Opinion
CV146010425S
11-29-2016
Thomas Cussen et al. v. Lambert & Barr, LLC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES, AND COSTS ARISING FROM VIOLATIONS OF THE CONNECTICUT UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT AND ON MOTION #201; ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
Honorable John D. Moore, J.
I
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This trial took place over thirteen days, beginning on April 5, 2016 and ending when the jury returned its verdict on April 27, 2016. The jury entered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs Mr. and Ms. Cussen (the plaintiffs) on count one, breach of contract; count three, negligence; and count four, violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The jury also found that the plaintiffs proved that they sustained an ascertainable loss as a result of the defendant's unfair trade practices. Neither party submitted special interrogatories as to damages. As a result, the jury found, without allocating damages among the three counts for which it found liability, that the plaintiffs had proven compensatory damages in the amount of $85,003.90. The jury found in favor of the defendant, Lambert and Barr, LLC (Lambert and Barr or the defendant) on count two, fraud.
The court denied the defendant's motions to set aside the verdict and for a remittitur. As a result, the court must now decide whether, and to what extent, to award the plaintiffs' attorneys fees, punitive damages, and costs under CUTPA. The court must also decide the reasonableness of a deposition fee charged by the defendant's expert witness.
The court conducted hearings on June 9, 2016 and August 1, 2016 pertaining to the plaintiffs' claims for attorneys fees, costs, and punitive damages under CUTPA. During the June 9, 2016 hearing, the court also heard arguments on motion #201, the plaintiffs' motion to determine the reasonableness of the fee of the defendant's expert witness Cissell; #205, the defendant's objection thereto; #203, the plaintiff's amended bill of costs; and #204, the defendant's objection thereto. For the reasons set forth below, the court, under CUTPA, awards the plaintiff's attorneys fees in the amount of $38,728.55 and punitive damages in the amount of $15,000. The court also finds that a reasonable hourly fee for the defendant's expert Cissell's deposition time is $350 per hour. Therefore, judgment shall enter for the plaintiffs, under CUTPA, for attorneys fees in the amount of $38,728.55 and punitive damages in the amount of $15,000, and for compensatory damages in the amount of $85,003.90 awarded by the jury. After the entry of judgment, the court clerk shall tax costs.
II
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
While the plaintiffs were away from their home, it was struck by lightning and set afire. The resulting blaze and the water sprayed on the home to extinguish the fire destroyed the plaintiffs' home. The plaintiffs' home needed to be gutted and rebuilt from the studs out. The plaintiffs retained the defendant to perform this work. The defendant, its agents and employees and outside contractors performed the work. The defendant submitted information and invoices to the plaintiffs' insurance carrier, Allstate Insurance Company, to assist the plaintiffs with the insurance claim that arose from the property damage. After moving back in to the home, the plaintiffs sued the defendant, as mentioned above, for breach of contract, negligence, fraud and CUTPA.
III
DISCUSSION
A
CUTPA Attorneys Fees
Under § 42-110g(d) of CUTPA, " the court may award . . . reasonable attorneys fees based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount of recovery . . . This statute clearly states that it is within the trial court's discretion in deciding whether to award attorneys fees and that the award is not to be based on the amount of the actual recovery to the party but rather on the work the attorney performed . . . We have previously acknowledged the importance to the CUTPA scheme of the availability of attorneys fees." Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown, 57 Conn.App. 189, 197, 752 A.2d 1098 (2000) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) " [T]he initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys fee is properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate." Carrillo v. Goldberg, 141 Conn.App. 299, 317, 61 A.3d 1164 (2013). This calculation is also called the lodestar calculation or the lodestar amount. Id. The court may vary its lodestar calculation based upon the application of the Johnson factors. Our Appellate Court has held that, " when awarding attorneys fees under CUTPA, the court must consider the following twelve [ Johnson ] factors: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee for similar work in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown, supra, 198. While these " factors may be relevant in adjusting the lodestar amount, . . . no one factor is a substitute for multiplying reasonable billing rates by a reasonable estimation of the number of hours expended on the litigation." Carrillo v. Goldberg, supra, 317-18. In regard to a discretionary award of attorneys fees under CUTPA, the trial court is deemed to be " in the best position to evaluate the particular circumstances of a case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Heller v. D.W. Fish Realty Co., 93 Conn.App. 727, 734-35, 890 A.2d 113 (2006).
During the CUTPA hearing, the court accepted into evidence Attorney Heffernan's billing records for this case, from inception through June 6, 2016, and heard testimony relating to Attorney Heffernan's retainer agreement with the plaintiffs. Attorney Heffernan billed the plaintiffs at the rate of $325 per hour for her work and $75 an hour for " intern/paralegal" work. These hourly rates are reasonable given the time and labor required; the difficulty of the questions involved; the skill required for proper delivery of the legal services needed; the amount of time involved and the results obtained; the experience, reputation, and ability of Attorney Heffernan; and the nature and length of her professional relationship with the clients. Moreover, these billing rates are within the range of the prevailing market rate for a similar attorney: an attorney of Attorney Heffernan's experience at the bar, in the " relevant legal communities" ]; e.g., the Litchfield judicial district, where this case was tried and the New Haven judicial district, where Attorney Heffernan maintains her office. None of the Johnson factors, however, warrant an enhancement of the lodestar calculation.
Attorney Heffernan's total bill in this case, submitted at the post-trial CUTPA hearing, was $108,347. This bill evidences a total of 341.96 billable hours, almost all billed out at Attorney Heffernan's hourly rate, $325 per hour, with only a miniscule portion billed out at the $75 per hour intern/paralegal rate. The unredacted form of Attorney's Heffernan's bill, which was admitted as an exhibit at the CUTPA hearing, was sufficiently detailed so that the court could review the work performed by Attorney Heffernan and her staff. After carefully reviewing this bill, the court finds that the billings for this case were fair and reasonable, with two relatively minor exceptions. The first exception arises from Attorney Heffernan's contractual provision for minimum time billing. Attorney Heffernan testified that, pursuant to her agreement with the plaintiffs, she would never bill less than .2 hours for any one task. In reviewing the bill, the court finds twelve entries in which Attorney Heffernan billed the plaintiff's .2 hours for tasks such as reviewing brief notices from the court or opposing counsel. The review referenced in each of these entries certainly took less than .1 hours, or six minutes, to complete. (See, for example, court exhibit 1 from the June 9, 2016 hearing). As a result of this first exception, the court deducts $390 (12 x .1 hours x $325/hour) from the plaintiffs' bill. The second exception arises from billing mistakes. On two occasions, Attorney Heffernan billed the plaintiffs at Attorney Heffernan's rate, $325 per hour for work that an intern/paralegal, whose rate was $75 per hour, completed. Attorney Heffernan testified during the CUTPA hearing that these matters should have been billed at the intern/paralegal rate. Item 11038 was billed at $1,625 (5 hours x $325/hour), and should have been billed at $375 (5 hours x $75/hour). Item 11039 was billed at $65 (.2 hours x $325/hour) and should have been billed at $15 (.2 hours x $75/hour). As a result of the second exception, the court deducts the difference, $1,300, from Attorney Heffernan's bill. The deductions from these two exceptions total $1,690.
These billing entries were 11038 and 11039.
The $1,690 deduction, however, is more than offset by the time that Attorney Heffernan expended in preparing and arguing post-trial motions, as well as her CUTPA punitive damages and attorneys fee claims, after June 6, 2016. In the context of a CUTPA claim, the court has the " discretion to award additional fees on the supplemental motion for work on post-trial motions . . ." Taylor v. King, 121 Conn.App. 105, 132, 994 A.2d 330 (2010). As mentioned above, the court heard testimony and argument on these matters on June 9, 2016 and August 1, 2016. Attorney Heffernan's bill, submitted during the June 9, 2016 hearing, included work performed through the date of June 6, 2016; this bill did not include the time expended during the June 9, 2016 and August 1, 2016 hearings. The court monitor's records, available to the court, and of which the court takes judicial notice, demonstrate that the June 9, 2016 hearing took approximately four and one-half hours and that the August 1, 2016 hearing took approximately three hours. The 7.5 hours Attorney Heffernan spent at these hearings multiplied by her hourly rate of $325 yields a product of $2,437.50. The difference between the deductions set forth in the preceding paragraph and the additional legal work discussed in this paragraph is $747.50. The court adds this net amount to the bill submitted by Attorney Heffernan to yield a total attorneys fee of $109,094.50. The court finds that this sum was fair, reasonable, and necessary for the total amount of work that Attorney Heffernan invested in this case, including trial preparation, trial, and post-trial activity. This conclusion, however, does not end the court's analysis.
The trial court has discretion in awarding attorneys fees under CUTPA. Our Supreme and Appellate courts have provided guidance as to how the trial court may exercise this discretion. " [W]hen certain claims provide for a party's recovery of contractual attorneys fees but others do not, a party is nevertheless entitled to a full recovery of reasonable attorneys fees if an apportionment is impracticable because the claims arise from a common factual nucleus and are intertwined." Total Recycling Services of Connecticut, Inc. v. Connecticut Oil Recycling Services, LLC, 308 Conn. 312, 333, 63 A.3d 896 (2013). The court's exercise in this regard is to ascertain whether the court may apportion attorneys fees as between counts that may give rise to attorneys fees from those counts that do not. To do so, the court must examine whether counts that would not support the award of attorneys fees, such as the counts of negligence and breach of contract, depend upon the same facts as counts that would support an award of attorneys fees, such as CUTPA. Heller v. D.W. Fish Realty Co., supra, 93 Conn.App. 735-36. In the present case, the claims of CUTPA and fraud would support an award of attorney's fees, while the claims of negligence and breach of contract do not.
In the cases of Heller and Taylor v. King, supra, 121 Conn.App. 132, the court found that it would be " impermissibly difficult" to apportion attorneys fees based on the CUTPA claim alone because all of the claims in those cases " depend[ed] on the same facts and circumstances." Heller v. D.W. Fish Realty Co., supra, 93 Conn.App. 735-36. The present case, however, is distinguishable on its facts, both alleged and proven. In this case, the facts alleged by the plaintiffs to support the counts of negligence and breach of contract were, for the most part, markedly different from those alleged in support of the counts of CUTPA and fraud. The factual allegations of the counts of negligence and breach of contract and the manner that they were proved dealt largely with poor workmanship. The breach of contract count posited a general allegation of poor workmanship (i.e., negligent breach of contract), while the negligence count consisted of specific allegations of negligence. These allegations are set forth, for example, in paragraph 6 of the negligence count. The factual allegations of the fraud and CUTPA counts, are however, identical (as pointed out in the court's jury instructions), and involve egregious behavior, including financial misrepresentations. For example, each of these two counts alleged (1) unscrupulous charges, including charges for items not done or completed; double charges to either the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs' insurer or to the insurer and contractors; charges for items or material for which the plaintiffs had already paid; charges for higher quality material than was actually installed, and 10 percent surcharges for profit and for charges for material not used; (2) misrepresentations as to materials installed; and (3) wrongful withholding of money, property and keys of the plaintiffs. Only a portion of the breach of contract count, namely paragraphs 8, 9, and 10, included similar allegations. These paragraphs allege that the defendant failed to install materials that the plaintiffs had specifically contracted for, failed to complete work contracted for, and charged a 10 percent profit not found in the contract. Therefore, the court finds that, for purposes of Heller and Taylor, the factual allegations of CUTPA and fraud and the factual allegations of the non-negligent breach of contract claims are inextricably intertwined, but that the CUTPA allegations are markedly different from, and are easily differentiated from the factual underpinnings of poor workmanship found in the negligence and negligent breach of contract claims.
This is, of course, as it should be. Connecticut's standard jury charge on CUTPA instructs the jury that a " simple breach of contract" alone does not constitute a CUTPA violation, unless such breach of contract action also constitutes " an unfair trade practice" or " deceptive act or practice." Connecticut Judicial Branch Civil Jury Instructions, (1999-2016) § 5.2-8, available at https://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/civil/Civil.pdf (last visited November 23, 2016).
Included within this category is the claim that the defendant abandoned the project before the work was completed.
For ease of reference, these counts are collectively referred to hereafter as the " CUTPA allegations" or " unfair trade practices."
An overwhelming amount of evidence presented and argument entertained during trial related to the latter category, the allegations of poor workmanship. During the twelve days of trial testimony, the court watched a cavalcade of contractor witnesses, salesmen, and experts testify, fifteen in number, about the quality of workmanship in support of the allegations of shoddy workmanship. Similarly, much of the testimony elicited from the plaintiffs and from Mr. Lambert and his daughter, Jennifer Lambert Ouellette, both employed by the defendant, had to do with poor workmanship. The poor workmanship testimony, whether from third parties or from the defendant's employees, pertained to virtually every system in the home: including, inter alia, the installation of cabinets, countertops, appliances, plumbing fixtures, doors, electrical components, insulation, flooring, roofing, siding, stairs, windows, vents, support beams, heating and air conditioning, decking, and siding. Some of the questions posed to the plaintiffs, and to Mr. Lambert and Ms. Ouellette, as well as a majority of the questions posed to Ms. Lambert of the defendant, had to do with the alleged overcharges, misrepresentations, and the wrongful withholding allegations of the fraud and CUTPA counts. As a result, the court finds that the majority of the plaintiffs' attorney's efforts during trial were directed to the shoddy workmanship allegations, under the counts of negligence and negligent breach of contract, rather than to the CUTPA allegations.
To analyze this finding in greater detail, the court conducted an intensive review of the trial. In this review, the court contrasted the amount of time dedicated during trial to evidence of an argument concerning negligent workmanship to the amount of time expended on the CUTPA allegations, namely, wrongful charges, wrongful withholding of property, and misrepresentations as to, inter alia, materials used at the plaintiffs' home. To conduct its review, the court scrutinized the court monitor's notes for every witness and for arguments that took place outside of the jury's presence. The court monitor's notes summarize witness testimony and legal arguments and contain a time signature displaying how long such testimony and arguments last. Using these notes, the court tallied up the total amount of time for each category of evidence submitted or argument made. The court supplemented its review of the court monitor's notes by listening to certain portions of the court monitor's recordings and reviewing, as necessary, its personal notes of in-chambers discussions and court proceedings. After doing so, and for the reasons set forth below, the court quantified the amount of court time spent on poor workmanship as opposed to unfair trade practices.
Not taking into account the day upon which the jury returned its verdict, April 27, 2016, this case was tried over the course of twelve trial days, from April 5, 2016 through April 26, 2016. April 5 and 26 were essentially one-half trial days. The other trial days were all full days, with the exception of one day, which the court adjourned at approximately 4 p.m. due to the unavailability of witnesses. As mentioned above, the court considered not only what transpired in open court, in front of the jury, but also what occurred out of the jury's presence in court or in chambers. After conducting its review, the court finds that 35.5 percent of the time spent at trial on evidence, legal argument, and the court's charge to the jury was attributed to facts or argument inextricably intertwined with the plaintiffs' CUTPA allegations, as contrasted to proof of or argument concerning poor workmanship.
Further, the court finds that the amount of time invested at trial to attempt to prove shoddy workmanship, on one hand, and unfair trade practices, on the other hand, is reflective of the amount of time invested in trial preparation of each of these two areas. The amount of labor involved in the development of the facts to prove negligence in this case was staggering. As mentioned above, the plaintiffs' home had to be gutted and rebuilt from the studs out. Each of the eighteen home systems involved in the repairs performed in this case, e.g., the installation of cabinets, countertops, appliances, plumbing fixtures, doors, electrical components, insulation, flooring, roofing, siding, stairs, windows, vents, support beams, heating and air conditioning, decking and siding required its own factual development, as well as proof of the breach of the relevant standard of care, which required securing expert testimony on many of these areas of installation. By way of contrast, the unfair trade practice allegations involved relatively discrete and limited blocks of factual evidence. For example, charging for items not installed or completed required comparing what was promised in the contract to what was delivered. Allegations of double charges required only the comparison of billings to various payees. Discovering whether a 10 percent surcharge was billed involved only reviewing certain bills. Proving that the defendant wrongfully withheld the plaintiffs' property necessitated only finding out whether the defendant still possessed any of the plaintiffs' property. Supporting a claim that the defendant abandoned the plaintiffs before the work was completed involved only eliciting testimony drawn largely from documented e-mail, exchanges pertaining to the termination of the business relationship. As a result, the court finds it reasonable to infer that the time spent at trial is reflective of time invested in trial preparation. Therefore, the court finds that the percentage of time expended during trial on the CUTPA allegations is a fair, just, and reasonable proxy for time expended on the CUTPA allegations in trial preparation.
Therefore, the court takes 35.5 percent of the total attorney's fee found above, $109,094.50, to ascertain the appropriate amount of attorneys fees to award. 35.5 percent of $109,094.50 is $38,728.55. As a result, the court awards $38,728.55 to the plaintiffs for their attorneys fees.
B
CUTPA Punitive Damages
CUTPA provides, in relevant part, " that [a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property . . . as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by [CUTPA], may bring an action . . . to recover actual damages . . . The court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages . . . as it deems necessary or proper. Awarding punitive damages under . . . CUTPA is discretionary . . . [T]he CUTPA statutes do not provide a method for determining punitive damages . . ." (Internal quotation marks prohibited.) Carrillo v. Goldberg, supra, 141 Conn.App. 312-13.
As mentioned above, the jury found both a CUTPA violation and that the plaintiffs suffered ascertainable loss by the violation. While it is clear that CUTPA punitive damages are not limited to common-law punitive damages, Ulbrich v. Groth, 310 Conn. 375, 448-52, 78 A.3d 76 (2013), there is no " precise formula to calculate punitive damage awards in CUTPA cases." Ostrowski & Havard, The Defense, Summer 2008, p. 8. Courts have recognized that " the purpose of CUTPA punitive damages is deterrence . . ." (Citation omitted.) Tingley Systems, Inc. v. Norse Systems, Inc., 49 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying Connecticut law). The " issue then of the defendant's financial circumstances is relevant and material to the deterrent non-common law punitive damages that the plaintiff would be required to prove under . . . CUTPA . . ." Lenz v. CNA Assurance Co., 42 Conn.Supp. 514, 515, 630 A.2d 1082 (1993). " As with the biblical widow's mite, the financial impact of an event on a party depends on financial circumstances. An amount that might deter [the] poor [biblical] widow could seem trifling and leave undeterred a corporate entity with large financial resources." Id. Further, courts must consider not only deterrence, but also notions of fairness. Fabri v. United Techs. Int'l, Inc., 387 F.3d 109, 125 (2d Cir. 2004). In contemplating fairness, courts consider the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct, the disparity between the harm or potential harm of the plaintiff and his punitive damages award, and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in similar cases. Id. Therefore, to calculate the appropriate amount of CUTPA punitive damages, the court must review all the factual circumstances of the CUTPA claim and damages, including mitigating evidence. Carmel Homes, Inc. v. Bednar, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-99-0079393-S, (October 1, 2001, Frazzini, J.). In considering these factors, the court finds the following. The court knows, as mentioned above, that the jury found at least one CUTPA violation and found that the plaintiffs sustained an ascertainable loss that flowed from that violation or those violations. However, as additionally mentioned above, the parties did not submit special interrogatories as to damages, so the court does not know how much of the $85,003.90 of compensatory damages arose from the ascertainable loss caused by the CUTPA violation(s).
Moreover, the court does not believe that the plaintiffs proved many of their more serious allegations of CUTPA violations. Many of the plaintiffs' more egregious CUTPA claims revolved around overbilling or double billing. As an example, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant double billed the plaintiffs by billing the insurance company for items the plaintiffs purchased. The evidence in support of this claim actually demonstrated that the defendant passed through, to the insurance company, bills for items or materials paid for by the plaintiffs so the plaintiffs could be reimbursed for such items or materials.
Similarly, the plaintiffs' claims for CUTPA violations arising from alleged improper billing for overhead and profit arose because the insurance company requested that the defendant break out, into separate line items all costs included in its estimate for the renovation, including profit and overhead. Further, the plaintiffs, working with the defendant, passed along to the insurance company for payment at least some of these billings for overhead and profit and received reimbursement for at least part of these billings. Conversely, the court found, in denying the defendant's directed verdict motion and post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to CUTPA, that there was evidence of some of the less serious CUTPA claims. These included the reuse of existing materials instead of the new materials promised and the claim that the defendant abandoned the project. Finally, mitigating evidence existed for the claim that the defendant abandoned the project. E-mail exchanges between the parties near the end of their business relationship displayed that the parties may well have shared the blame for the termination of the business relationship.
Under the holding of Lenz, supra, 42 Conn.Supp. at 515, the court must also consider the financial wherewithal of Lambert and Barr, LLC when deciding the amount of punitive damages necessary to deter it from future unfair trade practices.
In this regard, the court admitted, during the CUTPA hearings, as a sealed exhibit, the last three years of the defendant's federal tax returns. For purposes of a limited discussion of these returns in this memorandum, the court unseals these exhibits. These exhibits reveal ordinary business income for the defendant in the amounts of $42,630 for 2013, $25,537 for 2014, and an ordinary business loss of $72,442 for 2015. Neither the court's review of these returns nor cross examination by plaintiffs' counsel created any serious doubt about the veracity of these returns. For each of the years, the defendant had a relatively small difference between its gross sales and its costs of goods alone: $294,702 for 2013, $309,791 for 2014, and $220,535 for 2015. This small difference is, of course, further eroded, resulting in the ordinary business gains or loss referred to above, when one considers other expenses, including the salary of Jennifer Ouellette, rent, taxes and licenses, interest, depreciation, bank charges, insurance, legal and professional expenses, office expenses, utilities, dumping fees, and tools. The court also notes that Lambert and Bar, LLC is, literally, a " mom and pop" operation. Its owners are Mr. and Ms. Lambert, husband and wife; its regular office employee is the Lamberts' daughter, Jennifer Ouellette. In sum, given the financial wherewithal of Lambert and Barr, LLC, it would not take a large amount of punitive damages to punish it and to deter it from future CUTPA violations. For all of these reasons, and based upon the factors cited above, the court awards the plaintiff's punitive damages in the amount of $15,000 as a result of the CUTPA violations in this case.
Although the court denied, for the reasons set forth during the CUTPA hearing, the plaintiffs' motion to be given copies of those records, the court allowed plaintiffs' counsel the right to review these records for a sufficient period of time and allowed plaintiffs' counsel to cross examine the defendant's representative, Ms. Lambert, on the tax returns.
Upon the filing of this memorandum of decision, this exhibit is ordered to be re-sealed.
C
Fees for Expert Cissell's Deposition
In motion #201, the plaintiffs argue that a reasonable fee for the defendant's expert witness, Cissell's deposition should be the same as his normal hourly charge of $300 per hour. The defendant, in #205, objects. Cissell charged $350 for his deposition time, citing increased stress and the inability to get to other projects and increased preparation time. The court has considered Cissell's area of expertise, his education and experience, the nature and complexity of the issues on which he opined, the fees charged to his client for other work in this case, and the reasons Cissell posited for the change in fee structure for a deposition. Taking all of these factors into consideration, the court finds that $350 per hour was a reasonable amount for Cissell to have charged for his deposition testimony. Bernard v. Leon, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-02-0192329-S (March 3, 2006, Dooley, J.) (40 Conn.L.Rptr. 816, ).
D
Amended Bill of Costs
The plaintiffs submitted an amended bill of costs, #203. The defendant initially objected to three items on the bill of costs in filing #204. At the CUTPA hearing, the defendant limited its objection to only one item, the expert costs for the plaintiff's expert, David Sherwood. As a result, only the charge of $3,010 for Sherwood is at issue. Under Taylor v. King, supra, 121 Conn.App. 133-34, the plaintiffs cannot recover the expense of Sherwood's work as a taxable cost under CUTPA or under applicable statutes. Therefore, Sherwood's bill is not a taxable cost. The clerk shall tax the remaining costs, to which the defendant does not object, after the entry of judgment in this case.
SO ORDERED.