Opinion
2011-12-27
Pinchas DADON, appellant, v. 102–30 66TH ROAD CO–OP OWNER'S, INC., etc., et al., respondents.
Alan C. Glassman, Lynbrook, N.Y., for appellant. Thomas D. Hughes, New York, N.Y. (Richard C. Rubinstein of counsel), for respondents.
Alan C. Glassman, Lynbrook, N.Y., for appellant. Thomas D. Hughes, New York, N.Y. (Richard C. Rubinstein of counsel), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Nelson, J.), dated September 29, 2010, as, upon reargument, in effect, vacated so much of an order of the same court dated March 31, 2010, as denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and thereupon, granted that motion.
ORDERED that the order dated September 29, 2010, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff was injured when he tripped and fell on an interior staircase leading to the elevators in the lobby of the apartment building where he lived. He alleged that he had difficulty seeing the first step because the defendants negligently permitted natural sunlight to enter the lobby, thus creating an “optical confusion” ( Saretsky v. 85 Kenmare Realty Corp., 85 A.D.3d 89, 92, 924 N.Y.S.2d 32 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). While a landowner has a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe manner ( see Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868), a landowner has no duty to protect or warn against open and obvious conditions that are not inherently dangerous ( see Weiss v. Half Hollow Hills Cent. School Dist., 70 A.D.3d 932, 933, 893 N.Y.S.2d 877; Bretts v. Lincoln Plaza Assoc., Inc., 67 A.D.3d 943, 944, 890 N.Y.S.2d 87; Murray v. Dockside 500 Mar., Inc., 32 A.D.3d 832, 833, 821 N.Y.S.2d 608; Cupo v. Karfunkel, 1 A.D.3d 48, 51–52, 767 N.Y.S.2d 40).
Here, the defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the alleged condition was readily observable by the reasonable use of the plaintiff's senses, and was not inherently dangerous. They submitted, inter alia, affidavits of the apartment building's superintendent and of a licensed engineer stating that the lobby where the accident occurred was regularly maintained and compliant with the applicable building codes ( see Murray v. Dockside 500 Mar., Inc., 32 A.D.3d at 833, 821 N.Y.S.2d 608). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572). Photographic evidence of the accident scene submitted by the plaintiff was insufficient to defeat the defendants' prima facie showing ( see Martin v. City of New York, 82 A.D.3d 653, 654, 919 N.Y.S.2d 330; Remes v. 513 W. 26th Realty, LLC, 73 A.D.3d 665, 666, 903 N.Y.S.2d 8).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court, upon reargument, properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.