Opinion
CIVIL NO: 1:20-CV-00572
05-14-2020
ABRAHAM CRUZ, Plaintiff v. FEDERAL I.C.M. MANHATTAN, N.Y., et al., Defendants
() REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff, Abraham Cruz, began this action by filing a complaint along with an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion for the appointment of counsel. Although Cruz is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution Houtzdale, he names as defendants individuals from an institution in Manhattan, New York, and his claims stem from events at that institution.
SCI-Houtzdale is located within Clearfield County, which is in the Western District of Pennsylvania. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 118(c) (listing Clearfield County as within the Western District of Pennsylvania).
In the caption of his complaint, Cruz refers to this institution as "Federal at I.C.M. Manhattan, N.Y." Doc. 1 at 1. And in the body of his complaint, he lists the defendants as "I.C.M. Manhattan," and the Director of, a psychiatrist at, and an inmate at "I.C. Metro Manhattan." Doc. 1 at 2, 4.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which defines the proper venue for this action, provides that a civil action may be brought in:
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), which sets forth venue for an action where a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States, provides that venue is also proper where, among other locations, the plaintiff resides. That provision, however, applies only to actions against federal officers and employees sued in their official capacities; it does not apply to a Bivens action seeking monetary compensation from federal officials or employees in their individual capacities. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 542 (1980) (construing § 1391(e) as providing "nationwide venue for the convenience of individual plaintiffs in actions which are nominally against an individual officer but are in reality against the Government," and concluding that "[a] suit for money damages which must be paid out of the pocket of the private individual who happens to be—or formerly was—employed by the Federal Government plainly is not one 'essentially against the United States,' and thus is not encompassed by the venue provisions of § 1391(e)"); Guess v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 4:CV-16-385, 2016 WL 1242363, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2016) (concluding in a case where the plaintiff was seeking compensatory and punitive damages that the plaintiff cannot "employ § 1391(e) to establish venue in this district against the individual out of state federal officials named as Defendants in this matter"). Here, because Cruz seeks monetary compensation, we construe his claims against the federal officials as Bivens claims against them in their individual capacities. Therefore, §1391(e) does not apply. But even if it applied and even if we assume for the sake of argument that Cruz resides at SCI-Houtzdale, where he is presently incarcerated, SCI-Houtzdale, as noted above, is in the Western District of Pennsylvania, not in this district. Thus, venue still would not be proper in this district.
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
Here, Cruz provides a Manhattan, New York address for the defendants, and there are no allegations in the complaint to suggest that any of the defendants reside in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. And, as mentioned above, the events or omissions giving rise to Cruz's claims appear to have occurred in Manhattan, New York. Therefore, Cruz's claims fall within the venue of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and the claims are not properly brought in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which has no connection to either the claims or the parties.
There is also nothing in the complaint that suggests that this district would have personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants. --------
"While improper venue may be waived, judges in this Circuit have repeatedly concluded that venue considerations may be raised sua sponte." Guess, 2016 WL 1242363, at *2 (citing cases). We are permitted to raise the issue of an apparent lack of venue sua sponte, provided the court gives a plaintiff adequate notice of its concerns and an opportunity to be heard on the issue. Guyton v. Lappin, No. 3:11-CV-1390, 2011 WL 7430063, at *4 (M.D. Pa. 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 511571, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2012). Through the filing of this Report, we are providing notice to Cruz that these claims and defendants are not properly brought in this district. See Guyton, 2011 WL 7430063, at *4 ("Through the filing of this report and recommendation we are by providing such notice to the plaintiff in this case that some of these defendants and claims are not properly brought in this district."); Bell v. Blue Hen Spring Works Inc., No. 1:15-CV-01753, 2016 WL 2587126, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2016) (stating that "this Report and Recommendation functions as sufficient notice to the Plaintiff that the Court is considering sua sponte transfer of this action for improper venue, as the claims and Defendants are not properly brought in this judicial district"), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 2347188, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 4, 2016).
When a case has been brought against defendants in the wrong venue, the court may either dismiss that action "or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406(a). Here, since the complaint reveals that venue does not lie in this district, but it does lie in the Southern District of New York, the Court should enter an order transferring this case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Doing so will ensure that venue is proper and operate to protect Cruz's rights. In other words, transferring this case to the Southern District of New York would be in the interest of justice.
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the court transfer this case to the Southern District of New York. It is further recommended that Cruz's pending motion to proceed in forma pauperis and his motion for the appointment of counsel be deferred to the transferee court.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 14th day of May, 2020.
S/Susan E . Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
Chief United States Magistrate Judge