Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2196-13T4 DOCKET NO. A-5467-13T4
11-25-2015
DIANA J. CRONIN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. WILLIAM J. CRONIN, Defendant-Appellant.
Bettina E. Munson argued the cause for appellant (Lomurro, Munson, Comer, Brown & Schottland and Davison, Eastman & Muñoz, P.A., attorneys; Ms. Munson, of counsel; Carrie A. Lumi, on the briefs). Kristin S. Pallonetti argued the cause for respondent (The Law Office of Steven P. Monaghan L.L.C., attorneys; Ms. Pallonetti and Steven P. Monaghan, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Simonelli and Carroll. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, Docket No. FM-13-573-10. Bettina E. Munson argued the cause for appellant (Lomurro, Munson, Comer, Brown & Schottland and Davison, Eastman & Muñoz, P.A., attorneys; Ms. Munson, of counsel; Carrie A. Lumi, on the briefs). Kristin S. Pallonetti argued the cause for respondent (The Law Office of Steven P. Monaghan L.L.C., attorneys; Ms. Pallonetti and Steven P. Monaghan, on the brief). PER CURIAM
In these appeals, calendared back-to-back and consolidated for purposes of our opinion, we review a series of Family Part orders that (1) denied two post-judgment motions filed by defendant William J. Cronin to reduce his alimony and child support obligations; and (2) determined that he had the ability to pay those obligations. Defendant argues, among other things, that both motion judges erred in finding that he failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of changed circumstances.
This matter is before us a second time. Initially, on August 20, 2012, the Family Part entered two orders that compelled defendant to pay alimony arrears of $11,500, authorized the issuance of a bench warrant should he miss two support payments, and denied his motion to reduce his alimony and child support obligations. Defendant appealed the August 20, 2012 orders, and in an unpublished opinion we remanded the case to the trial court for more detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Cronin v. Cronin, No. A-0269-12 (App. Div. Oct. 17, 2013). We also instructed that, "[u]pon further review, should the court determine that defendant has proven a prima facie case of changed circumstances, it may order a period of discovery and, if warranted, a plenary hearing." Cronin, supra, slip op. at 13.
To lend context to the ensuing events that culminated in the present appeals, we recite the factual background and procedural history set forth in our prior opinion:
The parties were married in March 2003 and divorced on May 24, 2011. They have two
minor children. The judgment of divorce (JOD) incorporated the parties' marital settlement agreement (MSA) bearing the same date. The MSA required defendant to pay plaintiff $12,000 per month limited duration alimony for four years, and $2000 per month child support. The MSA specifically noted that defendant's alimony and child support obligations were based on an average gross income of $504,000 per year, which was defendant's average annual income from 2005 through 2007, as determined by a team of forensic accountants engaged by the parties during the divorce litigation. Income was imputed to plaintiff in the amount of $35,000 per year.
During the divorce proceedings, it was defendant's position that his income had declined since 2007. At the May 24, 2011, uncontested divorce hearing, defendant testified that his 2010 income tax return showed "substantially reduced earnings." He "expressed serious concerns about [his] ability to meet his financial obligation pursuant to [the MSA] . . . alimony [and] child support." Paragraph 4.25 of the MSA indicated that defendant had funded a $252,000 college savings plan for the children, and the parties "acknowledge[d] that [defendant] may have to borrow against it to meet his alimony and child support obligation." Consistent therewith, defendant testified at the divorce hearing that "[he] may have to use assets to meet [his] support obligation in the event that [his] business suffers."
At the hearing, plaintiff's counsel sought to make clear that defendant "has asserted the decrease in [in]come for 2010 [and] he has considered that decrease in income in entering into this agreement," even though the MSA utilized the period 2005-2007 as the baseline for establishing his support obligation. When defendant
expressed some uncertainty, the judge suggested that defendant take a few minutes to review the terms of the MSA with his attorney. After doing so, and after defendant indicated that he understood, his attorney stated: "I'm just a little concerned, that my client has to understand that — and I want the record to reflect that he is not waiving his right to come back in pursuant to Lepis ."
Barely a year after the divorce, in July 2012, plaintiff filed a motion seeking, among other things, to compel defendant to pay alimony arrears of $11,500, and to authorize the issuance of a bench warrant should defendant miss two support payments. Plaintiff also sought an award of counsel fees, pursuant to the express terms of the MSA. In response, defendant filed a cross-motion seeking to decrease his alimony obligation to $2500 per month, to recalculate child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines, and to compel plaintiff to produce her bank statements and records.
Defendant owns two businesses, Shore Insulation, Inc., and Commercial Thermal Solutions, Inc. In support of his cross-motion, defendant alleged that his 2005-2007 baseline gross income was no longer an accurate depiction of his current income from those businesses. Essentially defendant argued that, over the last three years, he earned as much as $400,000 less than the $504,000 gross income used to calculate his support obligation. He alleged that the economy had declined over the last three years, and that his businesses had suffered due to increased costs. Specifically, defendant maintained that he "must now advertise and attend trade
shows," and that "[c]osts of materials have increased and delivery companies now charge surcharges due to fuel costs." Also, the Environmental Protection Agency had issued new regulations, requiring him to create new advertising materials, and market to new customers. Profits had decreased, as the businesses had "been forced to cut our prices by [fifteen-to-twenty percent] to keep up with our competitors." Defendant further represented that his 2009 contract with the military had ended, and consequently his 2011 military sales were reduced from $717,000 to $50,000. He alleged that the businesses had $515,164 in inventory that was not being utilized, accounts receivable of $226,935 that were uncollected, and liabilities of approximately $641,000. He was also forced to take out a line of credit with PNC Bank to "keep Shore Insulation afloat."
As a result of the businesses' decline, defendant stated that he no longer took a paycheck from Shore Insulation, and that his monthly income was now only $4623, which was inadequate to meet his $14,000 monthly support obligation. He was also forced to withdraw approximately $200,000 from the children's college savings plan to meet his support obligations, although he promised to "take full responsibility for sending them to college in the future." Defendant resides with his mother, in an effort to reduce costs.
In opposing defendant's application, plaintiff maintained that defendant failed to demonstrate any changed circumstances. Plaintiff argued that the circumstances cited by defendant existed when the 2011 JOD was entered. Plaintiff disputed defendant's income figures, referring to them as "self-prepared style forensic accounting," and noted that defendant "claims his net income (of over $5 million in total sales) is now
down to $4623 per month . . . . This means that [defendant's] income is approximately [one percent] of his total sales." She further contended that the businesses' profit and loss statements reflected unusually high advertising expenses, depreciation, health insurance costs, and payroll expenses; in short, expenses that defendant as owner of the companies was in a position to manipulate. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant recently rented a new office, and drives a 2012 BMW 650i convertible.
In support of his cross-motion, defendant submitted his 2009-2010 joint tax returns, his 2011 tax return, 2011-2012 profit and loss statements for the businesses, and his 2009 and 2012 Case Information Statements (CIS). In reply, plaintiff submitted the 2005-2007 comparative cash flow analysis figures, her CIS income figures, comparative cash flow analysis reports from the three forensic accountants retained during the divorce action, and a cash flow analysis as of December 31, 2010, prepared by one of the accountants.
[Cronin, supra, slip op. at 2-7.]
Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980).
On remand, the trial court heard oral argument and again denied defendant's cross-motion to reduce his support obligations. In his ten-page statement of reasons, the judge found that the proofs submitted by defendant did not establish that his circumstances were either "substantially changed" or "permanent and not temporary."
The judge examined defendant's tax returns and business records and concluded that defendant's decline in income was already present when the judge signed the MSA in May 2011. He found that defendant's "circumstances remained fairly stable despite the moderate drop in his gross income," and that defendant's alleged decline in business income was not substantial enough to warrant modification. In determining that any decline was not sufficiently permanent to warrant modification, the judge cited the "cyclical" nature of defendant's businesses and their dependence on the commercial real estate and construction markets. The judge also found significant that defendant drives a "luxury sports car," which "retails for over $80,000," and that he "recently rented new space for his business in a costly section of Spring Lake." In short, "the [c]ourt [was] unconvinced that the businesses are in the dire [straits] alleged by [] [d]efendant."
The judge entered an order memorializing his written decision on December 3, 2013. Defendant again appeals from that order denying his initial modification request.
In April 2013, while defendant's first appeal that resulted in the remand was pending, he was arrested for having missed two support payments. On July 23, 2013, defendant filed a motion for an ability-to-pay hearing. Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for enforcement of the parties' MSA.
On August 2, 2013, a different Family Part judge stayed enforcement of the prior alimony and child support orders pending a testimonial ability-to-pay hearing. The judge also ordered a period of discovery. In the interim, defendant was required to pay $3200 per month via wage garnishment. The order further provided that "[d]efendant's arrears shall continue to accrue." This second judge subsequently conducted the ability-to-pay hearing over five non-consecutive days between February 18 and June 4, 2014. Defendant testified at the evidentiary hearing, as did his forensic accountant, John W. "Ted" Ibex, and Atul Malhorta, the accountant who prepares defendant's business and personal income tax returns.
Also, on February 18, 2014, while defendant's appeal from the December 3, 2013 order was pending, we granted defendant's motion for a limited remand that sought "to modify his alimony and child support obligations based upon his current financial circumstances and to present [an] expert report" that the first motion judge "did not consider" in the initial remand. As a result, defendant filed a second motion in the trial court in which he sought to reduce alimony to $789 per month and child support to $258 per month. The motion was assigned to the same judge who was then conducting the evidentiary ability-to-pay hearing.
On June 17, 2014, the judge issued an oral opinion finding that defendant had the ability to pay his full alimony and child support obligations. Specifically, she noted that defendant's
lifestyle simply doesn't comport with what he claims. And I would cite to a review of his Citibank credit card, and this was brought out on cross examination. On November 16[], 2011[,] defendant spent over $1,800 for Fendi watches then two days later over $400 for Fendi watches. There's speed dating on here, there's payments [] to his law firm.
Again, staying at hotels, spending over $200 for liquor in April of 2012. And there is payment to Nordstrom, a match.com, speeddating.com. There is the payment of [] almost $2,000 to the NRA, payments to Kohl's over $380,000, payments to Dicks Sporting Goods, Joseph A Bank, bicycles and other such issues.
The judge concluded that she
did not find defendant to be a particularly compelling witness for his own case or his claims that he cannot pay his court ordered support. At the time [] defendant first filed his motion for modification in 2012 defendant had . . . over $145,000 in the children's college funds that were suppose[d] to be used according to the [MSA] to . . . pay his support.
. . . .
Defendant has paid hundreds of thousands of dollars on his credit cards and he receives $36,000 from his mother and $9,000 from a friend and he immediately uses that to his own benefit to reduce his credit card balance basically to zero and paid [] $24,000 off of his credit card.
Unfortunately this [c]ourt finds that defendant never wanted to pay his alimony. He pays his child support or attempts to pay child support because he will not be a sympathetic litigant if he does not pay for his children.
But with respect to plaintiff that's simply a different story. She's relegated to receiving $500 of her $12,000 alimony amount. Defendant is paying her 4.16 percent on [his] obligation or 4.16 cents per dollar on her alimony award. I do not find defendant to be a credible witness or that it is credible that he cannot pay his support.
[(Emphasis added).]
In addition to finding that defendant was not credible, the judge also found that Ibex's testimony and report were not compelling. The judge observed that "all [Ibex] did was to chronicle a decline in defendant's business based on information defendant had provided him" and that Ibex "did not examine defendant's personal bank statements or his business or personal credit cards."
On June 27, the judge issued orders memorializing her decision in the ability-to-pay hearing and denying defendant's second motion to reduce his support obligations. In a thirteen-page written statement of reasons, the judge concluded that "there [was] no basis to reduce the alimony" as defendant had failed to establish a prima facie showing of changed circumstances. The judge also granted plaintiff's request to enforce the MSA and ordered defendant to pay $118,413.74 in alimony arrears and counsel fees of $5,282.50.
In denying defendant's second modification motion, the judge specifically incorporated her findings of fact and credibility assessments from the ability-to-pay hearing. The judge reiterated that defendant "was not a credible witness" and that Ibex's report was not "compelling" because he did not examine defendant's business and personal checking accounts and credit card statements or review the several forensic accountants' reports generated at the time of the parties' divorce.
The judge found that defendant was "manipulating his income and his ability to pay support." The judge relied on her conclusion from the ability-to-pay hearing that defendant's advertising expenses "have increased to an inordinate amount exceeding the average of his advertising budget in the past." She observed that defendant was now renting office space, whereas he had not done so in the past. The judge also found it troubling that defendant had increased the depreciation amounts for his businesses in 2010 and 2011, without which the loss for Commercial Thermal "would have been essentially eliminated." The judge found "no evidence" that "[defendant] has attempted to improve his financial situation" or that any decline in the gross sales of defendant's businesses was permanent.
The judge further cited various personal recurring monthly expenditures that defendant charged to his two businesses, including his $3000 monthly rent, $1700 monthly car lease payment, and various media subscriptions, such as Xbox and Netflix. The judge found that such expenditures should have been imputed to defendant's income. The judge also viewed defendant's depletion of the children's college fund for business purposes and his failure to pay his full $14,000 monthly support obligation in 2012 and 2013, respectively, as examples of defendant's "bad faith."
Defendant now appeals: (1) the December 3, 2013 order that denied his initial cross-motion to reduce his support obligations due to changed circumstances; (2) the June 27, 2014 companion orders that denied his second motion to reduce his support obligations, entered judgment against him in the amount of $118,413.74 for alimony arrears, and awarded plaintiff counsel fees of $5282.50; and (3) the June 27, 2014 order that found defendant has the ability to pay his support obligations and awarded plaintiff counsel fees and costs of $14,935.
On appeal, defendant argues that the December 3, 2013 order "is only a perpetuation of the errors underlying the August 20, 2012 companion [o]rders that were reversed and remanded by this [c]ourt." He asserts that his proofs were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances and that the first motion judge erred in failing to conduct a plenary hearing or address all pertinent issues.
Defendant raises similar arguments with respect to the June 27, 2014 companion orders. He further contends that the second judge, in considering defendant's claim of changed circumstances, improperly relied on credibility determinations she made during the ability-to-pay hearing. With respect to defendant's ability to pay, defendant argues that the judge erred in failing to make a specific finding as to his present income. Defendant also argues that the second judge exhibited a bias against him and his expert, Ibex, and made improper references to settlement. These errors, defendant argues, require that the case be heard before a different judge on remand. Finally, defendant challenges the counsel fees and costs awarded to plaintiff in the June 27, 2014 orders on the ground that the court failed to conduct the proper analysis in determining those awards.
Plaintiff was awarded $14,935 in the ability-to-pay matter, and $5,282.50 in the companion orders denying defendant's second modification motion and granting plaintiff's motion to enforce the MSA. --------
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following comments.
We begin with a review of the well-settled principles that guide our analysis. Alimony and child-support "may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. To make such a modification, a showing of "changed circumstances" is required. Lepis, supra, 83 N.J. at 146; see also Weishaus v. Weishaus, 180 N.J. 131, 140-41 (2004).
Temporary or anticipated circumstances do not warrant modification. Lepis, supra, 83 N.J. at 151. Moreover, "[t]he party seeking modification has the burden of showing such 'changed circumstances' as would warrant relief from the support or maintenance provisions involved." Id. at 157.
To determine whether there is a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, a judge must consider the terms of the order at issue and compare the facts as they were when that order was entered with the facts as they are at the time of the motion. Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J. Super. 108, 129 (App. Div. 2009), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 435 (2010). Once a prima facie case has been made and financial disclosures have been evaluated, "the court must decide whether to hold a hearing." Lepis, supra, 83 N.J. at 159. A trial judge has the discretion to decide the motion exclusively on the papers. Faucett, supra, 411 N.J. Super. at 128; Shaw v. Shaw, 138 N.J. Super. 436, 440 (App. Div. 1976). "It is only where the affidavits show that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact, and that the trial judge determines that a plenary hearing would be helpful in deciding such factual issues, that a plenary hearing is required." Shaw, supra, 138 N.J. Super. at 440.
Our scope of review of the trial court's decision is limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). "Whether an alimony obligation should be modified based upon a claim of changed circumstances rests within a Family Part judge's sound discretion." Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006); see also Storey v. Storey, 373 N.J. Super. 464, 470 (App. Div. 2004). Each individual motion for modification is particularized to the facts of that case, and "the appellate court must give due recognition to the wide discretion which our law rightly affords to the trial judges who deal with these matters." Larbig, supra, 384 N.J. Super. at 21 (quoting Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 355 (1956)). We will not disturb the trial court's decision on support obligations unless we
conclude that the trial court clearly abused its discretion, failed to consider all of the controlling legal principles, or must otherwise be well satisfied that the findings were mistaken or that the determination could not reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record after considering the proofs as a whole.
[Heinl v. Heinl, 287 N.J. Super. 337, 345 (App. Div. 1996).]
We start with the issues presented by the first remand. We conclude that, in reviewing defendant's initial cross-motion to reduce his alimony and child support obligations, the first judge properly found that no material change of circumstances had occurred that would warrant modification. All of the alleged "changed circumstances" raised by defendant in his initial cross-motion existed at the time the parties signed their MSA in May 2011. Defendant was well aware of the decline in his business income when he agreed to be bound by the terms of the MSA. Further, the parties had provided for the possibility that defendant's diminishing income would require him to use other funds to meet his support obligations by including such a provision in the MSA.
The judge also properly found that the claimed decrease in defendant's income was not of sufficient duration to establish that the reduction was permanent. As noted, defendant first sought to reduce his support obligation in July 2012, approximately fourteen months after the MSA was signed and the JOD entered. In Larbig, supra, 384 N.J. Super. at 22-23, an ex-husband's motion that was filed only twenty months after the entry of the judgment of divorce did not establish a permanent change of circumstances warranting modification. Similar to the present case, the ex-husband in Larbig argued that his business had "fallen on hard times," while the ex-wife argued that those circumstances were known at the time of the divorce action and that the parties' property settlement agreement had provided for such a downturn. Id. at 22.
Because defendant here is self-employed, he is able to control certain aspects of the business, such as whether to pay himself a salary or not, and the amount of that salary. In Larbig, we recognized that the changes in income that defendant alleges should be viewed "more expansively," i.e. over an even longer period of time than might be appropriate for a W-2 earner. See id. at 23. A Family Part judge has wide discretion to determine how long a changed circumstance must last in order to be considered permanent. Ibid. On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion.
Regarding defendant's argument that a plenary hearing was required, the determining factor is "whether the movant has made a prima facie showing that a plenary hearing is necessary." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 106 (App. Div. 2007). This rule was crafted with an eye to judicial economy, given that "practically every dispute in the matrimonial motion practice involves a factual dispute of some nature." Klipstein v. Zalewski, 230 N.J. Super. 567, 576 (Ch. Div. 1988). "An inflexible rule requiring a plenary hearing" on every matrimonial application "would impede the sound administration of justice, impose an intolerable burden upon our trial judges, and place an undue financial burden upon the litigants." Shaw, supra, 138 N.J. Super. at 440. Since we conclude that defendant failed to establish a prima facie showing of changed circumstances or that any changed circumstances were permanent, a plenary hearing to review defendant's initial modification application was not required.
In any event, we further conclude that any error in failing to conduct a plenary hearing on defendant's initial application was harmless. Defendant applied for, and was granted, an ability-to-pay hearing along with a period of discovery. Defendant was then afforded a full evidentiary hearing at which he testified, along with his forensic accountant and his business and personal accountant. A second judge, who heard the testimony and carefully reviewed voluminous financial documentation entered into evidence at the hearing, similarly concluded that defendant failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances, and that he had the ability to pay his full support obligations.
The judge found that defendant's testimony at the ability-to-pay hearing was not credible. "[I]n reviewing the factual findings and conclusions of a trial judge, we are obliged to accord deference to the trial court's credibility determination[s] and the judge's 'feel of the case' based upon his or her opportunity to see and hear the witnesses." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 88 (App. Div. 2006), certif. denied, 190 N.J. 257 (2007). The judge also recognized shortcomings in Ibex's expert forensic analysis, which she articulated as her basis for discounting it. A trial court is free to accept or reject the testimony of either side's expert, in full or in part. Brown v. Brown, 348 N.J. Super. 466, 478 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 193 (2002). We discern no basis to disturb the court's ultimate conclusion that defendant was manipulating his income in order to avoid his support obligations, which is supported by ample evidence in the record.
Defendant further argues that the judge improperly applied the credibility findings she made at the ability-to-pay hearing to her analysis of the merits of defendant's second Lepis application. To be sure, the purpose of an ability-to-pay hearing is different from that of a plenary hearing on a modification application. Schochet v. Schochet, 435 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 2014). We have articulated this distinction as follows:
[t]he Rule 1:10-3 hearing is not a plenary hearing to decide the appropriate amount of support an obligor should pay. That amount has been determined, either by the court following a trial or post-judgment motion, or by the parties themselves. The hearing is also not a substitute for an appeal or a motion to modify the obligation based on changed circumstances. The hearing comes about because an obligor has failed to comply with an order. The objective of the hearing is simply to determine whether that failure was excusable or willful, i.e., the obligor was able to pay and did not. It does not establish the future obligation of the party paying support.
[Ibid.]
Nevertheless, there was little to be gained in conducting a second plenary hearing on defendant's modification application. Defendant was permitted to engage in discovery prior to the ability-to-pay hearing. At that hearing, defendant testified and presented an expert forensic accountant along with his personal accountant. He also presented volumes of financial information, including tax returns and profit and loss statements, which was the same evidence he relied on to support his modification motion. Because the modification application was assigned to the same judge and the matters then proceeded contemporaneously, the judge was entitled to rely on her first-hand observations from the ability-to-pay hearing to inform her analysis of defendant's modification application.
We are also satisfied that, in assessing counsel fees, the judge properly relied on the fee-shifting provision that the parties expressly included in their MSA following extensive and protracted negotiations. The parties agreed as follows:
8.1 Counsel and Expert Fees. Each party shall pay for his or her own counsel fees in connection with the negotiation, preparation, review and execution of the within agreement and for any legal services rendered to either party in connection with the subsequent entry of a judgment terminating the marriage by a [c]ourt of competent jurisdiction . . . .
Should either party willfully fail to abide by the terms of this Agreement, the defaulting party will indemnify the other for all reasonable expenses and costs, including attorneys' fees incurred in successfully enforcing this Agreement. This provision is intended to be enforced as a freely bargained for contractual agreement, and a counsel fee claim for reimbursement pursuant to this provision is not intended to and shall not be subject to the Court's discretion under R. 4:42-9(a).
[(Emphasis added).]
"[T]he award of counsel fees and costs in a matrimonial action rests in the discretion of the court." Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 233 (1971). Moreover, a trial court's determination regarding the award of counsel fees "will be disturbed only on the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion." Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001).
We discern no reason to disturb the judge's award of counsel fees. The judge examined the parties' financial circumstances and also noted examples of defendant's bad faith in failing to honor his obligations under the MSA. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the quantum of fees awarded plaintiff was either unfair or unreasonable. Moreover, the counsel fee award effectuated the parties' intent under §8.1 of the MSA. Therefore, we are convinced that the court's decision was not an abuse of discretion.
Finally, defendant argues that the second judge displayed such animus that, in the future, the case should be assigned to another judge. We agree that the judge's remarks about defendant's selection of an expert forensic accountant were unfortunate. We nonetheless conclude, however, that her ultimate analysis of the limited weight to be accorded the expert's testimony and report finds valid support in the record. After carefully reviewing the entire record, we find no evidence of bias. Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 318 (App. Div. 2008). Certainly, a core function of any judge is to assess a party's credibility. "Bias cannot be inferred from adverse rulings against a party." Ibid. (citing Matthews v. Deane, 196 N.J. Super. 441, 444-47 (Ch. Div. 1984)). We are confident the judge will decide the matter in a completely fair and unbiased manner if again assigned this case in the future.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION