Opinion
C/A No. 2:01-2766-18
April 23, 2002
ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's declaratory judgment action. The court heard oral argument on February 22, 2002, and requested additional briefing. This matter is now ripe for disposition.
1. Background
This claim was brought as a result of damages sustained by two barges, GL-62 and GL-63, that collided as their respective tugs, Tug East Coast and Tug Colonel, passed each other. The collision took place in the Fort Sumter Range in Charleston, South Carolina. (Pl's Mem. in Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 5). This court has jurisdiction under its admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
A. Parties
Tug East Coast and Tug Colonel were towing the barges at the time of the collision. Tug East Coast was owned by Fladel Mar, Inc. and was operated by plaintiff Dann Marine Towing. (Pl's Mem. n Opp. to Motion to Dismiss 3-4). Tug Colonel was owned by Neptune Towing and was operated by defendant Dann Ocean Towing. (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss at 2-3).
At the time of the collision, defendant Dann Ocean Towing, Neptune Towing, and the Tug Colonel were insured by defendants St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company ("St. Paul"). (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss at 3). St. Paul, on behalf of the Tug Colonel, Neptune Towing, and Dann Ocean Towing, settled the entire damage claim with Great Lakes Dredge Dock Company ("GLDD"), which owned both damaged barges. St. Paul took an assignment from GLDD. (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss at 3). Neither Dann Marine Towing nor any representative of the Tug East Coast made any contribution to the claim settled with GLDD. (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss at 3).
B. Procedural Background
On May 17, 2001, St. Paul filed a Corporate Notice of Claim of Lien in the amount of $600,000 against the Tug East Coast in New Orleans, Louisiana. (Defs' Mem. in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss, Exh. G). At the time of the filing of the lien notice, Tug East Coast was situated in the Eastern District of Louisiana, and jurisdiction against the Tug East Coast and her owner was proper there. (Defs' Mem. in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss at 5). The lien notice sought a preferred maritime tort lien against the Tug East Coast for damage sustained by the barges. On June 4, 2001, St. Paul made a claim against plaintiff Dann Marine Towing for reimbursement of the $610,000 it paid to GLDD in settlement of its claim. (Nicoletti Aff. Exh. 7). Plaintiff filed suit in this court on June 27, 2001. On November 5, 2001, St. Paul brought an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, seeking damages from Fladel Mar, plaintiff Dann Marine Towing, and the Tug East Coast for the collision. (Defs' Mem. in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss Exh. H).
Plaintiff filed suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act ("the Act"), asking this court to declare: (1) that plaintiff was not responsible and not liable for the damage to the GL-62 and GL-63 and/or an alternative declaration that defendants Tug Colonel, GL-63,, Dann Ocean Towing, GLDD, and St. Paul are jointly and severally liable for the damage to the GL-62 and GL-63 in the approximate amount of $600,000 and (2) for a judgment declaring that the lien on the Tug East Coast be expunged and released. (Complaint ¶¶ D, E). Subsequent to oral argument on March 15, 2002, counsel for Fladel Mar, Inc., the owner of the Tug East Coast, produced a revised Letter of Undertaking, and defendants St. Paul agreed to accept the letter in lieu of arresting the Tug East Coast. (Defs' March 27 Mem. at 4, Exh, A). St. Paul also forwarded to plaintiff a Release of Claim of Lien. (Pl's April 4 Mem. at 6).
II. Legal Analysis
In their most recent memoranda, defendants argue that because St. Paul has released the lien on the Tug East Coast, plaintiff's declaratory judgment action is moot. In response, plaintiff argues that the court still has the discretion to exercise its declaratory judgment jurisdiction and should decide whether it is liable for any damages.
The Fourth Circuit has stated that "[a] federal court has the discretion to decline to entertain a declaratory judgment action, but, under the law of this Circuit, the court must do so only for 'good reason,'" Continental Cas. Co. v. Fuscardo, 35 F.3d 963, 965 (4th Cir. 1994). A district court "should normally entertain a declaratory judgment action within its jurisdiction when it finds that the declaratory relief sought (i) will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding," Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
Although the Fourth Circuit has not ruled directly on the issue, other courts have concluded that a declaratory judgment action is not the proper forum for a simple negligence case. See, e.g., Cunningham Bros., Inc. v. Ball, 407 F.2d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir. 1969); Morrison v. Parker, 90 F. Supp.2d 876, 880 (W.D. Mich. 2000) ("Following Cunningham, the uniform approach of the federal courts is that declaratory relief is generally inappropriate when a putative tortfeasor sues the injured party for a declaration of nonliability."); Friedman v. Geller, 925 F. Supp. 611, 613 (E.D. Wis. 1996) ("A declaratory judgment action is not a tool to compel potential negligent plaintiffs to litigate their claims at a time and in a forum chosen by the alleged tortfeasors. It is inappropriate to use the declaratory judgment status in what would otherwise be a run-of-the-mill negligence action.") (internal citation omitted), InCunningham, the injured party had filed a complaint for personal injuries against the alleged tortfeasor in district court, and the alleged tortfeasors had, in turn, filed a declaratory judgment action in district court a month later. 407 F.2d at 1167. The Seventh Circuit noted that "[t]he primary purpose of th[e] Act [was] to avoid accrual of avoidable damages to one not certain of his rights and to afford him an early adjudication without waiting until his adversary should see fit to begin suit, after damages had accrued." (Internal quotation marks omitted).Id. at 1167-68. The court noted that the plaintiff had failed to show how a declaration of non-liability for past actions would effectuate the purpose of the Act or afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity. Id. at 1168. The court concluded:
In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit cited approvingly to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Cunningham, noting that "[t]he Declaratory Judgment Act should not be used soley to compel personal injury plaintiffs to litigate their claims at a time and place chosen by alleged tortfeasor." J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. v. Innis, 985 F.2d 553, 1993 WL 13376 *2 (4th Cir. 1993) (Table).
To allow a declaratory judgment action under the facts before us would be to allow a substitute for the traditional procedures for adjudicating negligence cases. . . . [I]t is not one of the purposes of the declaratory judgment acts to enable a prospective negligence action defendant to obtain a declaration of non-liability.Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
This court finds the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Cunningham persuasive. As noted in Cunningham, the primary purpose of the Act is "to avoid accrual of avoidable damages to one not certain of his rights. . . ." 407 F.2d at 1167-68 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Minnesota Mining Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("In promulgating the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress intended to prevent avoidable damages from being incurred by a person uncertain of his rights and threatened with damage by delayed adjudication."). This is consistent with the Fourth Circuit's finding that the district court should entertain a declaratory judgment action when it will clarify the legal relationship at issue and will afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity arising from the proceedings.
In this case, the lien has been lifted against the Tug East Coast, and the only issue left to be decided is whether plaintiff is liable for damages sustained by the barges. As a result; this declaratory judgment action would not prevent avoidable injuries and would not clarify uncertain rights relating to this proceeding. Rather, any ruling by this court would simply determine whether plaintiff was negligent in the past. Defendants have presented case law supporting their position that a simple negligence case cannot be brought as a declaratory judgment action, and plaintiff has not shown that its claim is proper under the Act. This court concludes that as a result of the lifting of the lien against the Tug East Coast, plaintiff cannot proceed under the Declaratory Judgment Act with a simple negligence claim. As the court inCunningham found, if plaintiff were allowed to proceed in this forum, this court would allow the alleged tortfeasor to choose the forum of its choice and to disregard the standard procedure for adjudicating a negligence claim, without effectuating the purpose of the Act.
Moreover, the evidence suggests that plaintiff filed suit in this court to avoid litigating in what may by seen as a less convenient forum. In a letter dated June 4, 2001, St. Paul gave notice to plaintiff of its claim against Tug East Coast and Dann Marine Towing and Underwriters in the amount of $582,105.43. (Nicoletti Aff. Exh. 7). The letter requested that plaintiff submit to jurisdiction in New York. In response, plaintiff filed suit in this court on June 27, 2001, less then a month later.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, it is therefore ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.