference to conditions." Id., 559 F.3d 693, 699 n.4 (7th Cir. 2009). See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 161 (2nd Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 554 U.S. 902 (2008) (explaining that a segregated confinement of 305 days or more necessarily triggers due process protections, and segregation lasting 101 to 305 days may trigger due process protections, depending on the conditions of segregation); Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 2006) (reversing dismissal of claim involving 750 days' segregation, stating that when a "prisoner is subjected to a lengthy period of segregation, the duration of that confinement may itself be atypical and significant"); Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that one year of solitary confinement was sufficient to state a claim); but see Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that seven months' segregation, alone, does not implicate a liberty interest). Defendants do not contest that Plaintiff had a liberty interest in remaining out of segregation. Defendants do, however, argue that Plaintiff was given all the process that was due.
Id. at 524 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Inmates are entitled to certain procedural protections when constitutionally protected interests are at stake in order to forestall arbitrary government action. Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246, 1248 (7th Cir. 1995). These include at least 24 hours advance written notice of the charges prior to a hearing, the opportunity to call witnesses and present certain evidence to an impartial decision maker, and the right to a written statement providing the basis of decision and the evidence relied upon. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 865 (7th Cir. 2011). A disciplinary decision must also be supported by "some evidence in the record." Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). Plaintiff argues in his brief that he was not given a ticket when he was placed on investigatory status but was rather served with an "invalid" ticket one month later (Doc. 63, p. 6). Plaintiff also states that he was not allowed to sign the ticket, that it wasn't signed by a "hearing investigator," and that Defendant Rubach ignored his request to have a witness. There is no dispute, however, that Plaintiff was given advance written notice of the charges against him at least 24 hours prior to the hearing (Doc. 52-1, p. 5). That there may be some minor technical defects with the disciplinary charge paperwork, that did not alter the substance of the charges or the fact that it was timely given to Plaintiff, does not implicate a due process right. See e.g. Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006) ("this court has consistently held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state law or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices" (quotations marks and citations omitted)); Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 935 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff states that he requested witnesses of Defendant Rubach (who ignored him) and that in order to request witnesses while he was housed in the segregation unit at Menard, he needed to fill out a request slip to his counselor, which he did prior to the hearing (Doc. 52-1, p. 5). At the hearing, he also requested the two witnesses, but none were called. Plaintiff states that these witnesses would have testified that he was not involved in the fight and that he was at once on the weight pile and waiting to use the phone -- thereby making his statements to investigators not inconsistent. Plaintiff does not have an unqualified right to call as many witnesses as he wants - witness testimony that is irrelevant or unnecessary can be excluded. See Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495-6 (1985) (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566). There is no evidence, however, that the adjustment committee found the witnesses to be irrelevant or unnecessary nor is there any evidence that permitting the witnesses would have implicated institutional security. Indeed, Defendants have presented no evidence why the adjustment committee did not call these witnesses. See Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Although prison disciplinary committees may deny witness requests that threaten institutional goals or are irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary, they may not exclude witnesses requested by an offender with no explanation at all."). As such, they have failed to meet their burden on summary judgment. And, because these witnesses would have testified to the very issue of whether Plaintiff was involved in the fight or whether he was lying to investigators, a jury may find that their testimony was relevant and may have generated a different result.
This Court also has reservations about whether there was any evidence, let alone some evidence to support the charges. Plaintiff was found guilty of "fighting" and "dangerous disturbances" (Doc. 52-4, p. 1). The body of the decision however, speaks to Plaintiff's supposed untruthfulness. The "basis for decision" makes no statement that Plaintiff was involved in the fight or otherwise participated in dangerous disturbances. It merely states that he may have been untruthful about where he was specifically standing during the fight. While such a statement may support a guilty finding on the charge of impeding an investigation, it is wholly unclear how such a statement would support the charges of fighting or dangerous disturbances. See e.g. Redding v. Fiarman, 717 F.2d 1105, 114-5 (7th Cir. 1983) (discussing the adequacy of the written statement justifying punishment). This conclusion does not reflect on the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict Plaintiff; rather, the Court finds that Defendants have pointed to no evidence to support the conviction. See e.g. Viens v. Daniels, 871 F.2d 1328, 1334-5 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that the Court need only determine whether there is any evidence to support a disciplinary board's decision).
Defendants next argue that neither Hof, Ziegler, Westfall, Rubach, nor Butler were personally involved in the constitutional deprivations. They argue that because Plaintiff received due process at the adjustment committee hearing, they cannot be liable for issuing and serving the (false) disciplinary ticket. Moreover, they were not involved in the adjustment committee hearing and therefore could not be liable for any due process violation (Doc. 52, p. 11-12, citing Smith v. Butler, 2017 WL 5885290 (S.D. Ill. 2017)). It is true that § 1983 liability hinges on personal involvement. Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 833-4 (7th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the existence of "disciplinary procedures allow a prisoner a chance to defend against improper and erroneous charges." Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 1984); Karow v. Fuchs, 695 Fed.Appx. 966, 967 (7th Cir. 2017) ("But whether particular disciplinary charges are correct is a subject to be resolved by prison disciplinary boards, not by damages actions under $ 1983."). Therefore, because Plaintiff had an adjustment committee hearing, it would appear that his due process claims against Hof, Ziegler, Westfall, and Rubach would fail as a matter of law.
Certainly, Plaintiff may proceed on this claim against defendants Brookman and Keys, members of the Adjustment Committee.
However, because a jury could find that the adjustment committee hearing itself did not comport with due process, Plaintiff may proceed on a due process claim related to the false disciplinary ticket. In McKinney v. Meese, 831 F.2d 728 (7th Cir. 1987), the Seventh Circuit noted that both in that case and Hanrahan, the prisoner received due process at the subsequent hearing (advanced notice, opportunity to present evidence and witnesses, a neutral adjudicator, and written findings). Id. at 733. And, because there may be a question of fact as to whether there was even some evidence to support the conviction, the question of whether Plaintiff received due process is open. Finally, Defendants have presented no competent evidence on summary judgment that the tickets were supported by "any evidence." See Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994). Therefore, Hof (who wrote the disciplinary ticket) is not entitled to summary judgment.
Defendants cite to Smith v. Butler, 3:15-cv-770-NJR-DGW, 2017 WL 5885290 (S.D. Ill. 2017), for the proposition that no person other than the hearing officers can be liable for due process violations. That case, however, is factually distinct from this matter.
As to Zieglar and Westfall (who recommended temporary administrative detention) and Rubach (who served the ticket), there is no evidence that they were personally involved in any constitutional deprivation. Brown v. Wexford Health Sources, 2014 WL 7014111, * 6 (S.D. Ill. 2014). Plaintiff states that Rubach ignored a request for witnesses. However, Plaintiff acknowledged that the proper way to seek witnesses was through his counselor, who was not Rubach. Moreover, neither Zieglar nor Westfall were either involved in the investigation or involved in any disciplinary action that would have implicated a due process right.
There is no allegation that Plaintiff's temporary placement in investigatory detention violated his due process rights. See Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 1997). --------
Defendant Butler could be found liable if she "condoned or acquiesced in a subordinate's unconstitutional treatment" of Plaintiff. Minix, 597 F.3d at 833-4; Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015). As set forth above, Plaintiff testified that he sent Warden Butler a letter (or multiple letters) about the disciplinary proceedings and that she directed Assistant Warden Lashbrook to respond. Thus, Warden Butler did not simply ignore his letter but rather delegated the issue to a subordinate (who directed Plaintiff to file an ultimately successful grievance). See e.g. Powell v. Godinez, 1997 WL 6032927, * 5 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Moreover, merely approving discipline or denying a grievance is insufficient to establish personal liability. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011).
Qualified Immunity
Defendants briefly argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) ("Where the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive."). Qualified immunity "protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Estate of Escobedo v. Martin, 702 F.3d 388, 404 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted). And, "if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). In determining whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must consider two questions: "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?"; and, 2. was "the right clearly established?" Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; See also Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that a constitutional right is clearly established. Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2000). He must show that "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
As to Defendants Butler, Zieglar, Westfall, and Rubach, this Court already has concluded that a reasonably jury would not find that they violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. As such, they are entitled to qualified immunity.
As to Defendant Keys (and by extension Brookman), there is a question of fact as to whether they denied Plaintiff the opportunity to call witnesses and as to whether their decision to place Plaintiff in segregation was based on some evidence. It is clearly established that Plaintiff was entitled to the procedural protections outlined in Wolff, including the opportunity to call witnesses (if feasible). 418 U.S. at 558. When the evidence is taken in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, a jury may find that they violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights by failing to allow witnesses or explain why they would not be called. As such, they are not entitled to qualified immunity.
As to Defendant Hof, he also is not entitled to qualified immunity. As set forth above, a jury could find that Plaintiff was not afforded the procedural protections outlined in Wolff. A jury may find that Plaintiff was therefore subjected to an arbitrary prosecution that did not comport with due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, a clearly established right. See McKinney, 831 F.2d at 733. Such a conclusion would require Defendants to present evidence that the ticket was supported by some evidence. See Hanrahan, 747 F.2d at 1140. By failing to provide such evidence, a jury may find that the disciplinary ticket itself did not comport with due process. See McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 1999) ("However, we have long held that as long as procedural protections are constitutionally adequate, we will not overturn a disciplinary decision solely because evidence indicates the claim was fraudulent."). Because Plaintiff's due process right to be free from an arbitrary prosecution was clearly established and a jury could find that the right was violated, Defendant Hof is not entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendant Brookman
On August 14, 2018, Defendant Brookman filed a motion seeking to join the other Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 64). He states that he was inadvertently omitted from the motion and that his arguments are identical to the other Defendants' arguments. The motion is untimely. And, in light of the conclusions set forth above, the motion is futile and granting it would result in an unnecessary delay in these proceedings.
RECOMMENDATIONS
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all Defendants except Defendant Brookman on February 23, 2018 (Doc. 51) be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, that the Motion for Leave to Join filed by Defendant Brookman on August 14, 2018 (Doc. 64) be DENIED, that summary judgment be GRANTED in favor of Defendants Butler, Ziegler, Westfall, and Rubach and against Plaintiff, that summary judgment be DENIED as to Defendants Keys and Hof, that this matter proceed to trial on the claim against Brookman, Keys, and Hof, and that Court adopt the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law. DATED: August 23, 2018
/s/
DONALD G. WILKERSON
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and SDIL-LR 73.1(b), any party may serve and file written OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law within fourteen (14) days after service. Failure to file such OBJECTIONS shall result in a waiver of the right to appeal all issues, both factual and legal, which are addressed in the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd. and Joseph Sclafani, 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1986).
You are not to file an appeal as to the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. An appeal is inappropriate until after the District Judge issues an Order either affirming or reversing the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the U.S. Magistrate Judge.