Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-2766; SECTION "K"(2)
December 19, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
The plaintiff, Randall Cunningham, brings before this Court a Rule 59 Motion to Amend the Judgment or, Alternatively, for a New Trial. The plaintiff, Randall Cunningham, a seaman, was allegedly injured while working on defendant's rig on or about November 12, 2000 and on or about November 25, 2000. In the first incident, the plaintiff claimed that he injured himself when a heavy bottle fell on his shoulder. In the second incident, the plaintiff claimed to have injured himself or aggravated the first injury by "pulling slips" when he was aboard the rig. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's negligence and the unseaworthy conditions on the vessel were the causes of his injuries. Plaintiff also claimed maintenance and cure. The defendant, Noble Drilling, maintained that it was not negligent and that the vessel was not unseaworthy. Additionally, defendant alleged that Mr. Cunningham was not aboard the ship on the date of the first accident.
Rule 59, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, entitled, New Trials; Amendment of Judgments, states in pertinent part; "(a) Grounds. A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States . . . ."
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff $150,000 in actual damages, but found the plaintiff, Mr. Cunningham, 75% at fault. The jury awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in past lost income and did not make an award for maintenance. In advance of trial, the parties stipulated that Noble had paid $8,119.56 in maintenance and $9,120.32 in supplemental wages and/or advances. (Rec. Doc. # 88).
The plaintiff now seeks relief from the jury verdict for the following reasons:
1. The amount awarded for past medical expenses was not the amount put into evidence;
2. The amount awarded for past wage loss was not the amount put into evidence and there was no contradictory evidence as to the amount;
3. The amount awarded for future wage loss/impairment of earning capacity was not the amount put into evidence, and there was no contradictory evidence as to the amount;
4. The finding of no past cure, combined with an award of past medical is incongruous as the amount should have been awarded as cure since the jury found that Plaintiff was disabled while in the defendant's service;
5. The finding of an award for past wage loss and of disability while in defendant's service dictates a finding for past maintenance; and
6. The finding of 75% comparative fault on plaintiff's part is unsupported by the record of the proceedings.
A. Standard of Review on a Rule 59 Motion to Amend Judgment or For a New Trial
In Smith v. Transworld Drilling Comp., 773 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1985) Judge Rubin instructed that
Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure confirms the trial court's historic power to grant a new trial based on its appraisal of the fairness of the trial and the reliability of the jury's verdict. The rule does not specify what grounds are necessary to support such a decision but states only that the action may be taken "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." A new trial may be granted, for example, if the district court finds the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course.
Id. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted); See generally, Wright, Miller Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, § 2805 at 54 (1995). As such, "[c]ourts do not grant new trials unless it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error has crept into the record or that substantial justice has not been done, and the burden of showing harmful error rests on the party seeking the new trial." Wright, Miller Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, § 2803 at 46-47 (1995). Rule 59(a) should not become a knee-jerk reaction or "the avenue to which losing parties run after trial." Sisk, et al v. Sears, Roebuck, et al, 1996 WL 736967 (E.D.La. 1996). The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Pryor v. Trane Company, 138 F.3d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1998).
B. Plaintiff's Objections
I. Past Medical Expenses:
The plaintiff argues that during trial it established past medical expenses of $25,979.55 and requests that the Court adjust the damage award of $25,000.00 upward because the defendant did not present evidence upon which to reduce the amount by $979.55. Mr. Cunningham's argument is not completely accurate. The Court instructed the jury that the plaintiff had a duty to mitigate damages. (Jury Charges, p. 18). Additionally, Noble presented the testimony of Dr. Bruce McCarthy, who testified that the plaintiff could have mitigated the expense of his second surgery. The Court also heard the testimony of John Onstat, who stated that Diagnostic Management received at 30-50% discount from plaintiff's health care providers. The jury may have taken into account this testimony and adjusted the damage amount accordingly. Therefore, the Court finds that the jury's award of $25,000.00 was not manifestly unfair or against the weight of the evidence.
2. Past loss of Income
The jury awarded Mr. Cunningham, $25,000.00 in past loss of income. Mr. Cunningham argues that this award was not supported by the evidence because Mr. Cunningham's expert testified that Mr. Cunningham suffered $46,000.00 of past lost income. However, Noble presented evidence that Mr. Cunningham was able to work after the injury occurred — Mr. Cunningham worked for Greentree Apartments as a painter. Additionally, Noble presented evidence that both Dr. Line and Dr. Beam released Mr. Cunningham in July 2001 to return to medium type employment. In light of this evidence, the Court finds that the jury award was reasonable and not against the weight of the evidence.
3. Future loss of Income
The jury awarded Mr. Cunningham $25,000.00 in future wage loss. Mr. Cunningham contests this award and argues that the amount was arbitrary and does not reflect the evidence he presented at trial showing his impairment was a minimum of $312,299.00. Noble presented evidence that Mr. Cunningham could have returned to various types of employment including working for Taco Bell as a manager, working as a painter, or he could have returned to his work offshore. Dr. Line testified:
Q. Now by July 11 of 2001, or roughly three months post surgery, you were of the opinion that Mr. Cunningham could return to medium type employment.
A. Yes.
* * *
Q. So you anticipated on July 11th, that after two months, say by September 11th, Cunningham could return to full, unrestricted duty [offshore]?
A. Yes.
The Court finds that this the jury award of $25,000.00 was not against the weight of the evidence. The jury may have concluded that because of Mr. Cunningham's past work experience and Dr. Line's testimony that he could return unrestricted to offshore work by September 11th, that his future capacity to earn a living was not significantly diminished.
4. Maintenance and Cure
Mr. Cunningham contends that the jury's award of $25,000.00 should be characterized as "cure" and not "past medical expenses" because he was injured while performing services for Noble. Because cure cannot be reduced by the plaintiff's percentage of fault, Mr. Cunningham argues that the judgment should be amended to reflect the fact that the award of $25,000.00 is "cure" and should not have been reduced by the percentage of Mr. Cunningham's fault. Mr. Cunningham also argues that he was entitled to "cure" until he reached maximum medical cure, and that the jury interrogatories were incorrect because they did not make a finding of when Mr. Cunningham reached maximum medical cure.
Maintenance and cure is a seaman's right under general maritime law to receive a "per diem living allowance for food and lodging [maintenance] and . . . payment for medical, therapeutic and hospital expenses [cure]."Bertram v. Freeport McMoran, Inc., 35 F.3d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1994). A shipowner must pay maintenance and cure to any seaman who "becomes ill or suffers an injury while in the service of a vessel," regardless of whether either party was negligent. Id. The right to maintenance and cure terminates only when "maximum cure has been obtained." Id. The obligation to pay maintenance and cure is independent of tort law, and the shipowner's duty to pay is not affected by the injured seaman's own negligence. Boudreaux v. U.S., 280 F.3d 461, 468 (5th Cir. 2002). A seaman may recover for both cure and medical expenses. See id. However, a cure award cannot duplicate tort damages, such as an award for past medical expenses. See Brister v. A.W.I., Inc., 946 F.2d 350, 361 (5th Cir. 1991).
Mr. Cunningham's argument that his award for past medicals should be characterized as cure is without merit. His claim for cure and past medicals are separate and independent claims. Boudreaux, 280 F.3d at 468. Cure represents the vessel owners contractual obligation, while past medical expenses are damages under the Jones Act. Id. Furthermore, a finding of maximum medical cure does not preclude an award of medical expenses under the Jones Act segment of Mr. Cunningham's claim. Hagerty v. L L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986). In this case, the jury found that Mr. Cunningham had reached maximum medical cure, and presumably based their finding on the testimony of Dr. Line suggesting that Mr. Cunningham had reached maximum medical cure and could return to unrestricted offshore duty on or about September 11, 2001. Once Mr. Cunningham reached maximum medical cure, he was no longer entitled to cure from the defendant; however, he still had a claims for past-medical expenses which accrued after the point he reached maximum medical cure. The $25,000.00 award reflects the medical expenses the jury found Mr. Cunningham was entitled to recoup. This award is not unreasonable or against the weight of the evidence because it is reasonable for the jury to have found that Mr. Cunningham was entitled to medical expenses under the Jones Act which were beyond what Noble paid for "past maintenance and cure."
5. Comparative Fault
Mr. Cunningham argues that the jury had no rational basis for finding that Mr. Cunningham was at fault in causing or contributing to his injuries in the November 25, 2002 accident. The Court holds that the jury finding that Mr. Cunningham was negligent is also not against the weight of the evidence. Mr. Cunningham testified that he was aware of his shoulder pain, and yet he worked while he was in pain. Additionally, Mr. Cunningham testified that pulling slips with two people is unsafe. A reasonable jury could have concluded, based upon this evidence, that Mr. Cunningham was negligent in pulling the slips with an injured shoulder, and negligent in not asking for an additional person to help pull the slips.
C. Conclusion
The Court finds that Mr. Cunningham has not presented sufficient grounds for a new trial or an amendment to the judgment. As this Court noted in Morris v. Lee, Civ. A. No. 98-1656, 2001 WL 30199, *2 (E.D.La. Jan. 10, 2001), "although a judge's power to set aside verdicts is supported by clear precedent at common law, it must be balanced with `a decent respect for the collective wisdom of the jury, and for the function entrusted in our system.'" This Court may not grant a new trial simply because the court's assessment of the facts differs from the jury's. Id. The test for granting a new trial is that the movant must show that the verdict was "against the great weight of the evidence" and this standard restricts the Court's power to take a jury's verdict lightly when there is ample evidence to support its findings. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Cunningham's Rule 59 motion is DENIED.