Opinion
04-22-00408-CR
12-27-2023
Damien Devon DAVIS-PITTMAN, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
DO NOT PUBLISH
From the County Court at Law No. 11, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 627590 Honorable Tommy Stolhandske, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
LIZA A. RODRIGUEZ, JUSTICE
A jury convicted Damien Devon Davis-Pittman of misdemeanor assault-bodily injury. The trial court sentenced him to one year in the county jail, probated for twelve months with a $500.00 fine. In one issue, Davis-Pittman argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
Davis-Pittman also argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction; however, "the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt." Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Butcher v. State, 454 S.W.3d 13, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (recognizing that Brooks v. State "abolished factual-sufficiency review as it applies to criminal convictions."). Accordingly, we do not address Davis-Pittman's factual insufficiency argument.
Background
In this case, the information alleged that:
Davis-Pittman intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly caused bodily injury to another, namely PRISCILLA RESENDEZ, hereinafter referred to as complainant, by STRIKING THE COMPLAINANT WITH THE HAND OF THE DEFENDANT and GRABBING THE COMPLAINANT WITH THE HAND OF THE DEFENDANT.
At trial, Davis-Pittman pleaded not guilty. The State presented evidence that on July 20, 2019, at around 9:10 p.m., Davis-Pittman's aunt, Barbara Davis, called 911 and told the operator, "My nephew was hitting on his girlfriend who just had a baby." During the call, Davis identified her nephew, Davis-Pittman, by name. An audio-recording of the Davis's 911 call was admitted into evidence.
Bexar County Sheriff's Deputy Stephen Colon testified that he responded to the 911 call about a minute and half after the call was placed. When he arrived at the scene, he found Davis and Davis-Pittman pacing outside of a residence. When Deputy Colon asked about the girlfriend mentioned in the 911 call, Davis took Deputy Colon inside, where he found the girlfriend, Priscilla Resendez, crying and "shaken up." Deputy Colon noticed that Resendez had "markings" on her "like when someone is hit," including red markings on her face and around her neck. Resendez also had some swelling on her forehead.
Sergeant Shawn Thompson, who was employed by the Bexar County Sheriff's Department and also responded to the 911 call, testified that when he arrived on the scene, he saw that Resendez had visible injuries and he photographed them. Specifically, Resendez had bruising on both arms, "redness to her neck" at "her shirt line," "swelling to her head," and "scratches to her upper left forehead above the eyebrow, her left temple area, and her left cheek." Sergeant Thompson also noticed that the left sleeve of Resendez's shirt was torn. The photographs Sergeant Thompson took of Resendez's injuries were admitted into evidence.
Later, at the police station, Sergeant Thompson administered Miranda warnings to Davis-Pittman and questioned him. The questioning was videorecorded, and the videorecording was admitted into evidence. When Sergeant Thompson asked Davis-Pittman if he had grabbed Resendez by the arm when he was at the residence, Davis-Pittman replied, "The only thing I did was go like this [indicating with his hand] to her face to move it towards me to look at me." Based on this statement, Sergeant Thompson testified that Davis-Pittman told him that he had grabbed Resendez by her face to make her look at him.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-79 (1966).
Finally, the State called Davis-Pittman's aunt, Davis, to testify. Davis testified that her memory of July 20, 2019, was "foggy" and she did not "really recollect everything." However, Davis did recall that on July 20, 2019, she heard a "ruckus" in the kitchen. Davis also remembered that in her written statement she said that Resendez was sitting down at the kitchen table and Davis-Pittman was grabbing Resendez's arm and T-shirt and demanding that Resendez go outside. Davis also remembered Davis-Pittman "hovering over" Resendez and "hearing the argument, being an abused woman myself, I kind of went into a flashback, like let me help [Resendez]. . . . My first objective was let me take care of her." According to Davis, she did not see Davis-Pittman "strike" Resendez, but she did see "him grabbing and pulling on her" "and pulling her T-shirt." On cross-examination, Davis, who was living with Davis-Pittman and his mother at the time of trial, testified that she wished she had not intervened.
The jury found Davis-Pittman guilty as charged in the information.
Discussion
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Griffin v. State, 491 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). "This standard recognizes the fact finder's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence after drawing reasonable inferences from it." Griffin, 491 S.W.3d at 744. A reviewing court measures the sufficiency of the evidence against the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). "Such a charge would be one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the [information], does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried." Id.
"In an assault case, the essential elements of the offense are: (1) a person; (2) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; (3) causes bodily injury; (4) to another." Rodriguez v. State, 274 S.W.3d 760, 767 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.). Thus, under the hypothetically correct jury charge authorized by the information, the State was required to prove that Davis-Pittman intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to the complainant. See id.; Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1). "[T]he State was not required to prove the manner and means of causing the injury alleged in the information." Bin Fang v. State, 544 S.W.3d 923, 929 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.); see Rodriguez, 274 S.W.3d at 767 (rejecting argument that without proof as to the manner and means of committing the assault alleged in the information, the evidence would have been legally insufficient to support the verdict).
Davis-Pittman first argues the evidence is insufficient because the State did not prove that he was the one who injured Resendez. "The State must prove that the accused is the person who committed the crime charged." Bin Fang, 544 S.W.3d at 927-28. The State may prove a defendant's identity by direct or circumstantial evidence, coupled with all reasonable inferences from that evidence. Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The audio recording of Davis's 911 call in which she identified Davis-Pittman by his name and date of birth was admitted into evidence. During the call, Davis-Pittman stated: "My nephew was hitting on his girlfriend who just had a baby." Furthermore, the videorecording in which Davis-Pittman told Sergeant Thompson that he had grabbed Resendez's face was admitted into evidence. From this evidence, a rational fact finder could have found that Davis-Pittman was the person who committed the charged offense.
Davis-Pittman next argues that the evidence is insufficient because the State did not prove Resendez's bodily injury. "'Bodily injury' means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition." Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(8). "Any physical pain, however minor, will suffice to establish bodily injury." Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). "A fact finder may infer that a victim actually felt or suffered physical pain because people of common intelligence understand pain and some of the natural causes of it." Id. In their testimony, both Deputy Colon and Sergeant Thompson described the injuries they saw on Resendez's body, which included bruising on both of her arms, red markings on her face, red markings around her neck, swelling on her forehead, and scratches above her left eyebrow and on her left temple and left cheek. Sergeant Thompson photographed these injuries, and the photos were admitted into evidence. From this evidence, a rational fact finder could have found that Resendez suffered bodily injury.
Davis-Pittman also argues that the evidence is insufficient because the State did not prove any of the alleged culpable mental states. The State may prove a defendant's criminal culpability by direct or circumstantial evidence, coupled with all reasonable inferences from that evidence. Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 766. "Intent may [] be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as acts, words, and the conduct of the [defendant]." Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). "[T]he factfinder may consider the defendant's conduct and surrounding circumstances and events in deciding the issue of intent." Lee v. State, 442 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2014, no pet.). A person acts intentionally when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result. Tex. Penal Code § 6.03(a). A person acts knowingly when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b). A person acts recklessly when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur. Id. § 6.03(c). "The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Id.
Here, the evidence included the officers' testimony describing Resendez's injuries, photographs of those injuries, Davis's statement to the 911 operator that Davis-Pittman "was hitting on his girlfriend," Davis's testimony that she saw Davis-Pittman grabbing Resendez, and the videotape in which Davis-Pittman indicated that he had grabbed Resendez's face to make her look at him. Additionally, in the same videotape, Davis-Pittman acknowledged that earlier that day, while at a motel, he and Resendez had engaged in another physical altercation. In describing the earlier altercation Davis-Pittman stated: "But as far as me hitting her? That's because she hit me. Self defense. . . . She hit me everywhere, wherever she f**kin' want. Same thing I did. Hit her wherever I f**kin' want. Only place I missed was the f**kin' baby." Viewing all of the evidence cumulatively and in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found that Davis-Pittman intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to Resendez. See Bin Fang, 544 S.W.3d at 929 (holding a rational jury could infer the defendant's culpable mental state in an assault bodily injury case "because a person would be aware that beating someone with a fist is reasonably certain to cause bodily injury.").
Davis-Pittman finally argues that the State did not prove the manner and means alleged in the information "in a legally [] sufficient manner at trial." Nevertheless, under the hypothetically correct jury charge, "the State was not required to prove the manner and means of causing the injury alleged in the information." Bin Fang, 544 S.W.3d at 929; see Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 298-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding, in an aggravated assault case, that the State was not required to prove the allegations in the indictment that the defendant "hit[] the victim with his hand" or "twist[ed] the victim's arm with his hand" instead of the proved act that he "thr[ew] the victim against the wall" because it was a result-oriented offense, what caused the victim's injury was not the gravamen of the offense, and any variance between the allegation and proof at trial would be immaterial); Rodriguez, 274 S.W.3d at 766-67 ("A variance in the manner in which the assault occurred would not have been material and therefore would not be included in the hypothetically correct charge."). But even if the State was required to prove the manner and means of causing the injury as alleged in the information, the evidence would be legally sufficient because Davis testified that she saw Davis-Pittman grabbing Resendez and Sergeant Thompson testified that Davis-Pittman admitted to him that he had grabbed Resendez by the face.
Because a rational jury could have found the challenged elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction. We overrule Davis-Pittman's sole issue.
Conclusion
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.