Summary
holding that a defendant sentenced to life in prison for a sexual battery committed when he was a juvenile was not entitled to relief pursuant to Graham where he was released on parole when he was 25 years old and was then reincarcerated, and where the Commission on Offender Review has assigned him a presumptive parole release date, as the defendant was afforded a meaningful opportunity to obtain release
Summary of this case from Wright v. StateOpinion
CASE NO. 1D16–5578
05-31-2017
Jack Thomas Currie, pro se, Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Jack Thomas Currie, pro se, Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant has filed a rule 3.800(a) motion in which he argues that because he was a juvenile when he committed the offense of sexual battery with a firearm and received a life sentence with the possibility of parole, he is entitled to be resentenced pursuant to Atwell v. State , 197 So.3d 1040 (Fla. 2016), and Henry v. State , 175 So.3d 675 (Fla. 2015). We disagree. Appellant was afforded a meaningful opportunity to obtain release and, in fact, was released on parole when he was 25 years old. He then violated parole and was reincarcerated. The Florida Commission on Offender Review has assigned him a presumptive parole release date, and he continues to be considered for release on parole. We therefore conclude he is not entitled to be resentenced because he has not received the functional equivalent of a life sentence. He has already been released once, and he has the potential to be released again. Thomas v. State , 78 So.3d 644, 646 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (discussing that while some sentences "may become the functional equivalent of a life sentence, we do not believe that situation has occurred in the instant case").
AFFIRMED.
WOLF, RAY, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.