Opinion
No. CV 03 0091852S
January 27, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This motion to dismiss presents the issue of whether the day of recording a mechanics lien is excluded when calculating the one-year limitation period within which to commence an action to foreclose the lien. The first count of the complaint alleges that the plaintiffs recorded a mechanics lien against the property of the defendant, Samos, LLC, on October 30, 2002. It seeks a foreclosure of that lien. This action was commenced by service of process on October 31, 2003. The defendants have moved to dismiss the first count for lack of jurisdiction.
C.G.S. Section 49-39 provides in relevant part that "[a] mechanics lien shall not continue in force for a longer than one year after the lien has been perfected, unless the party claiming the lien commences an action to foreclose it . . . within one year from the date the lien was recorded." (Emphasis added). The defendants argue that Section 49-39 should be read so that calculation of the one-year limitation period would have given the plaintiff until midnight on October 29, 2003 to commence a foreclosure of the mechanics lien. The plaintiff counters that such a reading of the statute would deprive the plaintiff of the full one-year period to commence an action. I agree.
Section 49-39 is clear and unambiguous that a mechanics lien may remain in effect for as long as one year after it has been perfected. There can be no doubt that the one-year period begins to run the day following the day on which the lien is perfected. See, for example, Commissioner of Transportation v. Kahn, 262 Conn. 257, 264 (2003) in which the Supreme Court interpreted the language ". . . within six months after the same has been so filed . . ." as used in C.G.S. Section 13a-76 to mean that the six-month limitation period began to run on the day after the notice was filed. See, also First Federal Savings Loan Assn. of Rochester v. Pellechia, 37 Conn. App. 423, 425 (1995) where the Appellate Court consulted Black's Law Dictionary to help determine that the meaning of the word "after" in C.G.S. Section 49-14(a) limiting the filing of a motion for deficiency judgment to ". . . within thirty days after the time limited for redemption has expired . . ." was the day following the one on which the redemption period expired.
It is interesting that Section 49-39 goes on to use the word "from" in providing that an action to foreclose the lien must be commenced ". . . within one year from the date the lien was recorded." If it had used the word "after" instead of "from" the meaning would have been clearer. But, to interpret "from" and "after" to have different meanings in this context would create an absurd result. Although the statute permits a mechanics lien to remain in effect for a full year after perfection, the defendants urge the court to cut off the right of foreclosure one day before the end of that full year by interpreting "from" to include the day of perfection in the one-year limitation period. Following this reasoning, the plaintiff would have no right to foreclose the lien on the last day of its existence. This is absurd.
In order to determine the date the one-year limitation period commenced, the court is guided by "[t]he general rule . . . that where a period of time is calculated from a particular date or event, the day of such date or event is excluded from the calculation." Commissioner of Transportation v. Kahn, 262 Conn. 257, 264 (2003) (Citations omitted; emphasis added). In DeTeves v. DeTeves, 202 Conn. 292 (1987) the Supreme Court interpreted Section 3097(a) of the Practice Book which states that the trial judge may not extend the appeal period ". . . more than twenty days from the expiration of the original appeal period." (Emphasis added.) The original appeal period had expired on June 18, 1985. The Supreme Court stated that the language of Section 3097(a) was clear and unambiguous and that the trial court did not have power to grain a motion extending the appeal period beyond July 8, 1985. Id., 297. July 8 is 20 days "from" June 18, without including June 18.
See, Blackman v. Nearing, 43 Conn. 56 (1875), for a colorful early discussion of the rule, and the futility of trying to distinguish cases which have interpreted the different, but very similar, language used in various statutes and instruments.
The same reasoning must be applied to the situation in this case. October 31, 2003 is one year "from" October 30, 2002, the date that the lien was filed. This action was commenced on October 31, 2003. Therefore, the action was commenced in a timely fashion and the motion to dismiss must be denied.
BY THE COURT,
PICKARD, JUDGE.