Opinion
2 Div. 213.
April 12, 1945.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Dallas County; L. S. Moore, Judge.
T. G. Gayle, of Selma, for appellant.
The sheriff cannot collect any fee as an individual for services which the law requires him to perform. Code 1940, Tit. 54, § 5(4). It was necessary that the statute mention specifically the sheriff or other officer in order that such officers might claim the reward. In view of the constitutional amendment fixing the salary of the sheriff and providing that it shall be the sole compensation he might collect from any source connected with his office, requiring him to cover all other allowances, etc. into the county treasury, the sums provided by section 102, Title 29 of the Code can not be held to go to the sheriff individually. Amdt. No. XLVI, Code 1940, Vol. 1, Pocket Part, p. 37.
Wilkinson Wilkinson and Pitts Pitts, all of Selma, for appellee.
The law of fees and costs must be held to be penal and no fee must be demanded or received except in cases expressly authorized by law. Code 1940, Tit. 11, § 1; Mosely v. Kennedy, 245 Ala. 448, 17 So.2d 536. The sheriff is under duty to secure evidence, apprehend and arrest persons guilty of unlawfully distilling or manufacturing or making prohibited liquors or beverages. The sheriff is compensated by fees expressly provided by statute. Code, Tit. 11, §§ 34, 100. These fees so expressly provided do not include the fifty dollars allowed as a reward under Code, Title 29, § 102. The reward is not a fee to be allowed a sheriff, because he is sheriff, but rather a reward to spur individual initiative and diligence, whether the individual acts in an official or private capacity. Mosely v. Kennedy, supra. Offers of rewards must be liberally construed in the sense in which they are ordinarily understood and acted on, with a regard to the purpose for which they are intended. 46 Am.Jur. 112. A reward is a recompense or premium offered by the government or an individual in return for special or extraordinary service to be performed. 46 Am.Jur. 106. The class of rewards known as a bounty is clearly distinguishable from salary or pay. 8 Am.Jur. 831.
Frank M. Dixon, of Birmingham, amicus curiae.
This suit is by a petition filed by appellee, who is the sheriff of Dallas County, and against the county to obtain a declaratory judgment as to the ownership as between him and the county of the reward of fifty dollars in each case provided for in section 102, Title 29, Code 1940.
The controversy is controlled by a proper answer to the question of whether such reward is a fee, commission, allowance, or other compensation provided by law (other than his salary fixed by the Constitution) so as to require him as sheriff to "cover the same into the county treasury" under constitutional amendment XLVI (see, Pocket Supplement, Title 1-6, Code 1940), whereby a fixed salary is provided for the sheriff, and requiring him to collect all such named fees, and cover them into the county treasury.
We gave consideration to one aspect of the question in the case of Mosely v. Kennedy, 245 Ala. 448, 17 So.2d 536. We also there held that the reward was not intended to be a part of the fees fixed by law (sections 34 and 100, Title 11, Code of 1940), as compensation for the sheriff's official services. They were intended to "spur individual initiative and diligence." If the sheriff is required to cover them into the county treasury as a part of his compensation for official conduct, the intent of the Legislature would be entirely lost. We do not think the statute and constitutional amendment should be so construed as to frustrate the purpose evidently intended.
The trial court held that appellee was not required to cover the amount of such fees into the county treasury, and we agree with that holding.
Affirmed.
GARDNER C. J., and THOMAS and STAKELY, JJ., concur.