Opinion
NO. 01-16-00145-CR
01-05-2017
JARVIS DANCY, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 230th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1477868
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A grand jury indicted Jarvis Dancy for the offense of evading arrest or detention while operating a motor vehicle. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04(a). Trial was to the court, which found him guilty. Dancy appeals, contending that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
Background
Two witnesses testified at trial. Peace Officer C. Curry of the Houston Police Department testified for the State. Dancy then testified in his own defense.
According to Curry, he and his partner J. Anders were patrolling the city in a police cruiser one night, with Curry behind the wheel and Anders in the passenger seat. When they saw a pickup truck cross four lanes of traffic and fail to obey a stop sign, they attempted to stop the driver by activating their cruiser's lights and sirens. Instead of pulling over, the truck's driver fled at high speed with Curry and Anders in pursuit. The chase ended after the truck's driver almost collided with a second police cruiser, lost control of his truck, and struck a fence. Anders and another officer then arrested the driver, Dancy.
Dancy's testimony differed from Curry's in several respects. Dancy said that he stopped at the stop sign. Dancy also disputed that the police cruiser's lights and sirens were switched on when it pulled behind him. He testified that he saw two cars behind him and, based on the neighborhood and the time of night, Dancy thought they might be armed robbers. So when one of the cars tried to pull up alongside him, he hit the gas. At this point, the lights and sirens came on, but he did not necessarily believe it was the police. Dancy explained that he had seen a former police cruiser that a friend bought at auction that still had the lights and sirens. According to Dancy, he did not know that he had been fleeing actual peace officers until he was stopped.
The trial court found Dancy guilty. Dancy then pleaded true to an enhancement allegation that he had a prior felony conviction for assaulting a family member. He also stipulated to additional prior convictions, including two for evading arrest or detention. The trial court assessed Dancy's punishment at seven years' confinement.
Discussion
Dancy contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for evading arrest or detention while operating a motor vehicle. In a single issue, he argues that his conviction must be overturned because the indictment alleges that he fled from Anders, who was the passenger in the police cruiser. Dancy reasons that he cannot be convicted of fleeing from a passenger in the pursuing police cruiser whom Dancy did not know was present during his flight from the police.
A. Standard of review and applicable law
We apply the legal standard for sufficiency of the proof stated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Pena v. State, 441 S.W.3d 635, 640 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd). Under this standard, we "must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Gear, 340 S.W.3d at 746.
The elements of evading arrest or detention are (1) intentionally (2) fleeing (3) from a person whom the defendant knows is a peace officer (4) trying to lawfully arrest or detain him. TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04(a); Farrakhan v. State, 263 S.W.3d 124, 134 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006), aff'd, 247 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The identity of the peace officer is not an element of the offense. Riggs v. State, 482 S.W.3d 270, 276 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. ref'd). The intentionally fleeing party need only have known that a peace officer was trying to lawfully arrest or detain him. Rodriguez v. State, 799 S.W.2d 301, 302-03 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Thompson v. State, 426 S.W.3d 206, 209 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref'd). Evading arrest in a motor vehicle is a third-degree felony. TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04(b)(2)(A).
B. Analysis
Dancy argues that a reasonable factfinder could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally fled from Anders because there was no evidence that Dancy was aware that Anders was in pursuit. His position boils down to the contention that he cannot be convicted of fleeing from Anders, a mere passenger in the cruiser whose presence Dancy did not discern. We disagree.
Based on the evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it, the trial court could have rationally found the essential elements of the offense of evading arrest or detention while operating a motor vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and deferring as we must to the trial court's credibility assessments, the proof permitted the trial court to find that Dancy fled from Curry and Anders after running a stop sign, despite the fact that they were in a police cruiser and had activated its lights and sirens. It is not an element of the offense that Dancy knew the identity or number of the occupants in the police cruiser. TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04(a); Riggs, 482 S.W.3d at 276. Nor is it an element of the offense that the peace officer from which Dancy fled be the driver of the pursuing police cruiser. TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04(a); Riggs, 482 S.W.3d at 276; see Tillery v. State, No. 05-04-00425-CR, 2005 WL 165238, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 26, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (proof was sufficient to show defendant fled from passenger of police cruiser; offense of evading arrest or detention in motor vehicle does not require officer named as complainant in indictment to be vehicle's driver). However many occupants Dancy thought were in the pursuing cruiser, the proof was sufficient to permit the trial court to find that Dancy knew any occupant was a peace officer trying to detain him for a traffic violation. This knowledge suffices to support a conviction for evading arrest or detention while operating a motor vehicle. See Rodriguez, 799 S.W.2d at 302-03; Riggs, 482 S.W.3d at 276; Thompson, 426 S.W.3d at 209; Tillery, 2005 WL 165238, at *1-2.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Rebeca Huddle
Justice Panel consists of Justices Massengale, Brown, and Huddle. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).