Opinion
No. 05-16-01434-CR
01-03-2018
ISSAC TERMAINE CROW, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F16-52560-R
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Myers, and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Myers
The State charged appellant Issac Termaine Crow with causing bodily injury to a child 14 years of age or younger, a third degree felony offense enhanced to a second degree felony by one prior felony conviction. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.42(a), 22.04(a)(3), (c)(1), (f). Appellant pleaded not guilty and the case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict of guilty. The jury found the enhancement paragraph true and assessed punishment at 13 years' imprisonment. In three issues, appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to prove volitional conduct, to establish that he acted knowingly or intentionally, and to establish that he caused the complainant to strike his car. We affirm.
DISCUSSION
1. Volitional Conduct
In his first issue, appellant argues the State failed to prove "volitional conduct." More specifically, appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to convict him "because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun and electrical shock did not cause [him] to 'let go' of [I.C.]," and, "[m]oreover, the State failed to disprove that one of the officers bumped Appellant's arm, or an officer otherwise caused Appellant to have an involuntary movement resulting in the harm to [I.C.]."
The indictment alleged that appellant, on or about February 28, 2016, in Dallas County, Texas, intentionally and knowingly caused bodily injury to I.C., a child 14 years of age or younger, by striking him against a car. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(3), (c)(1), (f). Section 6.01(a) of the penal code requires a voluntary, i.e., volitional, act as an element of guilt. See id. § 6.01(a) ("A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession."); Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The issue of the voluntariness of one's conduct or bodily movements is separate from the issue of one's mental state. Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166.
"Voluntariness," within the meaning of Section 6.01(a), refers only to one's own physical body moments. If those physical movements are the nonvolitional result of someone else's act, are set in motion by some independent non-human force, are caused by a physical reflex or convulsion, or are the product of unconsciousness, hypnosis or other nonvolitional impetus, that movement is not voluntary.Rogers v. State, 105 S.W.3d 630, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (footnotes omitted). "[A] voluntary act that comprised a portion of the commission of the offense is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Section 6.01(a), even if that voluntary act was accidental or the consequences of that act were unintended." Farmer v. State, 411 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
In determining whether the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a factfinder could have found the essential elements of the charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The factfinder must resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). We presume the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We also defer to the factfinder's evaluation of the credibility and weight of the evidence. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
The evidence showed that appellant came into contact with Dallas police officers Joshua Crenshaw and Brandon Anderson on two occasions during the evening of February 28, 2016. Both encounters occurred at the Dallas apartment where appellant's girlfriend, Gwendolyn Robinson, lived with their two-month-old son, I.C. On the first occasion, the officers gave appellant a criminal trespass warning and he left the premises.
Later that evening, at around 10:00 p.m., Officer Crenshaw noticed another disturbance call from the same address. Robinson had called 911 and reported that appellant forced his way into the apartment, choked her, tried to kill her, and took their baby. Concerned about the child's safety, Crenshaw notified dispatch that he and Anderson would handle the call.
Robinson frantically signaled the officers as they drove through the apartment complex's parking lot, searching for appellant. She yelled that appellant had choked her and ran off with the infant. She did not know where he had gone. Then, as Officer Crenshaw questioned Robinson, appellant suddenly appeared on the other side of the patrol car holding the infant in his arms and yelling at Robinson. He was saying, "Why are you lying, why are you lying?" The officers got out of the squad car and ran towards appellant, yelling at him to "put the baby down, put the baby down." Appellant ran towards the open driver's side door of a nearby white car. Trying to stop appellant from getting into the car with the child, Anderson got behind appellant and grabbed a bag appellant had draped over his shoulder. Shouting "get off me, man," appellant turned and pushed Anderson away with his left hand while holding the child in his right arm. Appellant got in the car still holding I.C. in his right arm. Appellant held the child in his right arm over the right front passenger side of the vehicle while trying to fend off the officers with his left arm. Crenshaw pulled his gun and pointed it at appellant, repeatedly telling him to "put the baby down." During the struggle, appellant briefly upended I.C., holding him upside down by one foot while swinging him around inside the vehicle. The video from Officer Crenshaw's body camera, admitted into evidence and played for the jury, is not clear regarding precisely what happened to I.C., but it appears to show him striking the center console area before being dropped by appellant. Officer Anderson tased appellant, which momentarily disabled him and allowed Crenshaw to pull appellant from the vehicle and take him into custody. Anderson can be heard on the video yelling, "Get the baby. Get the baby." It is not clear from the video whether appellant dropped the child before or after he was tased.
When Robinson retrieved I.C. from the driver's side of the car, the child was bleeding from a cut to his finger and blood from the cut was smeared across Robinson's chest and on the infant's blanket. Officer Crenshaw photographed I.C.'s bloody finger, Robinson's chest, and the blood-stained blanket. He photographed bruises, scratches, and abrasions on Robinson's neck, injuries she said she sustained when appellant held her down and choked her with a coat hanger.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is sufficient evidence in this record for the jury to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant's voluntary actions caused I.C.'s injury. The struggle during which I.C. was injured was brought about by appellant's actions —e.g., forcing his way into Robinson's apartment, taking the child, ignoring the officers' repeated warnings to put the child down, attempting to fend off the officers with one arm while holding the child in the other--and the possibility that a momentary loss of control may have caused appellant to drop I.C. did not relieve him of the culpability for the offense. The jury could have rationally found that appellant engaged in a voluntary act during the commission of the offense that resulted in I.C. being injured, whether the injury occurred when appellant swung I.C. around inside the car or when appellant dropped him. See Rogers, 105 S.W.3d at 638 ("[T]he 'voluntary act' requirement does not necessarily go to the ultimate act (e.g., pulling the trigger), but only that criminal responsibility for the harm must 'include an act' that is voluntary (e.g., pulling the gun, pointing the gun, or cocking the hammer."); Rollins v. State, No. 01-14-00768-CR, 2016 WL 635218, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 11, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op, not designated for publication) ("If a defendant engages in a voluntary act and has the required mental state . . . his conduct is not rendered involuntary simply because his conduct also includes an involuntary act."). We overrule appellant's first issue.
2. State of Mind
In his second issue, appellant contends the State failed to prove "state of mind." He argues the evidence is insufficient to establish that he acted knowingly or intentionally, and he contends the cumulative force of the evidence is insufficient to support a conclusion that he consciously desired to harm I.C. or was reasonably certain that harm would have resulted.
"Injury to a child is a result-oriented offense requiring a mental state that relates not to the specific conduct but to the result of that conduct." Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 6.02(a); 6.03. A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a). A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b).
To convict appellant of causing bodily injury to the child, the State had to prove appellant caused I.C.'s injuries with the requisite criminal intent, i.e., intentionally or knowingly. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN § 22.04(a)(3), (f); Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. Direct evidence of the required culpable mental state was not required. See Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The jury could infer intent from any facts which tend to prove its existence, including the acts, words, and conduct of the accused, the method of committing the crime, and from the nature of the wounds inflicted on the victim. Id. The jury could also infer knowledge from such evidence. Id.
The jury in this case was free to determine appellant's intent from his actions and words as shown by the evidence, including the video from Officer Crenshaw's body camera. The manner in which appellant held I.C., at that time a two-month-old infant, before getting in the car and attempting to flee indicates he was aware of the standard of care when holding an infant. The jury could have concluded that appellant's decision to hold onto the infant after getting in the car was a calculated decision to evade being pulled from the car, arrested, or tased, or shot. The jury could have likewise concluded that appellant intentionally put I.C. in a position to be injured in order to protect himself from injury and/or to facilitate escape. The jury could have similarly determined that appellant was aware that engaging in a struggle with the police with one arm while holding a two-month-old infant in the other and swinging the child around inside the car as he did so was reasonably certain to cause injury to the child. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to I.C. We overrule appellant's second issue.
3. Manner Alleged
In his third issue, appellant argues the State failed to prove the "manner alleged." He argues the evidence is insufficient to establish that he caused I.C. to strike his car, and he contends the evidence is insufficient to prove I.C. sustained the injury to his finger or hand as a result of being struck by appellant against the interior of the car.
The Texas Penal Code broadly defines "bodily injury" as "physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(8). "Any physical pain, however minor, will suffice to establish bodily injury." Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). "A fact finder may infer that a victim actually felt or suffered physical pain because people of common intelligence understand pain and some of the natural causes of it." Id. The essential element or focus of section 22.04 is the result of the defendant's conduct and not the possible combinations of conduct that cause the result. Jefferson v. State, 189 S.W.3d. 305, 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also Alvarado v. State, 704 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
The evidence shows that appellant choked Robinson before grabbing I.C. and attempting to flee. Officer Crenshaw testified that he did not see any major injuries on Robinson when they first arrived, and the video from Crenshaw's body camera does not show any blood on Robinson's chest when Crenshaw is talking to her shortly after arriving on the scene. But the video does show appellant carrying the child over to the car, getting in, and then swinging the infant around inside the vehicle before dropping him. I.C. was bleeding from a cut to his finger after he was removed from the car and there was blood on Robinson's chest after she removed the child from the car. The jury could have reasonably concluded I.C. was not bleeding before appellant attempted to flee with him and that the child sustained the injury either when appellant was swinging him around inside the car or when he dropped him. We again conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to I.C. We overrule appellant's third issue.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
/Lana Myers/
LANA MYERS
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. 47
161434F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F16-52560-R.
Opinion delivered by Justice Myers. Justices Francis and Whitehill participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 3rd day of January, 2018.