Opinion
No. 05-03-00341-CV.
Opinion issued September 12, 2003.
Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 0003880-E.
DISMISSED.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, WRIGHT, and BRIDGES.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Baltasar D. Cruz brings this appeal, attempting to challenge the trial judge's judgment in this case. In eight issues, Cruz generally contends (i) the trial court clerk did not have authority to file the motion to replace guardian ad litem filed by Troutman Transportation, L.C. and Kathleen Sharrow, (ii) the trial judge abused his discretion in hearing and granting the motion, and (iii) Cruz is entitled to payment of his guardian ad litem fees and his costs and expenses of appeal. We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Jesus Beza, Sr. and Diana Beza, individually and as next friends of their son, Jesus Beza, Jr., sued Troutman and Sharrow for negligence. On July 11, 2002, Troutman and Sharrow filed a motion for appointment of guardian ad litem for the son and, approximately two weeks later, Cruz was appointed guardian ad litem. In a motion filed November 14, 2002, Troutman and Sharrow requested Cruz be replaced as guardian ad litem. Cruz filed a forty-eight page motion responding to the November 14 allegations and seeking sanctions against both Troutman and Sharrow. Following a hearing on December 19, 2002, the trial judge signed an order removing Cruz as guardian ad litem. On February 20, 2003, the trial judge denied Cruz's motion for sanctions. Cruz did not intervene in the case and, on March 20, 2003, the trial judge signed the final judgment.
Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction and cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel at any stage of a proceeding. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-47 (Tex. 1993). Standing pertains to a person's justiciable interest in a suit. Roman Forest Pub. Util. Dist. v. McCorkle, 999 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1999, pet. denied). Generally, appeal is available only to parties of record. Motor Vehicle Bd. of the Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. El Paso Indep. Auto. Dealers Assoc., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 108, 110 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam); Gulistan Carpet, Inc. v. Porter, 4 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.); Dear v. Russo, 973 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.). Thus, to challenge a trial court's judgment on appeal, the person filing the appeal must have been a party to the trial court action. See Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tex. 1965) (stating rule that "only parties to the record may exercise [the right of appeal]"); United Oil Minerals, Inc. v. Costilla Energy, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. dism'd) ("Once a final judgment has been entered, only parties of record may exercise the right of appeal."); see also Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (generally, only parties to action have standing to appeal; non-party may seek intervention in action for purposes of appealing final judgment).
In this case, Cruz was appointed guardian ad litem in July 2002 but was removed four months later. Thereafter, he did not file an intervention. When the trial judge rendered final judgment on March 20, 2003, Cruz was not a party to the case. The judgment makes no mention of or disposition affecting Cruz. Because Cruz was not a party to this case, he was not a party to the judgment and lacks standing to appeal the final judgment. See Preston v. Am. Eagle Ins. Co., 948 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, no writ) (appellants who were not parties to final judgment may not exercise right of appeal).
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.