Opinion
Civil Action Number 05-0147 Section: I/2.
June 17, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion of defendants, Tangipahoa Parish School Board, Louis Joseph, Mark Kolwe, Darrell Fairburn, Bret Schnadelbach, Steve Vales, Ella Maryland, and Joann Frazier, to stay proceedings in this Court pending the outcome of plaintiff's state court litigation. Pro se plaintiff, Oscar Dantlzer, did not file an opposition to defendants' motion, however, for the following reasons, defendants' motion is DENIED.
Background
This action for monetary damages and injunctive relief filed by Dantzler arises out of the plaintiff's employment as a school bus operator for the Tangipahoa Parish School Board. Plaintiff alleges that defendants, the School Board and several individual school officials and employees, discriminated against him by cutting his pay after Global Positioning System equipment was placed on his bus.On January 18, 2005, Dantzler filed a lawsuit in the 21st Judicial District, Tangipahoa Parish, Louisiana, alleging various claims under the United States Constitution and the Louisiana Constitution for relief at law and equity. On April 8, 2005, Dantzler filed an amended petition. On February 28, 2005, between the filing of plaintiff's original lawsuit in state court and the filing of his amended state court petition, Dantzler filed a complaint containing the same allegations in this court against the same defendants. On April 18, 2005, Dantzler filed an amended complaint.
Rec. Doc. No. 2.
Rec. Doc. No. 16, exhibit 2.
Rec. Doc. No. 2.
Rec. Doc. No. 9.
Defendants have moved for a stay of this action, contending that the requested damages are fully determinable by the pending state court proceeding and that continuing this action in this court would be an inefficient use of judicial resources and an inconvenience to all of the parties and witnesses involved.
Rec. Doc. No. 16.
Analysis
The Colorado River abstention doctrine governs whether this Court should abstain from hearing this lawsuit for monetary and injunctive relief because of a parallel lawsuit pending in state court. See Am. Guarantee Liab. Ins. Co. v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 408 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2005). However, defendants, citing Landis v. North American Co., rely on the principle that every court has the inherent, discretionary power to stay proceedings to control its docket. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S. Ct. 163, 166, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936).Defendants identify the following factors which they argue should be considered to determine whether a stay is appropriate: (1) considerations of comity; (2) promotion of judicial efficiency; (3) adequacy and extent of the relief available in state court; (4) identity of the parties and the issues; (5) the likelihood of prompt disposition of the case in state court; (6) convenience of the parties, counsel and witnesses; and (7) possible prejudice as a result of the stay. See Chintala v. Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 1392, 1393 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (borrowing factors from Nigro v. Blumberg, 373 F. Supp. 1206, 1212-13 (E.D. Pa. 1974)). Defendants further rely on a number of older cases where motions for a stay pending the outcome of state court proceedings were granted. However, defendants misunderstand this Court's discretionary power.
Rec. Doc. No. 16. Defendants cite two other cases, Golden Quality Ice Cream Co. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 53, 56 (E.D. Pa. 1980), and In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 92 F.R.D. 358, 359 (D. Md. 1981), both of which utilized a five-factor variation of the seven-factor test identified by defendants.
Rec. Doc. No. 16. Specifically, defendants cite Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Tishman Realty Constr. Co., 72 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), and Universal Gypsum of Ga., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 390 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
In determining the propriety of granting a stay of federal court proceedings based on parallel proceedings, the Fifth Circuit applies the Colorado River "exceptional circumstances" standard. See Am. Guarantee Liab. Ins. Co., 408 F.3d at 250-51 (finding that the federal district court lacked the discretion to stay pursuant to Colorado River because the federal and state proceedings were not parallel); Bank One, N.A. v. Boyd, 288 F.3d 181, 187 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that a district court's discretion must be exercised in accordance with Colorado River); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Mason, 18 F.3d 1261 (5th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging and weighing the Colorado River factors and finding no exceptional circumstances); Allen v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry, 948 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the factors of Colorado River and its progeny, which weighed in favor of abstention). Pursuant to the principle that "[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule," the Colorado River doctrine "represents the `extraordinary and narrow exception' to the `virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.'" Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 813, 96 S. Ct. at 1244; Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S. Ct. at 1246).
While no single factor is determinative, in making a decision to grant a motion for stay, a district court must consider: (1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over the res involved in the actions; (2) the relative inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; and (4) the order in which the state and federal actions were filed. See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 818, 96 S. Ct. at 1246-47. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co., the Supreme Court expanded the basic Colorado River analytical framework used to determine whether exceptional circumstances exist that weigh in favor of a federal court's deference to a parallel state court proceeding. See Mercury Construction, 460 U.S. at 26, 103 S. Ct. at 942. The Mercury Construction Court added two additional factors to be weighed: (1) the existence of federal-law issues, "always . . a major consideration weighing against surrender" of federal court jurisdiction, and (2) the adequacy of the state court's proceedings to protect the party invoking federal jurisdiction. 460 U.S. at 26, 103 S. Ct. at 942.
The Colorado River and Mercury Construction factors are to be weighed in a flexible and pragmatic manner, keeping in mind the realities of the case, "with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction." Id. at 21, 103 S. Ct. at 940; see Black Sea, 204 F.3d at 650 (weighing the Colorado River and Mercury Construction factors and concluding that "the balance tips decisively against abstention"). Notwithstanding the fact that some of the factors identified by defendants may overlap with the Colorado River factors, defendants have not sufficiently addressed the factors necessary for this Court to determine the existence of exceptional circumstances which would warrant a stay. In view of the fact that defendants have taken a misguided approach and argued that this Court has purely discretionary power to grant a stay, the Court cannot, at this time, grant defendants' motion for a stay pending the outcome of the state court proceedings. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion for a stay is DENIED.