Opinion
NO. 2013-CA-000172-MR
03-07-2014
TRAVIS G. DALTON APPELLANT v. STEVE HANEY, WARDEN APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Travis Dalton, pro se Eddyville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: J. Todd Henning Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN W. PECKLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 12-CI-00376
OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
BEFORE: ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE; JONES AND VANMETER, JUDGES. JONES, JUDGE: Appellant Travis Dalton, pro se, appeals from the Boyle Circuit Court order denying his petition for declaration of rights. For the reasons more fully explained below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
At all relevant times, Dalton, an inmate of the Kentucky Department of Corrections ("KDOC"), was incarcerated at the Northpoint Training Center in Burgin, Kentucky. On May 19, 2012, another inmate, John Bray, was assaulted outside of Northpoint's chapel. The KDOC's Internal Affairs Office ("IAO") conducted an investigation of the incident. Based on its investigation, the IAO determined that there was sufficient evidence from which to conclude that Dalton and another inmate arranged the assault on Bray.
On June 12, 2012, the KDOC issued a Disciplinary Report charging Dalton with a "physical action, resulting in death or injury of an inmate" as related to Bray's assault. The report states:
[A]n investigation was completed regarding Inmate Dalton's involvement in the assault on Inmate John Bray. In the evening on May 19, 2012, Inmate Bray was physically assaulted while he sat at the picnic table in front of the Chapel. Inmate Bray had to be transported to the Hospital for further treatment. He sustained serious injuries to his face and jaw. Internal Affairs received sufficient evidence that Inmate Dalton was involved with ordering a hit on Inmate Bray to be assaulted. Inmate Dalton along with Inmate Hodge approached another inmate in order to arrange the assault on Inmate Bray. This shall serve as the inmate's summary and a complete copy of this investigation will be forwarded to the Adjustment Officer.
Dalton pleaded not guilty and requested a hearing before the Adjustment Officer. Prior to the hearing, Dalton filed a Kentucky Open Records Act request requesting the KDOC to turn over any information/evidence the IAO collected during its investigation of Bray's assault. The KDOC denied Dalton's request on the ground that complying with the request would pose a "security threat" to the institution, its inmates, staff, or others.
From the record, it appears that the Northpoint Training Center uses a single adjustment officer to adjudicate disciplinary matters instead of an adjustment committee.
We were not provided with a copy of the actual request, but Dalton referred to its contents both before the circuit court and in his appellate brief.
In denying the request, the KDOC cited Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 61.878 and KRS 197.025. The KDOC's denial is part of the record.
On June 26, 2012, Dalton came before the Adjustment Officer, Sergeant Steve Taylor. The Adjustment Officer found Dalton guilty and issued the following findings:
Inmate Dalton was present at the hearing along with his legal aid Hope #193609. Inmate had pled not guilty during the investigation and also in the hearing. However, An [sic] investigation was conducted after May 19, 2012, by internal affairs and did state and provide evidence that inmate Dalton did take part in the assult [sic] on John Bray. Based on the investigation I find inmate Dalton guilty of this Category 7-02 1 A Inchoate.
The Adjustment Officer ordered Dalton to pay restitution of $1000 for Bray's hospital bills, assigned him 180 days in disciplinary segregation, and revoked 730 days of his good-time credit. Dalton appealed the Adjustment Officer's decision to Northpoint's warden, Appellee Steven Haney. On July 26, 2012, Warden Haney denied the appeal. He included the following handwritten notation in the appeal section on the disciplinary hearing form: "Decision supported. Due process in order."
On August 20, 2012, Dalton filed a Petition for Declaration of Rights with the Boyle Circuit Court. Dalton's petition sought a determination that the KDOC violated his due process rights because he did not have access to the investigatory records and because the Adjustment Officer did not verify any facts he relied on in finding Dalton guilty. The circuit court denied Dalton's petition on September 18, 2012, after concluding that the decision was supported by "some evidence." The circuit court also determined that Dalton was not constitutionally entitled to the investigatory records. Dalton subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit court denied on November 16, 2012. The circuit court entered an amended order on January 25, 2013.
This appeal followed. Dalton raises two alleged errors on appeal. First, Dalton asserts that the Adjustment Officer denied his due process rights by failing to independently verify the reliability of the information contained in the investigatory report and by failing to cite any reason for adopting the investigating officer's statement in his findings. Second, Dalton maintains that the KDOC denied his due process rights by refusing to turn over the IAO's investigatory report.
Dalton also asserts that the KDOC failed to follow its own administrative policies and procedures with respect to the investigation and adjustment officer's decision. Because we conclude that the hearing officer's decision violated Dalton's procedural due process rights, we see no reason to separately address his claims related to violations of the internal policy and procedures.
It is unclear to us whether Dalton is also attempting to assert an independent claim under Kentucky's Open Records Act. However, as discussed in more depth below, any such claim is barred because Dalton failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his declaratory judgment action in circuit court.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Protected Liberty or Property Interest
Without a protected liberty or property interest, a prisoner cannot successfully maintain a claim under the Due Process Clause. "Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250, 103 S.Ct.1741, 1748, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983). Thus, the first issue we must decide is whether Dalton asserted a cognizable due process claim.
With respect to constitutional due process protections, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having an impact on a prisoner. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) ("[T]o hold . . . that any substantial deprivation imposed by prison authorities triggers the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts.") Rather, a prisoner is entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause only when the alleged deprivation imposes an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995).
Dalton's disciplinary proceeding resulted in disciplinary segregation, restitution, and revocation of good-time credits. Standing alone, placement in segregation is not enough to trigger due process protection because such a placement does not impose any atypical or significant hardship on the prisoner. Id.
Revocation of earned good-time credits, however, is a different matter. See Marksberry v. Chandler, 126 S.W.3d 747, 752 (Ky. App. 2003). Where a state has created a right to good-time credit that shortens a prison sentence and provides that the credit is revocable only upon an inmate's serious misconduct, he has an interest of "real substance" subject to procedural due process protection. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974-75, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Here, Dalton's disciplinary proceeding resulted in the revocation of two years good-time credit. As such, we have no difficulty concluding that Dalton has alleged an interest protected by the Due Process Clause.
Additionally, we observe that Dalton was ordered to pay $1000 in restitution. Although, we can find no published Kentucky authority directly on point, other jurisdictions hold that a prisoner has a protected interest when a prison orders funds taken out of his trust account for restitution. See Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 179 (3rd Cir. 1997) ("Inmates have a property interest in funds held in prison accounts."); Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 222 (7th Cir. 1986). We agree with those jurisdictions that prisoners have possessory interests in their prison trust accounts.
Because Dalton's disciplinary proceeding implicated two protected interests, the revocation of earned good-time credit and the taking of money from his prison trust account for restitution, we have no difficulty concluding that Dalton asserted a cognizable procedural due process claim. Having concluded that Dalton was entitled to some process under the Due Process Clause, we must next determine how much process he was due under the circumstances.
B. Process Due Dalton
It is well settled that "[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 2975. When a protected liberty or property interest is at stake a prisoner is entitled to: "(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action." Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 1055 S.Ct. 2768, 2773, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). "The due process requirements set out in Hill have been recognized and applied in Kentucky." Webb v. Sharp, 223 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Ky. 2007).
Furthermore, unlike in a criminal proceeding, due process does not require that a guilty finding in a prison disciplinary proceeding be supported by evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or even substantial evidence. Rather, due process dictates simply that in establishing guilt the disciplinary body must rely on "some evidence" it has determined to be reliable. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454-57, 1055 S.Ct. at 2773-75.
On appellate review, ascertaining whether the "some evidence" standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Id. at 456, S.Ct. at 2774. Rather, the applicable question for the appellate court is simply whether the circuit court correctly determined there to be "some evidence" that the fact-finder reasonably relied upon in determining guilt. Houston v. Fletcher, 193 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Ky. App. 2006). A reviewing court must also determine whether the fact-finder's written findings indicate that he or she independently assessed the reliability of the evidence relied upon. Haney v. Thomas, 406 S.W.3d 823, 826 (Ky. 2013).
C. Dalton's Claims
We first address Dalton's argument that he had a right to the IAO's investigatory file. Dalton maintains that the KDOC's failure to produce the investigatory file in response to his Open Records Request deprived him of his due process right to confront witnesses and mount a defense. The Appellee maintains that the methods and sources used in an internal affairs investigation of this nature must be kept confidential to insure effective security in the institution and to avoid retaliatory attacks on the participants of the investigation.
While a prisoner has a due process right to call witnesses and produce evidence, it is not an unfettered right. Rather, the prisoner's rights must be balanced against the legitimate institutional needs of assuring safety and control of inmates. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, S.Ct. at 2769. We agree with Appellee that the KDOC should not be required to make available to inmates information that seems, in the judgment of prison officials, likely to compromise the security of other inmates or the ability of the prison to conduct further investigatory activity. Deference to the KDOC's judgment on this point is demanded by the legitimate concern of maintaining order and safety in the prison environment.
To the extent that information endangers another inmate, an officer, or compromises the overall security of the prison, the accused inmate has no due process right to that information. See Stanford v. Parker, 949 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Ky. App. 1996) ("There was no violation of appellant's due process rights in the refusal to reveal information which prison officials deemed confidential."). Thus, we conclude that the circuit court correctly denied Dalton's claim that withholding the investigatory report from him violated his due process rights.
It is unclear whether Dalton is also arguing that Appellee's failure to turn over the information also violated the Kentucky Open Records Act. In any event, we find that he cannot maintain such a claim because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this action in circuit court.
Kentucky Revised Statutes 197.025(3) states:
KRS 61.880 to the contrary notwithstanding, all persons confined in a penal facility shall challenge any denial of an open record with the Attorney General by mailing or otherwise sending the appropriate documents to the Attorney General within twenty (20) days of the denial pursuant to the procedures set out in KRS 61.880(2) before an appeal can be filed in a Circuit Court.
The KDOC denied Dalton's open records request on June 18, 2012. There is nothing in the record to show that Dalton appealed the denial to the Attorney General as of the date he filed his petition in circuit court. As such, the circuit court correctly refused to address any alleged violations of Kentucky's Open Records Act. See Thrasher v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.3d 132, 134 (Ky. App. 2012).
We now turn to Dalton's assertion that the Adjustment Officer should have independently assessed the reliability of the investigatory report and indicated his reasons for relying on the report in his written decision. We find the Supreme Court's decision in Haney dispositive of this issue. Haney, 406 S.W.3d at 823.
In Haney, a prison disciplinary committee found Thomas, an inmate, guilty of hitting another inmate. Id. at 824. In its written report, the Adjustment Committee stated that it relied on "the confidential information received from Lieutenant Gribbins, [which] the Committee . . . believed to be true in accordance to policy." Id. Thomas maintained that his conviction violated his due process rights because there was no written statement from the fact-finder regarding the reliability of the evidence. Id. at 825. The Court of Appeals agreed with Thomas. Id.
The Supreme Court accepted discretionary review to consider "what amount of particularized findings must the Adjustment Committee make in order for the 'some evidence' standard to be met while also protecting the safety and security of inmates who become witnesses." Id. at 826. The Court observed that when the supporting evidence is not supplied to the reviewing court nor discussed in the Adjustment Committee's findings, appellate courts are placed in the untenable situation of "rubber stamping an arbitrary determination." Id. "If the Adjustment Committee simply accepted the investigating officer's conclusion as true, it would be 'merely recording the findings made by the investigating officer. . . . To proceed in that fashion is not fact finding. It is recordkeeping.'" Id. at 827 (quoting Hensley v. Wilson, 850 F.2d 269, 276 (6th Cir.1988)).
The Court explained that it was not unreasonable to require "prison administrators to simply state for the record, without divulging identities why witnesses are reliable." Id. at 828. The Court ultimately concluded that to comport with due process, the Adjustment Committee must cite to some corroborating factors in its written decision that establish the reliability of the internal investigatory report. Id. The Court then provided a non-exhaustive list of methods the Adjustment Committee might use to establish reliability without jeopardizing the prison's legitimate concerns of safety and confidentiality. Id. at 827-28. Regardless of the method of corroboration, the Court held that the record should divulge some "corroborating factors" relied upon by the Adjustment Committee in reaching its decisions. Id. Ultimately, the Court held that: "[a] simple statement in the Adjustment Committee's findings that 'the Committee believes the information is credible and the information reliable' is not enough to satisfy the some evidence standard." Id. at 828.
For example, the Adjustment Committee could cite in its findings that it: 1) placed the investigating officer under oath and received his testimony; 2) relied on corroborating testimony and evidence; 3) had firsthand knowledge of the sources of the information and considered them reliable based on past experience; 4) conducted an in camera review of the investigator's report and found the report and the investigator to be reliable; or 5) relied on underlying factual information. Id.
The Adjustment Officer in this case, much like the Adjustment Committee in Haney, simply stated that: "an [sic] investigation was conducted after May 19, 2012, by internal affairs and did state and provide evidence that inmate Dalton did take part in the assult [sic] on John Bray. Based on the investigation, I find inmate Dalton Guilty of this Category 7-02 1 A Inchoate."
While the "some evidence" standard is a deferential one, there must be a contemporaneous written record from which a reviewing court can determine that the administrative body made an independent assessment of reliability. Id. There is no such record in this case. To affirm the circuit court without such a statement would be to rubber stamp what appears objectively to be an arbitrary determination of guilt wherein the Adjustment Officer "adjudged the inmate guilty simply because the investigating officer says he or she is guilty." Haney, 406 S.W.3d at 826.
We realize that the circuit court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's guidance in Haney when it rendered its decision. The circuit court rendered its opinion and supplemental order in January 2013; Haney was not designated as final until September 19, 2013.
--------
The written finding of guilty in this case is constitutionally insufficient under Haney. At a minimum, the Adjustment Officer should have explained why he deemed the evidence contained in the investigatory report to be reliable. Haney, 406 S.W.3d at 825-28. Because the record fails to explain why the Adjustment Officer deemed the evidence reliable, we conclude that the Appellee denied Dalton the procedural process he was due.
Therefore, we must reverse the portion of the circuit court's order dismissing Dalton's procedural due process claim as related to the Adjustment Officer's findings and remand this action. On remand the circuit court should direct the Appellee to afford Dalton another hearing before the Adjustment Officer. On rehearing, the Adjustment Officer must independently assess the reliability of any evidence put before him, indicate on the record that he has done so, and, if he deems the evidence reliable, articulate the basis for that determination. We note, however, that we are not requiring the Adjustment Officer to reach a different outcome or render detailed, comprehensive findings of fact. The written conclusion and findings, however, should indicate some minimal, independent indicia of reliability As it currently stands, the Adjustment Officer's finding of guilt does not comply with the minimal process due Dalton.
As set forth above, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Travis Dalton, pro se
Eddyville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: J. Todd Henning
Frankfort, Kentucky