Opinion
02-25-2015
Jennifer CRUZ, etc., appellant, v. BRENTWOOD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, respondent.
Congdon, Flaherty, O'Callaghan, Reid, Donlon, Travis & Fishlinger, Uniondale, N.Y. (Michael T. Reagan of counsel), for appellant. Collado, Collado & Fiore, PLLC, Brentwood, N.Y. (Andrew J. Fiore of counsel), for respondent.
Congdon, Flaherty, O'Callaghan, Reid, Donlon, Travis & Fishlinger, Uniondale, N.Y. (Michael T. Reagan of counsel), for appellant.
Collado, Collado & Fiore, PLLC, Brentwood, N.Y. (Andrew J. Fiore of counsel), for respondent.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, SANDRA L. SGROI, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
Opinion In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Asher, J.), dated July 15, 2014, as denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging negligent supervision.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
On April 23, 2007, the plaintiff, who was then a seventh-grade student at West Middle School, in the defendant Brentwood Union Free School District (hereinafter the District), allegedly sustained personal injuries when she was assaulted by two fellow students. The plaintiff, by her mother, commenced this action against the District alleging, inter alia, negligent supervision. The District moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court, among other things, denied that branch of the District's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging negligent supervision.
“Schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” (Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44, 49, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372, 637 N.E.2d 263 ; Khosrova v. Hampton Bays Union Free Sch. Dist., 99 A.D.3d 669, 951 N.Y.S.2d 235 ). In determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow students, it must be established that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury; that is, the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated (see Brandy B. v. Eden Cent. Sch. Dist., 15 N.Y.3d 297, 302, 907 N.Y.S.2d 735, 934 N.E.2d 304 ; Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d at 49, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372, 637 N.E.2d 263 ; Jake F. v. Plainview–Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 94 A.D.3d 804, 944 N.Y.S.2d 152 ; Buchholz v. Patchogue–Medford Sch. Dist., 88 A.D.3d 843, 844, 931 N.Y.S.2d 113 ).
Here, in support of that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging negligent supervision, the District failed to establish, prima facie, that the alleged assault was an unforeseeable act or that it had no actual or constructive notice of prior conduct similar to the subject incident (see Khosrova v. Hampton Bays Union Free Sch. Dist., 99 A.D.3d at 671, 951 N.Y.S.2d 235 ; Luciano v. Our Lady of Sorrows School, 79 A.D.3d 705, 911 N.Y.S.2d 911 ; Smith v. Poughkeepsie City Sch. Dist., 41 A.D.3d 579, 580–581, 839 N.Y.S.2d 99 ). Since the District failed to meet its prima facie burden, we need not consider the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642 ).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the District's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging negligent supervision.