Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition to challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DP-016355, Dennis J. Keough, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Law Office of Rebecca N. Captain and Lawrence A. Aufill for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Parties in Interest.
OPINION
ARONSON, J.
David G. seeks extraordinary relief from a juvenile court order setting a hearing to select a permanent plan for his now seven-month-old daughter Jessica under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26 (.26 hearing; all further statutory references are to this code unless specified otherwise). David challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s order denying him reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1), which requires reunification services “unless the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, those services would be detrimental to the child.” Our review discloses no error, and therefore we deny David’s writ petition.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jessica and her mother, L.C., tested positive for methamphetamine on the day of Jessica’s birth in December 2007. L. admitted using the drug during her pregnancy. The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) promptly filed a petition alleging L. failed to protect Jessica and abused Jessica’s siblings (§ 300, subds. (b) and (j).) The petition cited the positive drug tests of mother and child, the illicit substance abuse of Jessica’s parents and their failure to complete substance abuse programs, and referred to prior cases involving the dependency and adoption of Jessica’s half-siblings. Jessica was L.’s fifth child. L., herself a dependent of the juvenile court between the ages of eight and 18, had previously received reunification services, including parent education, counseling, drug testing and treatment, but failed to reunify with her children. Jessica’s birth marked the second time L. had delivered a child who tested positive for methamphetamines when born.
At the time of Jessica’s birth, L. and David were on parole. David’s record included convictions for vehicle theft and drug possession. He failed his only attempt to complete a drug program. About a week after Jessica’s birth, sheriff’s deputies discovered over three ounces of methamphetamine possessed for sale during a parole search of the David’s Santa Ana motel room. David admitted ownership of the drugs and paraphernalia, and also acknowledged he had been using drugs, and furnishing them to his friends.
During an interview with SSA on December 19 at the jail, David appeared tired and confused and had difficulty understanding the social worker. He told the social worker he had “never done as much drugs as he had the three days prior to his arrest.” He admitted using methamphetamine while on parole, but he managed to avoid testing positive. He believed using the drug was “the only way to fix [his] problems” and conceded when he used methamphetamine “I will spend all my money on it, I need help with that.”
Both parents were incarcerated at the county jail pending disposition of their criminal cases. David ultimately received a three-year prison term; L. received a four-year sentence. SSA placed Jessica in a licensed foster home. The court authorized weekly monitored visitation with the parents at the jail.
In January 2008, the court sustained the petition’s jurisdictional allegations after the parents submitted on SSA’s reports and counsel stipulated to a sufficient factual basis. SSA recommended the court deny reunification services based on L.’s previous failures at reunification and the parents’ lengthy prison sentences. The parents requested the juvenile court consider the paternal grandparents’ home as a placement option if it denied reunification services. The court denied the parent’s request and placed Jessica in a concurrent planning home.
In early March, the paternal grandparents filed a modification petition (§ 388) and a request seeking de facto parent status. The court denied the de facto parent request. At a combined hearing on the section 388 petition and dispositional issues in early April, the court denied the grandparents’ petition, denied reunification services to the parents, and set a section .26 hearing for July 31, 2008. David filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the orders. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) We issued an order to show cause. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(e).) L. has not sought writ relief.
SSA had recommended against placing Jessica with the paternal grandparents based on a substantiated report of physical abuse by the paternal grandfather in 1994 and the grandfather’s failure to disclose the incident.
II
DISCUSSION
David contends the juvenile court erred when it declined to provide him with reunification services. Specifically he argues SSA’s reports did not show Jessica would suffer a detriment if he received services and complains SSA relied exclusively on the fact and length of his incarceration, but failed to consider his relationship with Jessica and the “nature of treatment required,” or “what services would be available to the father while incarcerated.”
We examine the court’s determination denying reunification services for substantial evidence. (In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 484 (James C.); Edgar O. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 13 (Edgar O.) In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 600.) We must draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings and must view the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s order. (In re Jeannette S. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 52, 58.)
Section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) provides in relevant part, “If the parent or guardian is incarcerated . . ., the court shall order reasonable services unless the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, those services would be detrimental to the child. In determining detriment, the court shall consider the age of the child, the degree of parent-child bonding, the length of the sentence, the nature of the treatment, the nature of the crime or illness, the degree of detriment to the child if services are not offered and. . . any other appropriate factors. Reunification services are subject to the applicable time limitations imposed in subdivision (a).” Section 361.5, subdivision (e) (1) applies to incarcerated parents even if some of the listed factors are not pertinent to a particular case, and the trial court has the discretion to weigh the relevant factors in whatever manner it deems appropriate. (Edgar O., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 18.)
We are aware of no requirement, as David seems to suggest, that SSA address all the reasons supporting a finding of detriment in one section of its reports, or that it expressly analyze each element listed in section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1). As we explain, SSA’s reports contain ample evidence supporting the juvenile court’s express finding that providing reunification services would be detrimental to Jessica.
Age of the Child: Because Jessica was under age three, section 361.5, subdivision (a)(2) limited court-ordered services to six months from the date SSA removed her from the physical custody of her parents. This relatively short period reflects a public policy that it is imperative to place a young child in a permanent, loving home where she can bond with her adoptive parents. Here, David received a three-year prison term. While the court may extend reunification services to an incarcerated parent under certain circumstances (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3); § 366.21, subd. (e)), David did not qualify because he could not demonstrate a substantial probability Jessica would be returned to his physical custody within the extended time period. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude David, once released on parole, would not be in a position to take custody of his child, who would have had little if any contact with him. Jessica’s young age — three months at the time of the disposition hearing — weighed heavily in favor of a finding reunification services would be detrimental to Jessica.
Section 361.5, subdivision (a)(3) provides, “Notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), court-ordered services may be extended up to a maximum time period not to exceed 18 months after the date the child was originally removed from physical custody of his or her parent or guardian if it can be shown, at the hearing held pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 366.21, that the permanent plan for the child is that he or she will be returned and safely maintained in the home within the extended time period. The court shall extend the time period only if it finds that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian within the extended time period or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent or guardian.”
Section 366.21, subdivision (e) provides in relevant part, “If the child was under the age of three years on the date of the initial removal . . ., and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan, the court may schedule a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 within 120 days. If, however, the court finds there is a substantial probability that the child, who was under the age of three years on the date of initial removal . . . may be returned to his or her parent or legal guardian within six months or that reasonable services have not been provided, the court shall continue the case to the 12-month permanency hearing.”
Degree of Parent-Child Bonding: SSA removed Jessica from her parents’ physical custody at birth and police incarcerated David a week later. The court authorized weekly visits in jail, but Jessica had only a few 20-minute visits. Two visits occurred through glass, and David was able to touch Jessica on another visit. The monitor described a March 7 visit as “bad” and “rough”, with a cranky Jessica crying throughout. Not surprisingly, given the circumstances, David presended little or no evidence of parent-child bonding. This factor supports the court’s denial of reunification services.
Length of the sentence: As noted above, David received a three-year prison term in or about the end of December 2007. David reported he expected to be released in May 2009. Even assuming his calculation was correct, David’s incarceration extended beyond the limit of a potential reunification period. The length of David’s sentence weighed in favor of the court’s finding that reunification services would be detrimental to Jessica.
Nature of crime: David had an extensive criminal record and substance abuse history, which he minimized. He explained that he dropped out of a voluntary substance abuse program because “the people there were fake.” Previous stints in prison for auto theft and drug crimes had not deterred him from his criminal endeavors. He committed the current crimes shortly after SSA took his daughter into protective custody. The nature of David’s crimes, coupled with his history of criminal behavior and substance abuse, are additional factors supporting the court’s decision to deny reunification services.
Degree of Detriment to Child if Services Not Offered and Other Appropriate Factors: Nothing in the record suggests Jessica would suffer detriment if David did not receive reunification services. Jessica appeared to thrive in her foster placements. By the date of the disposition hearing, she had been placed in a concurrent planning (pre-adoptive) home. According to SSA, the prospective adoptive parents had demonstrated a willingness and ability to meet Jessica’s needs and were committed to adopting her. The absence of detriment to Jessica if services were not offered weighed in favor of a finding that reunification services would be detrimental to Jessica.
All factors listed in section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) supported the juvenile court’s finding that reunification services would be detrimental to Jessica. (James C., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 485.) Consequently, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order denying reunification services to David.
III
DISPOSITION
The petition for a writ of mandate is denied.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P. J., O’LEARY, J.