Opinion
CIVIL 3:21-cv-283
06-03-2024
JOSE ENRIQUEZ CRUZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF POTTSVILLE, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
This case initially presented a series of very serious allegations of police misconduct but now involves a single narrow and clearly defined question: whether an officer who perceives himself as being under mortal threat, and urges others to intervene, can be held liable if the force the other officers used is excessive. This claim involves an incident which ended in City of Pottsville police officers shooting the plaintiff, Jose Enriquez Cruz. Following the shooting, Cruz was arrested and pled guilty to reckless endangerment and resisting arrest, among other drug and weapons charges. Cruz then sued the City of Pottsville, Pottsville Police Department, and the officers who shot him, as well as a Pennsylvania State Trooper who responded to the incident, Trooper Rooney, alleging various constitutional violations and state law tort claims associated with his arrest. The Court dismissed the institutional defendants, and the plaintiff has settled his claims against the City of Pottsville police officers who shot him. Thus, the only remaining claims are those lodged against Trooper Rooney, an officer who did not discharge his firearm but perceived Cruz as pointing his weapon at him and yelled “shoot, shoot, he's pointing it at me.” (Doc. 93, ⁋⁋ 35-37). The remaining claims against Trooper Rooney are Fourth Amendment false arrest and excessive force claims as well as Pennsylvania state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, and negligence. (Doc. 41).
Trooper Rooney is now Corporal Rooney, but for consistency and clarity purposes we refer to him as Trooper Rooney throughout.
Trooper Rooney argues that Cruz is barred from asserting any false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claim because he pled guilty to the charges of reckless endangerment and resisting arrest, which necessarily involved him pointing a gun at officers. Alternately, he argues that the undisputed facts show no constitutional violation on his part and that he is immune from liability. Given the narrow factual scenario before us, and the high degree of specificity with which we are to view claims which seek to hold government official liable for constitutional violations, in our view, Trooper Rooney is shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity since he was not on notice, at the time he instructed the officers to shoot Cruz, that his actions would violate the constitution. Accordingly, we recommend the Court grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment on Cruz's federal claims against this defendant. Further, we note that many of Cruz's remaining stat claims against Trooper Rooney are highly problematic on the undisputed facts before us. Moreover, the dismissal of the federal claims in this case suggests that we should not continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these problematic state law claims.
I. Factual Background
On March 8, 2019, City of Pottsville police responded to a 911 call reporting that a Hispanic male carrying a backpack was on the front porch of a residence shooting a gun. (Doc. 93, ⁋⁋ 1-10). City of Pottsville police officers Webber, Messner, and Rainis responded, along with Pennsylvania State Troopers Pahira and Rooney. (Id., ⁋⁋ 11-12). When officers arrived at the address, body cam footageshows they encountered the plaintiff, Cruz, a Hispanic male, on the front porch of the residence carrying a backpack. (Id., ⁋⁋ 16-18). Cruz was ordered to put his hands up and he did not comply, instead walking away from police officers, repeatedly ignoring their commands. (Id., ⁋⁋ 19-26). Cruz alleges that he had not committed a crime, as he was just sitting on the porch waiting for an Uber, and that he feared for his life upon seeing officers approaching him with guns drawn. (Doc. 107, ⁋⁋ 1-9).
Unless otherwise noted, our review of the exhibits, including the 911 call and body cam footage, confirms the statements we cite in the defendant's statement of facts.
Cruz entered a yard across the street and continued to ignore commands from officers to raise his hands. (Doc. 93, ⁋⁋ 25-26). Though it is unclear from the video footage, all parties agree that after Cruz entered the yard, he pulled out a gun and pointed it to his own head. (Doc. 93, ⁋⁋ 28, 30; Doc. 107, ⁋⁋ 12-14). According to Cruz, he pulled the trigger at his own head twice, but the gun did not go off. (Doc. 107, ⁋⁋ 15-17). Officer Rainis then deployed his taser, at which point Cruz dropped to the ground and appeared to be lying face down. (Id., ⁋ 27; Doc. 93-4, at 2:26-2:31). Cruz states that he was tased for 23 seconds and after gaining control back of his upper body, he grabbed the gun next to him and again put it to his head and tried to pull the trigger a couple of times, but it did not work. (Doc. 107, ⁋⁋ 20-21). He then cocked the gun and the bullet fell out and he locked the slide back so it could not fire, giving up his suicide attempt. (Id., ⁋⁋ 22-23). According to the defendants Cruz refused orders to drop the gun and continued to move on the ground, at which point Trooper Rooney deployed his taser. (Doc. 93, ⁋⁋ 31-34). Indeed, the video footage seems to show Cruz's arm moving prior to the second taser being deployed, and officers repeatedly ordering him to drop the gun, although it is impossible from any view to see what is in his hand or where he is pointing it. (Doc. 93-4, 2:30-2:43). Nonetheless Cruz acknowledges possessing a firearm as he lay prone.
Here, the parties' accounts diverge, and the video evidence does not definitively confirm the necessary details. According to the defendants, the circuits in Trooper Rooney's taser did not close, meaning Cruz would have felt no physical effect from the second taser. (Doc. 93, ⁋⁋ 40-50). Thus, according to the defendant, Cruz still had control of his weapon when Trooper Rooney saw Cruz move his firearm towards him in a sweeping motion, at which point Trooper Rooney dropped to the ground and yelled “shoot, shoot, he's pointing it at me.” (Id., ⁋⁋ 35-37). City of Pottsville police officers then shot Cruz. (Id., ⁋ 38).
Cruz's description of the shooting differs. He argues that he did, in fact, feel the effects of Trooper Rooney's taser and lost full control of his entire body, was convulsing on the ground, unarmed, nonviolent, and completely incapacitated when he heard Trooper Rooney tell officers to shoot him. (Doc. 107, ⁋⁋ 25-36). He also alleges that he heard officers yelling “slide locked back” before he was shot. (Doc. 107, ⁋ 31).
The video footage does not bear out the discrepancies in the factual allegations. Although immediately preceding the Trooper Rooney shouting that Cruz was pointing the gun at him, an officer yells, “the slide's back” (Doc. 94-3, at 3:45), no view from any of the three body cam videos shows clearly what Cruz was doing with his arms at the time he was shot, nor is the gun clearly visible in the video. All that is clear is that Cruz fell to the ground after Officer Rainis deployed the first taser and remained on the ground throughout the rest of the encounter. (Doc. 94-4, 2:26-3:00). But the video also shows officers repeatedly commanding Cruz to drop his gun and shows Trooper Rooney dropping to the ground and yelling, “shoot, shoot, he's pointing it at me.” (Doc. 94-3, at 3:30-4:00). Thus, regardless of what Cruz's subjective motivations and intent may have been, the uncontested evidence plainly shows that in the moment Trooper Rooney perceived Cruz to be pointing a gun at him, and the trooper called out to other officers.
Cruz was shot in his stomach and from behind and was helicoptered to the hospital where he underwent surgery and survived. (Doc. 107, ⁋⁋ 37-42). He states that he still has a bullet in his chest and fragments in his abdomen and pelvis and that he has not fully recovered mentally or physically from the incident. (Id., ⁋⁋ 43-44). Following his release from the hospital, Cruz was arrested and ultimately pled guilty to twelve counts charged in a criminal information, including reckless endangerment, resisting arrest, and firearms and drug charges. (Doc. 93, ⁋ 56-59). The facts underlying the criminal information to which Cruz pled guilty included that he pointed a Colt Semi-Automatic Pistol and attempted to discharge the firearm in the direction of the officers. (Id.) In the course of his guilty plea Cruz acknowledged these essential facts.
Cruz then initiated this case against the City of Pottsville, Pottsville Police Department, the Pottsville police officers who responded (collectively “the Pottsville defendants”) as well as Pennsylvania State Trooper Rooney. (Doc. 1). His original complaint alleged that the defendants violated his Fourth amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure, his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, and his Eight Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act. (Id.) The Court dismissed all claims against the City of Pottsville and the Pottsville Police Department and dismissed all claims against the other defendants except his Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure and excessive force claims and state law claims against Defendants Rooney, Messer, and Webber. (Doc. 41). Cruz subsequently settled with the Pottsville defendants, effectively dismissing all claims against them. (Doc. 91). Following a period of discovery, the remaining defendant, Trooper Rooney, has now moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 92). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. (Docs. 93, 94, 106, 107). For the reasons that follow, we recommend the defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted.
Cruz was granted leave to amend his ADA and Monell claims as well as his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief and subsequently filed an amended complaint. Since these claims related only to the Pottsville defendants, who have settled, they are not addressed in this R&R.
II. Discussion
A. Motion for Summary Judgment - Standard of Review
Defendant Rooney has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), and for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.” Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id., at 248-49.
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claims, “the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006), accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id., at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must “consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
Moreover, a party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that such factual disputes exist. Further, “only evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F.Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing any supporting evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 Fed.Appx. 896, 899 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denial.” Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark New Jersey v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is also not sufficient.” Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, “a party resisting a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Finally, it is emphatically not the province of the court to weigh evidence or assess credibility when passing upon a motion for summary judgment. Rather, in adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true. Id. Additionally, the court is not to decide whether the evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit has instructed that:
To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant. In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla” threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the believability and weight of the evidence.Id. In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); NAACP v. North Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011).
B. The Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment False Arrest, False Imprisonment and Malicious Prosecution Claims Fail Because Officers Had Probable Cause to Arrest Him.
At the outset we note that Cruz's Fourth Amendment allegations of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution are fatally flawed in a fundamental way: given the undisputed facts before us the responding officers had probable cause to arrest him and he was ultimately convicted on his guilty plea of the crimes for which he was arrested. Although the issue of probable cause can be a fact-bound determination, given the benefit of our perspective at this stage of the litigation, which requires us to view the record as a whole in determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, in our view, the undisputed facts before us demonstrate that no jury could find that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Cruz. The plaintiff alleges that the officers involved in his arrest, including the remaining defendant Trooper Rooney, falsely arrested him without probable cause. This federal constitutional claim implicates Cruz's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides:
In ruling on the Motions to Dismiss, the Court explained that the plaintiff's “Count I for unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment against Defendants Rooney, Messer, and Webber” went forward. (Doc. 41, at 4). Since it has been undisputed since the inception of the litigation that Cruz pled guilty to the crimes for which he was arrested, in our view, the only remaining Fourth Amendment claims are Cruz's false arrest and false imprisonment claims, which are “generally analyzed together,” Brockington v. City of Phila., 354 F.Supp.2d 563, 570 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 2005), and both implicate a lack of probable cause. Nonetheless, to the extent that the plaintiff still asserts a malicious prosecution claim against Trooper Rooney, his conviction bars him from asserting this claim since “‘our precedents are clear that § 1983 plaintiffs alleging arrest and prosecution absent probable cause may bring malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth Amendment, but are entitled to relief only if they are innocent of the crime for which they were prosecuted.” Washington v. Hanshaw, 552 Fed.Appx. 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2000)). Therefore, “a plaintiff claiming malicious prosecution must prove actual innocence as an element of his prima facie case.” Steele v. City of Erie, 113 Fed.Appx. 456, 459 (3d Cir. 2004).
The defendant argues that, since Trooper Rooney was not the arresting officer, liability under Section 1983 cannot attach because he lacks personal involvement. We note that the fact that an officer did not actually effectuate the arrest is not automatically dispositive as, “[i]n some circumstances, liability can attach to non-arresting officers, but the inquiry still turns on probable cause for the arrest itself.” Gardner v. Evans, 920 F.3d 1038, 1064 (6th Cir. 2019); see also Cooper v. City of Chester, No. CIV.A. 11-5381, 2013 WL 925067, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2013) (quoting Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 748 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[A] police officer can be liable for a false arrest that occurs outside of his presence if he had reason to know' that such a false arrest was likely to occur). Accordingly, our analysis focuses on whether probable cause existed.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and now Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest without probable cause is a constitutional violation that may be redressed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Walmsley v. Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Patzig v. O'Neill, 577 F.2d841, 848 (3d Cir. 1978)). However, in order to make out a false arrest claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that police lacked probable cause to arrest. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995). Thus, proof that probable cause was lacking is essential to any § 1983 claim arising out of the arrest or detention of an individual. For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, probable cause to arrest exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed by the person being arrested.” U.S. v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). An arrest by a police officer without a warrant “is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). In conducting an inquiry into whether probable cause to arrest existed, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances presented, and “must assess the knowledge and information which the officers possessed at the time of arrest, coupled with the factual occurrences immediately precipitating the arrest.” United States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 2002).
Although “[t]he probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification,” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003), all interpretations of probable cause require “a belief of guilt that is reasonable as opposed to certain.” Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971)). Probable cause “does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.” Wright, 409 F.3d at 602 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972)). Accordingly, the evidentiary standard for probable cause is significantly lower than that required for conviction. Id. (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979)); see also Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that probable cause requires only a “fair probability” that a person committed the relevant crime). Because an arrest is made with probable cause if at the moment it was made the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge “were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the suspect] had committed or was committing an offense,” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964), the constitutional validity of an arrest does not turn on whether the suspect actually committed any crime, Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2003).
Thus, “[t]he determination that probable cause exists is fundamentally a factual analysis that must be performed by officers at the scene. It is the function of the court to determine whether the objective facts available to the officers at the time of arrest were sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that an offense was being committed.” United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1206 (3d Cir. 1984). Although officers on the scene may draw inferences and make deductions that might elude an untrained person, United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981), “an officer's inferences and deductions can only justify a warrantless arrest if the government satisfies its burden of establishing the probable cause necessary to support the arrest,” Myers, 308 F.3d at 255. While “[g]enerally, the existence of probable cause is a factual issue. Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 1984)[,] [s]ummary judgment can be granted in an appropriate case on probable cause, id. at 192.” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1995). One such case, where summary judgment may be appropriate, is when the alleged infraction is captured on videotape. When making this probable cause assessment in light of events that are captured on videotape, we must view the facts in the light depicted by the videotape, and we may not indulge in the “visible faction” of ignoring what the video plainly shows. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (reversing court of appeals ruling with respect to application of qualified immunity in an excessive force case, noting that the court of appeals erred by accepting a version of facts that was shown to be a “visible fiction” and admonishing that the lower court “should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.”); Tindell v. Beard, 351 Fed.Appx. 591 (3d Cir. 2009).
Here, we find such facts exist. Even given the fact-bound nature of this Fourth Amendment claim, the undisputed evidence would preclude a jury from finding the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Cruz in this case, where a 911 call recording confirms that police received a report of a Hispanic male with a backpack on the porch of a residence firing a gun, (Doc. 93-1), and video evidence shows that officers arrived to find Cruz, a Hispanic male with a backpack, on the porch with a gun, (Doc. 93, ⁋⁋ 16-18). Then officers endeavored to instruct him to drop the weapon several times, which he refused to do (Id., ⁋⁋ 19-26), then tased him twice, (Id., ⁋⁋ 27, 31-34) then perceived him as pointing a gun at him, something he has pled guilty to doing. (Doc. 94-3, at 3:30-4:00). On the facts available to the officers on the scene at the time, as demonstrated by the video evidence, probable cause clearly existed for Cruz's arrest since it is undisputed that he was wielding a gun and refused to comply with officers' commands. Thus, the objective facts available to the officers at the time of arrest were sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that an offense was being committed. Glasser at 1206. Moreover, Cruz's guilty plea is powerfully confirmatory evidence of these facts of these facts since in the course of this plea Cruz was required to acknowledge under oath that he had committed these crimes. Accordingly, we recommend the Court grant summary judgment as to the plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims.
Because we find probable cause existed, we need not reach the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims are barred by his conviction under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). The Court found it premature to bar these claims under Heck at the motion to dismiss stage noting that “‘claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are not the type of claims contemplated by the Court in Heck which necessarily implicate the validity of a conviction or sentence.' That is because “[i]t is at least conceivable that arresting officers could lack probable cause to arrest and detain even if the evidence later supports conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.' Burke v. Twp. of Cheltenham, 742 F.Supp.2d 660, 669 (E.D. Pa. 2010).” (Doc. 40, at 17). However, since we find probable cause existed, we need not extend the Heck inquiry further at this stage.
C. Defendant Officer Rooney Is Entitled to Qualified Immunity.
The ultimate merits of Cruz's excessive force claim as it relates to the shots fired by Pottsville police are less self-evident because-notwithstanding his guilty plea-the video evidence does not clearly show Cruz pointing a gun at the officers. However, it is entirely clear that Trooper Rooney perceived an immediate and potentially lethal threat when he told officers Cruz was pointing a gun at him and to shoot. Importantly, however, the only remaining defendant in this case, Trooper Rooney, did not fire his gun. Instead, the injures sustained by Cruz were the result of the use of force by other officers who are no longer parties to this litigation. Thus, in the current posture of this case we address a much narrower question; namely, whether, even if the force used by the officers who shot Cruz, who are no longer included in this litigation, was arguably excessive, it was clearly established to Trooper Rooney that calling for the officers to shoot a suspect who he perceived as pointing a gun at him would violate Cruz's constitutional rights. Given the legal lens we apply to qualified immunity claims, we find it was not clearly established that Trooper Rooney's warning to the other officers clearly violated Cruz's rights, and as such recommend the Court find Trooper Rooney is entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim.
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The doctrine protects public officials “from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.” Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 599 (3d Cir. 2005).
In accordance with this doctrine, government officials will be immune from suit in their individual capacities unless, “taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury . . . the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right” and “the right was clearly established” at the time of the objectionable conduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Courts may exercise their discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in consideration of the circumstances presented by the particular case at hand. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 (2009). “The relevant dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. This inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case.” Id. at 201. Accordingly, “to decide whether a right was clearly established, a court must consider the state of the existing law at the time of the alleged violation and the circumstances confronting the officer to determine whether a reasonable state actor could have believed his conduct was lawful.” Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010).
The court is no longer required to conduct these two inquiries sequentially, Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 820, and it may forego difficult constitutional issues and confer qualified immunity to a defendant if it is apparent that the defendant did not violate rights that were clearly established at the time the defendant acted. Id. Where a court elects to address the alleged constitutional violations, however, the court's analysis of the merits for purposes of summary judgment merges with analysis of the deprivation of federal rights for purposes of qualified immunity. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 299-300 (3d Cir.2000); Crouse, 668 F.Supp.2d at 671; see also Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir.1996) (“[C]rucial to the resolution of [the] assertion of qualified immunity is a careful examination of the record ... to establish ... a detailed factual description of the actions of each individual defendant (viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff).”). Because qualified immunity entails a consideration of whether the law was clearly established at the time of a defendant's conduct, this defense, which focuses on the state of the law, presents a question of law for the court, and one which can often be resolved on summary judgment. See Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243 (3d Cir.2010).
Having found that no issue of material fact exists as to whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Cruz, our inquiry ends on the first prong, as the officers' conduct with regard to Cruz's arrest was not unconstitutional. However, having found that Cruz's excessive force claim is fact-bound in nature, and the evidence, such as police body cam footage, does not undisputedly answer the question of whether Pottsville Police used excessive force in shooting Cruz, we analyze the issue of qualified immunity as to this claim starting from the second prong, whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. On this score, the Third Circuit has instructed:
“[A] defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014). “In other words, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question' confronted by the official ‘beyond debate.' ” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). That way the “immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam) (quoting White v. Pauley, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam)). To determine whether a right is clearly established, we first state the right at the appropriate level of generality, and then determine whether the right was clearly established at the time the events occurred.
When framing the constitutional right at issue, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts ... not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. Rather, we must frame the right at issue with “a high ‘degree of specificity,' ” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015) (per curiam)), accounting for both the “specific facts at issue,” Kisela, 138 S.Ct. at 1153, and the “specific context” facing the officers, Spady, 800 F.3d at 638. Specificity is “particularly important in excessive force cases,” City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S.Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (per curiam), because “it is sometimes difficult
for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine ... will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts,” Kisela, 138 S.Ct. at 1152 (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12).Kelley v. O'Malley, No. 22-1688, 2024 WL 1208080, at *2-3 (3d Cir. Mar. 21, 2024).
Thus, accounting for the specific facts at issue in this case, it is important to note that Cruz has settled his claims against the City of Pottsville police officers who actually shot him. The only remaining defendant in this case is Trooper Rooney who did not fire a gun at Cruz but rather called out to other officers that Cruz was pointing a firearm at him and shouted “shoot, shoot, he's pointing it at me.” Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether it is clearly established that an officer who perceives himself as being under mortal threat and urges others to intervene violates the constitution if the force the other officers used is later found to be potentially excessive. In addressing the issue of whether the law was clearly established in this particular context, we are mindful that for the purposes of qualified immunity, “clearly established rights are derived either from binding Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent or from a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals.” Kelley, 2024 WL 1208080, at *4 (quoting James v. New Jersey State Police, 957 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2020)).
In the instant case, there are at least two layers of legal ambiguity which indicate that Cruz's claim against the trooper is not grounded upon clearly established law and lead us to conclude that Trooper Rooney is entitled to qualified immunity on this excessive force claim. At the outset, in our view, the question of whether it was clearly established that the officers who shot Cruz were violating his Fourth Amendment rights under the circumstances is unclear. For example, the Supreme Court found an officer did not violate a clearly established right by shooting a suspect who was armed with a knife, had not responded to at least two police commands to drop the knife, had been “acting erratically” before police arrived, and was less than six feet from a bystander. Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100 (2018). Similarly, the Third Circuit granted qualified immunity in a case where police shot a suspect who was armed with a gun, ignored police orders to drop the gun, was easily within range to shoot police, and the situation unfolded in “seconds.” James v. New Jersey State Police, 957 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2020). However, the rising tide of caselaw in other circuits has held that that it is a clear violation of the Constitution to shoot someone who is only threatening self-harm. See Gibbons v. New Jersey State Police, 969 F.3d 419, 436 n157 (3d Cir. 2020) (McKee, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). And the parties agree only that Cruz pointed the gun at himself; it is disputed whether Cruz, who was face down on the ground at the time the officers shot him, pointed his gun at the officers.
Nonetheless, in framing the issue with the high degree of specificity required by the Third Circuit, we find no analogous binding Supreme Court precedent, Third Circuit precedent, or robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals, and the plaintiff points us to none, stating that it is clearly established that an officer who perceives a suspect pointing a gun at him and shouts “shoot, shoot, he's pointing it at me”, is liable for the allegedly excessive use of force by other officers. The paucity of case law addressing the situation of the officer who perceives himself as being under mortal threat, and urges others to intervene, strongly suggest that the law is not clearly established that an officer who calls out for help in response to a perceived lethal threat is liable for the degree of force used by other officers to address that threat.
Indeed, imposing civil liability as a matter of clearly established law on the officer who calls for assistance in this fraught, fast-moving, and potentially deadly scenario is ill-advised for a host of reasons. In a setting where life or death hangs in the balance, and police are compelled to make split second decisions, the legal standard proposed by Cruz would compel an officer to either remain silent in the face of a perceived lethal threat or carefully parse his words, crafting a nuanced verbal response to immediate, grave danger, in order to avoid liability for the acts of others.
The doctrine of qualified immunity is plainly designed to enable police confronting what they perceive to be dire risks to call for help without the necessity of carefully gauging how the actions of others taken in the fog of exigency might later conceivably be viewed with the clarity of hindsight. Thus, in this unique factual setting, where Trooper Roony clearly perceived a threat to his life, and cried out “shoot, shoot, he's pointing it at me” we cannot say “the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” Kelley at *2. Accordingly, we recommend the Court hold that Trooper Rooney is entitled to qualified immunity on this excessive force claim.
D. Many of Cruz's State Law Claims Fail on the Merits and The Court Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over the Remaining State Law Claims.
In addition to his federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Cruz has attempted to fashion state-law intentional tort claims against the defendant for what he alleges was intentional misconduct on his part. Cruz asserts claims of assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and negligence against Rooney. At the outset, Cruz's claims of false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution fail for the reasons already discussed; the officers had probable cause to arrest him, and he pled guilty to the resulting charges. An essential element to any cause of action for false arrest and false imprisonment in Pennsylvania is the absence of probable cause, which we have already found existed in this case. See Basile v. Twp. of Smith, 752 F.Supp.2d 643, 665 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 537 Pa. 68, 641 A.2d 289, 295 n.2 (1994)). Moreover, like the constitutional claim of malicious prosecution, Pennsylvania law requires favorable termination of criminal proceedings initiated against a plaintiff to maintain a to maintain a claim for malicious prosecution. Id. And since it is undisputed the Cruz's proceedings did not terminate in his favor, he pled guilty to the charges, he cannot succeed on his state law malicious prosecution claim.
As to Cruz's remaining state law claims of assault, battery, and negligence, the defendant argues that he is shielded from liability by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Indeed, under Pennsylvania law, the Commonwealth, its agencies and employees enjoy broad immunity from most state-law tort claims, as the General Assembly has by statute provided that “the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.” 1 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 2310; see also Moore v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa.Cmwlth. 56, 538 A.2d 111, 115 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1988) (“In other words, if the Commonwealth is entitled to sovereign immunity under Act 152, then its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties are likewise immune.”). This grant of immunity “applies to Commonwealth employees in both their official and individual capacities, so long as the employees are ‘acting within the scope of their duties.'” Larsen v. State Employees' Ret. Sys., 553 F.Supp.2d 403, 420 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
The plaintiff's state law claims survived the defendants' motion to dismiss on this sovereign immunity argument, with the Court noting that there still existed a question as to whether Rooney acted within the scope of his employment. On this score:
Conduct of an employee is within the scope of employment if it is of a kind and nature that the employee is employed to perform; it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer; and if force is intentionally used by the employee against another, it is not unexpected by the employer.Zion v. Nassan, 283 F.R.D. 247, 266 (W.D. Pa. 2012), aff'd, 556 Fed.Appx. 103 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Natt v. Labar, 117 Pa. Cmwlth. 207, 543 A.2d 223, 225 (1988)). However, “Pennsylvania courts have recognized that an assault committed by an employee upon another person for personal reasons or in an outrageous manner is not actuated by an intent to perform the business of the employer and, as such, is not within the scope of employment.” Id. at 267 (internal quotations omitted).
In this case the video evidence shows that, within a matter of seconds, Trooper Rooney attempted to subdue Cruz, who was brandishing a weapon, and refusing orders to drop it or put his hands up. The trooper tased Cruz but perceived that he was still pointing a weapon at him and yelled for other officers to shoot. On these facts, it strains credulity to argue that the trooper was acting in any way that would have been outrageous or unexpected by his employer. Indeed, as the defendant points out, the Pennsylvania State Police issues tasers to its troopers and trains them on their use, tending to indicate that they would expect troopers to utilize these tools to subdue suspects. Further, it does not appear from the video that Trooper Rooney had the time or motivation to instruct the other officers to shoot for any personal reason, other than his perception that Cruz was pointing a gun at him. Nonetheless, recognizing that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has noted that “[a]lthough unauthorized conduct, including the intentional use of force, may still be within the scope of employment in certain circumstances, this question is for the jury to decide based on the evidence presented,” Justice v. Lombardo, 652 Pa. 588, 614, 208 A.3d 1057, 1073 (2019), and noting that, having recommended dismissal of the federal claims in this case, the Court is not obligated to apply Pennsylvania law and decide these highly problematic claims. Instead, we recommend the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's remaining state law claims.
On this score, where the jurisdiction of the federal court was premised on alleged federal claims which are found to be subject to dismissal, the proper course generally is for “the court [to] decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if-... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) (holding that when federal causes of action are dismissed, federal courts should not separately entertain pendent state claims).” Bronson v. White, No. 05-2150, 2007 WL 3033865, *13 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2007) (Caputo, J.) (adopting report and recommendation dismissing ancillary malpractice claim against dentist); see Ham v. Greer, 269 Fed.Appx. 149, 151 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Tully v. Mott Supermkts., Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 1976). (“Because the District Court appropriately dismissed [the inmate's] Bivens claims, no independent basis for federal jurisdiction remains. In addition, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to address the state law negligence claims).
Thus, in light of the fact that we recommend dismissal of all of Cruz's federal claims as well as many of his state law claims on the merits and recognizing that the only remaining state law claims would require us to apply the state law that governs sovereign immunity, we recommend the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Cruz's remaining state law claims of assault, battery, and negligence.
II. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 92), be GRANTED with regard to the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims and state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and that the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Cruz's state law claims of assault, battery, and negligence. Since we recommend all the plaintiff's remaining federal claims be dismissed, we recommend this case be terminated in federal court, without prejudice to the plaintiff pursuing his claims of assault, battery, and negligence in state court.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.