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Daughters of Sarah Nursing Home Co. v. Frisch

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Feb 7, 1991
170 A.D.2d 752 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)

Opinion

February 7, 1991

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Albany County (Kahn, J.).


On November 20, 1987, defendant was advised by telephone that Jennie Alpert, her aunt, had been transferred to plaintiff's nursing home and that she would be required to fill out papers necessary to the admission and treatment of Alpert. When presented with a document, defendant inquired, "Am I signing away my life?" Defendant avers that she was informed that it was a routine form that had to be signed to permit admission and care for Alpert. Defendant's husband, who was present at the time, avers that there was no explanation of any financial responsibility resulting from executing the document. Defendant signed the document as "Responsible Party".

Alpert died February 13, 1989 and, the next day, defendant received notification advising that Alpert was ineligible for Medicaid. Thereafter, in connection with this action to recover the costs attendant upon services rendered Alpert, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Defendant cross-moved for an order directing that plaintiff be required to respond to interrogatories served. Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion and granted the cross motion. This appeal by plaintiff ensued.

We affirm. Here, unlike in Daughters of Sarah Nursing Home Co. v Lipkin ( 145 A.D.2d 808), a question of fact was created by plaintiff's response to defendant's inquiry concerning her possible liability if she signed documents concerning the admission, care and treatment of Alpert. In Daughters of Sarah Nursing Home Co., the defendant unmistakably guaranteed payment of his father's bill. Here, defendant may have executed the subject instrument relying on the representation that the form was a mere formality, without any explanation of the financial obligations resulting. Although the existence of a binding contract is not dependent on the subjective intent of either party (see, Brown Bros. Elec. Contrs. v Beam Constr. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 397, 399), an issue of fact was created concerning the intent to contract by the differing inferences which can be drawn from the oral exchange between defendant and plaintiff's representative (see, supra, at 400).

Order affirmed, with costs. Mahoney, P.J., Casey, Mercure and Harvey, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Daughters of Sarah Nursing Home Co. v. Frisch

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Feb 7, 1991
170 A.D.2d 752 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
Case details for

Daughters of Sarah Nursing Home Co. v. Frisch

Case Details

Full title:DAUGHTERS OF SARAH NURSING HOME COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. MARILYN…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department

Date published: Feb 7, 1991

Citations

170 A.D.2d 752 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
565 N.Y.S.2d 532

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